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Abstract.
Equity is a major policy objective in the Spanish health care system, both at 
national and regional levels. Partly in consequence, thre have been many 
studies of inequalities in health and health care in Spain. However, given the 
decentralisation process of health care such research efforts should better be 
addressed at the appropriate level of policy-making, which in the case of Spain 
are largely the regions enjoying full competencies such as Catalonia. The 
objectives of this research were to study the extent to which the health system 
in Catalonia delivered services according to need criteria and, further, to find 
patterns of inequality in the utilisation of health care services by types of care.
The 1994 Catalan Health Survey (15,000 interviews) has been used to assess 
whether the goal of equal treatment for equal need has been achieved, taking 
equal treatment as equal expenditure, and equal need as equal ill-health and 
self-reported morbidity. Concentration curves, Le Grand and Collins and Klein 
indices of inequality have been used together with logistic regressions models 
of the determinants of utilisation.
The results suggest that, to a large extent Catalonia has achieved equity in the 
provision of health care overall. Despite this, different patterns of utilisation of 
services according to primary care, outpatient care and inpatient care have 
emerged. Utilisation of primary care is marked, by infants and old age groups, 
by women, and low income groups and education levels. Out-patient care 
utilisation is dominated by intermediate age groups, particularly among 
women, and high income groups and education levels. Finally, inpatient care, 
representing almost half of the health care budget, has not shown income nor 
education as significant variables, pointing to medical need as the variable that 
could best explain utilisation. In all three patterns described it is need, in terms 
of acute sickness, lim iting chronic illness and self-perceived health status,
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which stand out as significant predictors of utilisation. Among many other 
issues, this research has disclosed at a regional level of analysis that overall 
equitable systems may co-exist with inequalities in more specific services and 
types of care.
Policy implications derived from this study aim at better targeting the causes of 
inequality and to foster the need of continuing research along these and other 
lines, both better to understand the dimensions of inequalities and to monitor 
the effectiveness of policy responses.
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Preface.
Egalitarian principles of social justice argue health care services should be 
delivered according to need criteria and not according to other such as 
socioeconomic conditions. This research focusses on such ideal of justice and 
explores, for the case of health care in Catalonia, the extent to which 
individuals and groups in equal need receive equal amount of health care 
services.
Equity has been high up in the health care policy agenda in Spain particularly 
since the 1986 General Health Act. The decentralization of health care as a 
policy area has brought the equity principle into the areas of concern of 
regional governments such as Catalonia. Further, it is at that level of policy 
action that equity in the provision of health care services coould best be 
addressed, both for proximity and competency reasons. Indeed, since the early 
eighties Catalonia is invested with almost full competencies in health care, 
particularly as regards the organisation and management of health care at the 
level of its territory. In the scope of this devolved competencies the regional 
authorities arrange the provision of services to the population. This research 
therefore addresses the issue of equity in the provision of health care services at 
the decentralised level of Catalonia.
The research is structured in eight chapters. The first chapter covers a review of 
the evolution of both the Spanish and Catalan health care systems starting in the 
early forties, distinguishing three periods in time and evolution, accounting for 
the main problems and solutions raised in each of them. It also offers an 
overview of how the system stands today as regards health outcomes and the 
prevailing finance and delivery arrangements of health care services, both 
nationally and in an international perspective.
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The second chapter reviews the main concepts and methods for assessing 
equity as a policy objective. It addresses a series of controversial and debated 
questions such as what is meant by equity, and how the measurement of equity 
is attempted. A brief account of the major theories on equity in health care is 
given together with a review of the most commonly used measures and 
methods to its assessment. This second chapter concludes with a review of the 
main studies on inequalities in health and health care in Spain, covering a 
twenty year period (1978 to 1998). The main findings and methods are 
displayed and commented so as to later set and compare the results of this 
research.
The third chapter reports on the methods used in this thesis, discussing the 
study objectives and hypothesis, the morbidity measures and use/need ratios 
used, as well as the standardisation procedures and the logistic regressions 
methods applied.
The fourth chapter gives an account of the findings regarding the distribution of 
need, that is, how the various indicators used to approximate the concept of 
need distribute across income groups in Catalonia. A series of concentration 
curves and indices are used to this purpose.
Chapter five reports by means of illustrative tables, charts and text the extent to 
which the Catalan health care system provides services according to need 
situations at the three levels of medical assistance studied, namely primary, 
specialist and inpatient care. To this end Le Grand and Colins and Klein 
use/need ratios are used.
Chapter six takes account of logistic regression results. The use of logistic 
regressions has allowed for a finer analysis w ithin each type of service as 
regards the relevance of variables such as age, gender, need, income and 
education.
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The seventh chapter in this research focusses on the interpretation of the results, 
both as regards inequalities in health and in health care, and discusses possible 
explanations, policy implications and areas of future research in this field of 
knowledge. This chapter also accounts for the limitations to this research and 
how these may affect the findings and conclusions.
Finally, Chapter eight summarises the conclusions, placing emphasis on the 
levels of analysis to the study of inequalities and recapitulating the main 
findings and plausible policy responses to the disclosed inequalities.
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CHAPTER 1.
Health Care in Spain.
It is difficult to disentangle the trends and policies in health care in Spain and 
Catalonia from Spanish history itself. I am going to handle it by reviewing the 
historical events that have shaped the various policies from 1942 to 1996.
This chapter is therefore a review of the Spanish health care system. It provides 
a chronological overview of the development of health care in Spain from the 
Francoist era to democracy, comprising three separate periods: from 1942 to 
1966, from 1966 to 1986, and from 1986 to the present day. I w ill be pointing 
out which were some of the unsolved problems in each period and how the 
following period was to overcome them. Finally, I w ill give an outline of how 
the system stands today in terms of both the delivery and finance of health care 
services accounting for coverage, health expenditures, regional allocation of 
resources and health outcomes.
Today, Spain's GDP per capita is $15,162 (PPPs in 1996) and has a population 
of over 39 million. Despite spending only 7.4% of GDP (1997) in health care it 
performes remarkably well in morbidity and mortality indicators: 674.5 
mortality rate for all causes (per 100,000 pop.), 6.0 infant mortality rate (per 
1,000 live births), 81.0 years and 73.3 female and male life expectancy 
respectively (1994), and 9% population in hospital1. The Spanish health care 
system covers 99.8% of the population and is mainly publicly funded (75%), 
largely through taxes. As regards private funding (25%) almost 90% are direct 
payments. Private insurance premia only accounts for 2.5% of the total 
expenditure, although there are significant differences across regions. Above 
70% of the available beds are publicly owned, although this varies greatly from
1 See Tables 1.4, 1.11 and 1.12. in this chapter.
18
region to region, too. The organisational structure is decentralised to the 
seventeen Spanish regions but only seven of them are invested with full 
competencies in health care. The allocation of resources to the regions is - 
mainly done on the bases of population in the territory2. The resulting 
management scenario is that of a group of ten regions directly controlled by 
central Madrid-INSALUD (National Health Institute) and seven highly 
autonomous regional health services. The whole of the INSALUD and the 
regional health services shape the Spanish National Health System.
1.1. The diversity of social insurance schemes (1942-1966).
Throughout the literature, most authors (De Miguel, 1985; Saturno, 1988; 
Aparicio, 1989; Rodriguez and De Miguel, 1990) agree that the origins of 
contemporary Spanish public health system started after the Spanish civil war, 
in 1942, with the creation of a Compulsory National Health Insurance scheme 
called SOE (Seguro Obligatorio de Enfermedad). The public health system as 
we know it today was completed half a century afterwards, when the Socialists' 
1986 General Health Act (GHA) developed the prevailing national health 
service.
The SOE, as a health insurance scheme, was a key feature in the social security 
system until 1966, when a comprehensive Social Security Act (Ley de Bases 
Seguridad Social) was put through. During the 1938-1966 period the 
development of social insurance schemes was rapid despite uncoordinated. The 
model set up by the SOE in the mid forties was originally designed to protect 
only those "weak" workers who lacked some sort of insurance, but gradually 
turned into a model that covered all manual workers, general employees and
2
As it w ill showed later, two resource allocation systems coexist in Spain, namely a common system 
and the so-called imputaciones de cupo which only relate to the Basque Country and Navarre.
19
the middle class. The Spanish social security system became consequently 
more complex, not only due to the changes affecting the SOE itself, but 
because of the appearance of new schemes 3. At this early stage, although the 
diversity of schemes was the rule, a line could be drawn between those 
managed by the 1908 created National Institute for Social Security, called the 
Instituto Nacional de Prevision (INP), mainly accidents, retirement, health, 
family, unemployment and rural workers schemes, and those others, mainly 
occupational schemes, managed by the 1946 born Mutualities (Mutualidades 
Laborales) in charge of pension schemes and funds.
The SOE was not only the first step towards the creation of a social security 
system but was also a landmark in the building of a health care market, 
gradually controlled by the State. As Rodrfguez and De Miguel argue, from the 
very moment of launching the SOE, the State undertook the creation of a large 
public health care system that limited the possibilities for the development of 
the private sector (Rodrfguez and De Miguel, 1990). By the mid-sixties, the 
SOE had covered half of the Spanish population leaving hospital care as an area 
for further private action. The development of a private sector would not have 
been easy, however, if it were not for the rise in the health care demand as a 
result of having created and expanded the SOE. The private market started then 
satisfying the health care needs of the welthier classes, depriving the less 
privileged social groups of modern medical health services (Kelley, 1984).
In the sixties, the two management bodies in the Spanish system, INP and 
Mutualities, faced a crisis that prompted the need for reform. The accelerated 
growth of the number of pensioners, from 240,000 in 1956 to 703,000 in 1966,
3
These new schemes were:
* Compulsory Old Age and Incapacity scheme (Seguro Obligatorio de Vejez e Invalidez) 
created in 1947.
* The 1956 Work Accidents scheme (Seguro de Accidentes Laborales).
* The 1961 Unemployment benefit scheme (Seguro de Desempleo).
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(Gonzalez et a/., 1987) along with the increase in the average pension benefit, 
forced an economic crisis in the core of the Mutualities. The INP followed a 
similar path. The SOE experienced a steady expansion which, together with the 
revaluation of other politically important schemes, led to its financial crisis. 
Major changes were needed, not only regarding financial issues but also other 
measures that would lead to a greater unity regarding schemes. Accordingly, 
the 1966 Social Security Act (Ley de Bases de la Seguridad Social) put an end to 
the diversity of social insurance schemes unifying them within an organised 
structure typical of a social security system. Soon afterwards, the 1974 Financial 
Law tried to overcome the existing financial difficulties. These two laws 
together implied a reform of Spanish social security arrangements.
1.2. The social security reform (1966-1986).
The Spanish social security system operated until the mid-sixties under the 
conventional elements of a corporative Bismarkian welfare state. The 1966 
Social Security Act implied a substantial change to the ruling Spanish model. A 
more Beveridgean oriented social security system was legally implanted. The 
clash of the two models led to a series of tensions, contradictions and 
inefficiencies that persisted until 1978, when the Spanish Constitution Act 
clearly favoured the British-like universal coverage model.
The INP and the Mutualities, nevertheless, continued managing the system until 
1978, financially sustained by social contributions (90%of public expenditure 
in the period 1972-76), with an almost absent State's direct financial 
involvement. The 1966 Social Security Act extended the levels of social 
protection, and drafted the uniformity of the existing social insurance schemes. 
In the following years, the 1966 Act needed substantial amendments regarding 
financial and protection issues. Accordingly, a complementary Financial Law 
was put through in 1974 setting the bases for universal coverage, better 
coordination of the managing agencies, greater financial involvement of the
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State, and redistribution. In 1975 the social security budget became part of the 
Government's budget, which ultimately meant a tighter control by the Spanish 
Parliament.
The 1966-78 period witnessed, moreover, a considerable increase of the 
Spanish population with free access to the public health system, from 55% in 
1965 to 81% in 1975, and 90% in 1985 (OECD, 1998; Coll, 1990) (See also 
Table 1.4), along with the building and strengthening of the public health care 
system. This was done through a considerable expansion of the social security 
hospital network and the employment of more health care workers, mainly 
physicians. The reasons that lay behind this expansion are various, including a 
better response to need, professional pressure, and the fascists preference for 
huge public building projects. The growth in the hospital sector reinforced, 
however, the curative dimension of the system in detriment of rather more 
preventive policies, since the increase in hospital beds was not complemented 
by similar improvements in primary care services (Saturno, 1988).
The pre-democratic decade was also the starting point for Conciertos 
hospitalarios, that is hospital services contracted to the private sector by public 
administration bodies, which became, starting in the seventies, a permanent 
solution to a still deficient public hospital system. Indeed, the practise of the so- 
called conciertos began, as Coll argued, as a temporary answer for an incipient 
social security system which had only limited physical resources itself (Coll,
1980). The advantage this sort of contracts had was the utilisation of adequate 
and unused private facilities as social security grew rather than constructing 
new public hospitals. The financial value of these contracts for 1972 
represented 17% of all social security health expenditures. By 1980 it had 
grown to 22%, increasing not only in absolute figures but also as a percentage 
of total inpatient expenditure. Since then, the conciertos have shaped the 
"modus-vivendi" of the public-private mix in Spain, intensifying the dependent 
position of the private sector, and defining its role as a complementary one
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rather than substitutory.
The reasons that lay behind the continuing and expanding of conciertos as a 
mixed delivery solution were threefold. First, there was a widespread, albeit 
probably erroneous, asumption that the private system provided cheaper health 
care. It only appeared to be cheaper because less services were provided. In 
terms of size, medical equipment, degree of medical education of the health 
personnel, and their number per patient and bed, private facilities were inferior 
to those of social security hospitals. The second argument to favor conciertos 
came from the political pressures to the governmental bureaucracy, particularly 
from the health industrial sector and pharmaceutical companies, conservative 
parties and professionals, investment institutions, and private hospitals. Finally, 
the insuficient public investment in capital facilities in the past, which had 
contributed to a lack of public beds in almost all the regions, still affects today's 
public hospital network, which makes of these contracts an essential issue in 
the public-private relationship (Kelley, 1984).4
The 1979 first party elected in the democratic period, Union de Centro 
Democratico (UCD), admitted the Francoist system needed to be corrected 
regarding inefficiencies and imbalances, although preserving and improving 
some of their technical structures. UCD's policy makers believed the problems 
with the regime's system were consequence of an increasing bureaucracy, 
deficient planning and an absence of priorities regarding structures and 
benefits. Finally, the system's financial difficulties in the past were judged by 
the ruling UCD as the result of the mid-sixties economic growth, the parallel 
expansion of social benefits, and the 1973-75 economic crisis which made that
4
This has been of particular importance in Catalonia as it w ill be shown later.
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advancing trend impossible to sustain.5
Overcoming the outlined problems of persistant financial difficultes, inefficient 
managing bodies, and poor levels of redistribution and coordination became 
the major concern of the Pactos de la Moncloa. Indeed, major social policies 
under UCD came as a result of the 1977 Pactos de la Moncloa, a multi-party 
agreement (pactos) set up in order to address the main economic, social and 
political changes the new born democracy required. In Pactos de la Moncloa a 
four point proposal regarding social security was discussed. First, the 
restructuring of the managing bodies, towards simplification, rationalisation, 
cost-containment, social efficiency and decentralisation. In this respect, the 
gradual transformation of the social security system since 1966 was completed 
in 1979 with the disappearing of the Mutualities. In parallel, new managing 
agencies replaced the INP 6, although experts argue these were new names to 
old and well known bodies (Rodrfguez and De Miguel, 1990).
The democratic period is profoundly marked in its begining by the economic crisis and by the 
changes in the health policy models. The world economic crisis of 1973 forced the reduction of 
hospital beds and services in the great majority of European countries. In Spain this was done onto 
a still deficient hospital structure, breaking off the modernisation process in hospitals started in the 
mid-sixties and being the cause for the historical underdevelopment of the public health care 
system for years (De Miguel, 1985).
These bodies were INSS, INSALUD, INSERSO and INEM, and had the following competencies: 
INSS-1978 (Instituto Nacional de Seguridad Social) Economic and budgetary issues:
* Companies register.
* Admissions of beneficiaries.
* Recognition of the right to assistance benefits and medical assistance. 
INSALUD-1979 (Instituto Nacional de Salud) Health care:
* Health Asssitance (preventive health and health promotion included).
* Management and administration of staff, centres, and health services.
* Coordination (conciertos).
INSERSO-1979 (Instituto Nacional de Servicios Sociales) Social Services:
* Old aged.
* Disabled (physical and psychical).
* Special programmes.
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The second element of the proposal looked for a more powerful control of the 
management itself. Accordingly, the management came under the 
responsibility of two Ministries, the Ministry of Labour, responsible for social 
security issues, and the Ministry of Health, in charge of health and health care 
policies. For the first time in the history of Spanish social security system public 
health insurance was managed by a distinct department in government. Third, 
the Pactos claimed for a more progressive and redistributive finance of the 
social services together with a greater involvement of the State in these matters. 
Although the finance was common to both Ministries, through the social 
security Treasury, the balance in its sources changed since. Social contributions 
fell from 89% of the total public expenditure in 1977 to 76% in 1985, and the 
State's transfers from the general budget raised from 3.3% to 21.3% in those 
same years (Coll, 1990). Pensions and health persisted as the two main 
expenditure chapters within Spanish social security, accounting respectively for 
60% and 30% of the total amount. Finally, the Pactos de la Moncloa pressed 
for an increase in the level of assistance, specially regarding health issues, 
looking for a more integrated concept of health, the so-called integral health.
Five were then the main characteristics that defined the Spanish social security 
system in the 1975-1986 transitional period before the socialist government 
put through a National Health Service. First, it was a mixed financed system, 
where contributions to the budget were raised by employers and employees on 
one hand, namely social contributions, and the State on the other, through 
taxes. Second, the management of the system has become the State's concern. 
Although the employer was understood to be both responsible for and cause of 
employees damages, through the social security system this responsibility was 
transfered onto the State. Third, it provided social assistance since the State 
aimed at raising people's welfare through individual benefits. Despite the 
system still did not cover the entire population, beneficiaries were not just 
those who had a job but also other targetted groups. Fourth, the benefits aimed 
at a compensatory concept, more than to a really redistributive one, although
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the latter was increasingly important. Finally, the system was not as fragmented 
as before 1966, and a larger unity of schemes and bodies was in place.
To sum up, starting after Franco's death in 1975, the democratic period raised 
new political expectations, new parties, and new leaders. Along with political 
reforms the Social Security experienced rather incrementalist albeit necessary 
changes until 1986 when the General Health Act established the foundation of 
a decentralised National Health System. Although there was still plenty of 
room for improvement in the unity of schemes and bodies, the range of issues 
the Socialist 1986 General Health Act were to address were mainly those 
derived from two principles outlined in the 1978 Constitution Act, namely 
achieving universal coverage and fostering decentralisation.
1.3. The General Health Act and the National Health Service (1986-1996).
The Spanish socialist party, Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE), remained 
throughout these first democratic years, as a powerful opposition to UCD until 
1982 when general elections gave PSOE and Felipe Gonzalez access to power. 
However, it was not until the 1986 General Health Act (Ley General de 
Sanidad), and following a period of confrontation and strikes from the highly 
organised medical professional bodies, that the socialists' law was put through. 
The law proposed the creation of a National Health System (Sistema Nacional 
de Salud), similar in concept and objectives to those national health services 
already in place in different European countries.7 In particular, this new, 
universalistic, a priori equitable and solidaristic model, resembled to the British 
system and counted with citizens' participation and control as additional
In the months previous to to the final draft of the Law, a controversy was raised about whether 
using National Health Service (Servicio Nacional de Salud) or National Health System (Sistema 
Nacional de Salud), since "System" better applied to the whole of public and private activities in 
the finance and delivery of health care. Regardless of the different views on this point, the socialist 
government in Spain opted for National Health System (Elola, 1991).
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endorsement elements.8 The national health service model was seconded by a 
minor part of the medical organisations, the left wing parties both PSOE and the 
comunist PCE, and the majority of the population.9 However, the earliest ideas 
of the socialist Ministry for Health regarding the contents and objectives of the 
GHA were gradually redefined according to the distribution of power in the 
health sector. The struggle between the different agents in the health system 
was reflected in the GHA in two ways. On one hand, the long time it took to be 
put through Parliament, almost three years and, on the other, what soon was 
believed to be its main characteristic, namely ambiguity.10
Primary health care, efficiency, universal coverage, and decentralisation were 
the main priorities outlined by the GHA. Primary health care was given priority 
by the socialist Ministry of Health for two main reasons. First, it was the main 
cause for criticism within the public health system, not only by physicians and 
managers but also by the vast majority of its beneficiaries. Second, the socialist 
policy makers took on the World Health Organisation (WHO) principle of a 
rational health system, stressing the importance of primary care, health 
promotion and preventive health services.11 Efficiency was the second
8
The health system until then was perceived as both imposed to the medical professionals and 
foreign to the needs of the Spanish population. In fact, giving more power to the people as a policy 
strategy was almost absent from the priorities during the first years of socialist government (1982- 
1986). In 1986 the final draft of the GHA conceived a patient charter and the development of an 
institutional body to deal with patient' comments and suggestions.
9
There was an alternative model, closer to the French type, supported by the right wing party and 
3/4 parts of the medical professional associations. However, Spain already had a fairly extense 
public hospital system and this model was refused by the government.
10
Aparicio aknowledged that ambiguity seems to be the main characteristics of laws that develop 
economic and social rights (Aparicio, 1989).
11
W HO  Alma Ata declaration (September 1978). The use the socialist government made of the 
W HO recommendations has been considered slanted by the different interest groups, particularly 
important by the medical organisations.
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objective of the GHA. It was to be achieved through two policies: a hospital 
structure reform, and the improvement of the existing managing bodies in the 
frame of the constitutionally born Autonoumous Communities or regions. The 
goal was to unify the fragmented public health system within each region 
overcoming problems of coordination, duplication of services, and inefficient 
allocation and distribution of resources.12
The objectives of universal coverage and decentralisation were the core of the 
GHA. These two objectives were first raised by the 1978 Constitution Act, but 
not formally addressed in health care until the 1986 GHA was passed. 
Regarding universal coverage, the GHA claims , for example, public health 
care w ill be extended to cover all Spanish population, and access to services 
w ill be carried out on conditions of effective equality. This proves as a clear 
commitment of public authorities to universality and equity13. Further, the 
decentralisation of health services to the seventeen Autonomous Communities, 
and the creation of their respective regional health services, is an omnipresent 
issue throughout the GHA. The Spanish NHS is thus to be taken as the 
adequate coordination and integration of the seventeen regional health services 
(GHA, art. 50 and following). The effective integration of these regional health 
services is a basic condition to achieve the objectives outlined in Art.1 of the 
GHA, namely the right to health protection of all citizens, the convergence of 
life conditions, the coordination of public policies, the uniformed levels of 
functioning of public services, and an effective health planning, that would 
result in the improvement of service related issues.
De Miguel argued, on the contrary, that the establishment of the so-called State of the Autonomies 
(Estado de las Autonomias), political and administrative model regarding the relationship between 
the State and the regions, complicated the efforts of the reform insofar it promoted power 
struggling in the modelling of the Law, transforming it into a legal instrument that would lead to 
the division of the National Health System (De Miguel, 1985).
In following chapters a deeper discussion of the way the various legal texts take account of both 
universalisation and equity w ill be given.
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The regions were entitled to elaborate on the GHA through development and 
complementary laws, in the use of their competencies and according to their 
Estatutes (Estatutos de Autonomfa). Therefore, so as to achieve the objectives 
outlined in the GHA the first step was the gradual creation of the seventeen 
Regional Health Services (RHS), one for each region. There was, however, an 
implicit danger for the system to become highly centralised at the regional level 
once the decentralisation process to the regions had started. In order to avoid 
this the GHA structures the RHS in smaller health districts (Areas de Salud)) 
where an important role is played by the local authorities and municipalities.
Every RHS would produce a regional health plan according to the region's 
health needs, and within a rational use of resources. The resulting seventeen 
health plans would be essential in the shaping of the National Integrated Health 
Plan (Plan Integrado de Salud). This latter plan would result from the 
combination of four sources, that is, the forementioned regional health plans, 
specific plans of a national scope, specific common plans of the regions and the 
State, and other particularities related to financial and resource allocation 
arrangements.14
The GHA also advocated for general coordination among regional authorities 
in areas such as personnel, prevention, promotion and assistance, principles of 
coherence, armony and solidarity of the health system, and basic and common 
criteria to efficiency evaluation. This general coordination, which would lead 
to reciprocal information, common action, and integration of services, is the 
task of central administration bodies so as to actually achieve the integration of 
the NHS. Regardless of the level of competencies the seventeen regions may 
have, the State holds exclusive competence on High Inspection (Alta 
Inspeccion). High inspection is addressed by the GHA in Art.43 in reference to
14
To date, no National Integrated Health Plan has seen the light yet.
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three main issues: adecuacy of regions' plans and health programmes to the 
general objectives set up by the State; evaluation of the achievement of 
common goals; and supervision of those regions with full transfered 
competencies in health care.
Finally, the GHA dealt with the system's integration (art.44 to 47), and the 
body set up to preserve that integrity principle was the Interregional Health 
Council (Consejo Interterritorial de Salud). This body is a permanent body of 
reciprocal information among regions and with the State. The task of this 
institution is threefold: coordination of the basic lines of policy regarding 
adquisitions, contracts, pharmaceuticals, and personnel; some planning role; 
and the general coordination role.
However, the ambiguity in the GHA, outlined as one of its characteristics when 
assessing its birth process, is of particular relevance regarding this point.
Indeed, in reference to the Interregional Health Council tasks, it is far from clear 
what should be understood by "basic lines of policy" (De Miguel, 1985). 
Furthermore, the law does not provide the Interregional Health Council with 
any monitoring nor control mechanisms to properly address its task, which may 
lead to a diversity of regional policies in the health care area, threatening the 
unity of the NHS. Integrity, moreover, should go beyond the coordination of 
regional objectives in order to achieve a National Integrated Health Plan, which 
should be something more than stitching together the seventeen regional health 
plans, to encourage the linkage of health policies as well as other areas of 
policy that affect the final health status of the Spanish population.15
The existing Consejo Interterritorial de Salud (Interregional Health Council) needs to be invigorated 
undertaking aspects such as general policy for the country, research coordination, and information 
systems.
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1.3.1. Decentralisation in Spain.
Since decentralisation has been high up in the agenda from the very early years 
of democracy, and it is a key element to understand the need for this piece of 
research, it is necessary to explore in greater detail what is meant by that and 
what forms does it take in the case of Spain.
Decentralisation can be broadly defined as the transfer of authority, or dispersal 
of power, in public planning, management and decision making, from the 
national level to subnational levels, or more generally, from higher to lower 
levels of government (Rondinelli, 1981). However, as Mills argued, in practice, 
health system decentralisation takes many different forms depending not only 
on overall government political and administrative structures and objectives, 
but also on the pattern of health system organisation prevailing in the particular 
country. Although it is important to acknowledge that decentralisation policies 
are concerned with changing power relationship between levels of government 
(Smith, 1985), political considerations are not the only explanation to why a 
country implements a decentralisation process (Mills et a/., 1990).
Indeed, the decentralisation literature and theory argue that there are six major 
benefits to the health care sector that should result from implementing a 
satisfactory decentralisation process (Mills et a/., 1990). In the first place, it is 
expected a greater rationality in the organisation of the services on the basis of 
smaller geographical and administrative areas. Second, communities w ill 
benefit from larger involvement in the management of their own health, leading 
to more appropriate health plans at regional or local level in relation to the 
needs and problems of the area. In short, a higher degree of community 
participation. Third, decentralisation is argued to help to contain costs and 
reduce duplication of services by relating reaponsibilities to defined catchment 
populations. Fourth, it would help to reduce inequalities among regions and 
rural-urban areas through a selective reallocation of central resources. In fifth
31
place, it is said to bring up a closer interaction of activities from governmental, 
non-governmental and private health organisations. Finally, decentralisation 
would improve health programmes implementation by reducing centralised 
control over local administration matters.
W ithin this theoretical scenario, four main types of decentralisation can be 
distinguished in practice: deconcentration, devolution, delegation and 
privatisation, each of these entailing different degrees of responsibility16. Table 
1.1. shows in which areas of health policy the aforementioned types of 
decentralisation enjoy responsibilities.
Table 1.1.
Health policy areas and types of decentralisation.
Health Policy areas Deconcentration Devolution Delegation Privatisation
Legislative - 4c 4c - -
Revenue raising * 4c 4c *  * 4c 4c 4c
Policy making - 4c 4c *  * 4c 4c
Regulation - 4c 4c * -
Planning and resource allocation 4c * 4c 4c * * * 4c 4c 4c
Management 
- personnel * * * * *  * 4c 4C 4c
- budgeting and expenditure *  4c 4c 4c *  *  * 4c 4c 4c
- procurement of supplies * 4c 4c * * * 4c 4c 4c
- maintenance * 4c 4c * * * 4c 4c 4c
Intersectoral collaboration 4c 4c 4c 4c * * * 4c 4c 4c
Interagency coordination * 4c * * * 4: 4c 4c
Training * 4c 4c * * * 4c 4c 4c
-  no responsibilities * limited responsibilities * *  some responsibilities * * *  extensive responsibilities 
Source: M ills  e ta /.  (1990 ).
16
For a full description of each type of decentralisation, please see Mills et a/. 1990.
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In Spain, the decentralisation process took the particular form of devolution. 
Devolution has been defined as the creation or strengthening of subnational 
levels of government that are substantially independent of the national level 
with respect to a defined set of functions (Mills et a/., 1990). The theory asserts 
these levels of government normally have a clear legal status, recognised 
geographical boundaries, a number of functions to perform, and statutory 
authority to raise revenue and make expenditures. They are rarely completely 
autonomous but are largely independent in their areas of responsibilities.
Spain's legal frame for health decentralisation is shaped by three elements: the 
1978 Constitution Act, the regions' Estatutes, and the 1986 General Health Act 
(GHA). Thus, the GHA is part of a much wider, comprehensive and 
constitutional process of decentralisation and State redefinition known as the 
State of the Autonomies.17 The regions have become the administration level in 
charge of health management and control through their Regional Health 
Services (RHS).
However, the decentralisation process in Spain has not been homogeneous and 
is still to be completed. The transfer of authority in the health policy area from 
central government to the regions has been done in different degrees, which 
has resulted in diverse levels of autonomy. Accordingly, only seven of the 
seventeen Spanish regions enjoy today full decentralisation of health care and a 
thorough body of competencies. The other ten, although with some degree of 
autonomy, are still under the central and direct management of the National 
Health Institute-INSALUD in Madrid.
Following both the decentralisation process and the use the regions made of the 
transferred competencies, a twofold set of difficulties emerged (Min.Adm.Pub.,
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the regions' Estatutes of Autonomy set the grounds of a new 
organisation of the State in seventeen Autonomous Communities or regions, and were the 
landmarks for the begining of an agreed and slow process of decentralisation of important areas of 
public management among which we find health care.
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1992). On one hand, those problems that follow from an imperfect definition of 
responsibilities in the legal framework of the 1978 Constitution, the Regions' 
Estatutes, and the 1986 GHA, which has resulted in different, even opossite, 
interpretations of the Law when coming from the State and the regional 
authorities. The so-called Constitutional Appeals and the Competence Conflicts 
derived have forced the customary intervention of the Spanish Constitutional 
Court. However, we should think of these conflicts and appeals as something 
proper to the development of the State of the Autonomies, in which political 
bargaining is everydays course of action. The purely administrative problems 
define a second group of difficulties. Regions with administrative defficient 
tradition face management problems in the use of the competencies they have 
assumed.
Both groups of difficulties back up the idea that the health decentralisation 
process should be thought as a long time process that requires high dosages of 
political consensus and calls for continuous development and adjustment. Any 
further reform in the health care area should, thus, bear in mind both the 
decentralisation process and the principles originated in the Constitution, the 
Estatutes and the GHA. The needs for political consensus, development, 
coordination and adjustment go beyond the decentralisation process itself 
affecting any coming reform proposal at regional or national level. The fact that 
regions with invested competencies in health care may implement policies 
disregarding those needs could foster the breaking-up of the system, 
endangering the Spanish NHS as we know it today.
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1.4. The present situation.
Although punctual data has been given in the previous sections when 
necessary, I consider both illustrative and mandatory to provide an all- 
embracing statistical view of the Spanish health care system as it stands today, 
describing some existing geographical disparities, the trends in expenditure and 
finance, availability of resources, and health outcomes. I also account here for 
an overview of the remaining problems and porposed reforms. Finally, although 
Catalonian statistics are shown here together with the rest of the regions, a brief 
introduction to the particularities of the Catalan Health System is also offered.
Despite in some of its articles the GHA encourages territorial equity there are 
still some geographical differences among regions as regards the number of 
total beds per 1,000 inhabitants, doctors per bed, and doctor-nurse ratios. In 
reference to those disparities, two significant issues should be noted. First, 
north-east regions and Madrid prevail as the best equipped regions in terms of 
beds per 1,000 inhabitants and personnel per 100 beds, while the south-west 
areas in Spain remain below with reference to the same ratios (Tables 1.2 and 
1.3). Second, conciertos correct in some degree the existing public sector 
differences among regions. Indeed, private-public conciertos in regions such as 
Catalonia and the Basque Country are the solution to a deficient public system 
as bed provider. This has defined a mutual dependency relationship between 
both sectors since the private sector sees conciertos as the means to survive in 
the health care market.18
The private sector remains fairly dependant of the public sector insofar the latter has become the 
most important client in terms of resources. As it w ill later be shown, private insurance premia in 
Spain is only around 2 to 3% of total expenditure in health care.
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Table 1.2.
Health personnel per 100 beds (1994).
REGIONS
NHS OTHER PUBLIC PRIVATE
MDs Nurses MDs Nurses MDs Nurses
Andalucia 45.8 92.0 24.4 46.0 8.3 15.2
Aragon 47.4 94.5 10.4 16.8 16.9 19.5
Asturias 47.0 85.4 8.9 17.3 17.6 22.4
Balearic Islands 46.6 89.7 11.9 17.8 10.0 28.8
Canary Islands 47.2 86.5 14.6 29.0 7.4 9.0
Cantabria 39.8 87.8 14.8 23.9 5.4 7.4
Castille-Leon 43.5 82.1 10.3 18.6 4.0 8.3
Castille-La Mancha 39.8 73.1 9.7 12.8 16.2 20.1
Catalonia 44.3 101.9 26.8 46.4 16.8 32.3
Valencia 45.7 90.7 23.4 42.6 14.8 22.4
Extremadura 39.8 75.9 2.1 4.6 3.4 8.1
Galicia 39.0 69.7 22.2 31.5 10.5 14.7
Madrid 54.6 102.4 28.1 52.8 11.2 22.7
Murcia 55.6 95.0 31.3 58.3 3.5 8.5
Navarre 33.7 74.3 15.6 * 45.8 * 18.0 64.2
Basque Country 37.0 70.6 2.3 * 3.9 * 4.7 17.4
Rioja 42.9 92.7 10.2 21.0 3.0 5.0
Ceuta and Melilla 40.0 86.7 34.4 - - -
SPAIN 44.8 87.2 20.2 50.3 12.2 23.3
M Ds = Medical Doctors 
* (1989)
Source: INE. (1997b)
Table 1.3.
Available beds per region (1994).
REGIONS
NHS OTHER PUBLIC TOTAL PUBLIC PRIVATE TOTAL
N % N % N % N % N Per
1,000
inhab.
Andalucia 17,035 71.6 1,235 5.2 18,270 76.8 5,523 23.3 23,793 3.37
Aragon 3,348 53.1 1,976 31.3 5,324 84.4 977 15.6 6,301 5.32
Asturias 3,166 67.9 428 9.2 3,594 77.1 1,070 22.9 4,664 4.31
Balearic Islands 1,261 35.4 1,163 32.7 2,424 68.1 1,134 31.9 3,558 4.93
Canary Islands 2,914 34.3 2,860 33.7 5,774 68.0 2,713 32.0 8,487 5.53
Cantabria 1,878 62.1 431 14.2 2,309 76.3 717 23.7 3,026 5.75
Castille-Leon 6,498 47.9 3,959 29.2 10,457 77.1 3,120 22.9 13,577 5.38
Castille-La Mancha 4,317 74.2 975 16.8 5,292 91.0 523 9.0 5,815 3.46
Catalonia 4,846 15.3 7,397 23.3 12,243 38.6 19,426 61.4 31,669 5.22
Valencia 8,987 68.8 1,992 15.2 10,979 84.0 2,091 16.0 13,070 3.28
Extremadura 2,977 66.2 1,196 26.6 4,173 92.8 323 7.2 4,496 4.20
Galicia 6,725 59.3 1,565 13.8 8,290 73.1 3,044 26.9 11,334 4.15
Madrid 10,741 44.4 6,387 26.4 17,128 70.8 7,051 29.2 24,179 4.83
Murcia 1,849 50.6 862 23.6 2,711 74.2 944 25.8 3,655 3.41
Navarre - - - - 1,785 65.7 931 34.3 2,716 5.18
Basque Country - - - - 6,161 66.0 3,172 34.0 9,333 4.48
Rioja 504 51.7 371 38.1 875 89.8 100 10.2 975 3.73
Ceuta 163 62.0 100 38.0 263 100.0 - - 263 3.75
Melilla 172 57.5 127 42.5 299 100.0 - - 299 4.98
SPAIN 85,597 50.0 33,024 19.2 118,621 69.2 52,859 30.8 171,480 4.40
N -T o ta l number 
Source: INE (1997a).
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Overall, the private hospital sector accounts for almost 30% of the available 
beds in Spain, but these are concentrated in the northern regions of Spain, 
namely Catalonia, the Basque Country, Navarre, Galicia, Asturias and 
Cantabria. The reasons that could explain this pattern are largely historical. 
Beneficiencia and non-for-profit private centres have a long tradition in these 
regions. When the expansion of the public hospital system was undertaken in 
the sixties the presence of private centres in these areas was taken into account 
and, in an attempt to reduce regional disparities, fewer public facilities were 
allocated to these regions.
According to 1998 OECD data the Spanish system today covers 99.8% of the 
population. As stated in the evolution of the health care system in Spain, there 
has been an increasing trend in coverage since the creation of the SOE. In Table 
1.4. a cross-national comparison of coverage percentages is offered for the 
period 1960 to 1996. Spain has traditionally been a laggard among European 
countries. At the end of the sixties the gap started to be reduced probably by 
effect of the extension of health schemes and the appearance of new health 
care legal arrangements such as the Social Security Act (Ley de Bases de la 
Seguridad Social) and the 1974 Financial Law. The GHA in 1986 should also 
be considered as a landmark in terms of its effect on coverage. Indeed, soon 
after the GHA the population under public health care reached to 97%, slowly 
progressing upto date. Therefore, universalisation of public services is almost a 
reality in Spain today. The pursue of equity, in terms of universal coverage, 
have counted on political commitment, financial resources into the system, and 
have also used the existing private facilities network in some regions by means 
of the forementioned conciertos.
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Table 1.4.
Population coverage of medical care (% of population).
Selected Countries 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996
Spain 54 54 55 58 72 81 84 84 88 97 99 99.5 99.8
Italy 87 88 91 92 94 95 98 100 100 100 100 100 100
France 76.3 85 88 88 96 96 98 99 99 99 99.5 99.5 99.5
Germany 85 85 85.8 85.8 90 90.3 91 90 92 92.2 92.2 92.2 92.2
Netherlands 71 71 71 83 98 75 75 74.5 73.3 69.3 70.7 70.9 72
Sweden 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
United Kingdom 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Australia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Canada 71 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Japan 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
United States 20 22 38 38 40 40 40 42 42.6 43 44 44 45
Source: OECD (1998).
The extension of public health care to almost the entire population has not 
been at the expense of an outraging public expenditure. According to OECD 
data, the total expenditure in health care in Spain, as shown in Table 1.5., 
represents 7.4% of GDP in 1997, close to European and OECD standards. 
Historically, however, this has not been the case. In 1965 the health 
expenditure-GDP ratio was below 3%. The succesive health reforms, with a 
greater involvement of public authorities in the provision and finance of health 
services brought up this figure to 5% in 1975 and to 6.3% in the 1980s, closing 
the historical gap with the rest of European countries.
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Table 1.5.
Total expenditure on health (% GDP).
Selected Countries 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
Spain 2.6 3.4 4.3 5.6 5.8 5.6 6.5 7.5 7.4
Italy 4.3 4.9 5.9 5.7 6.9 7.1 7.7 8.6 7.6
France 5.2 5.8 6.2 7.0 7.9 8.5 8.7 9.8 9.9
Germany 4.6 5.8 7.4 8.6 9.2 9.3 8.8 10.0 10.4
Netherlands 4.3 5.2 6.7 7.5 8.1 7.9 8.2 9.0 8.5
Sweden 5.5 6.9 7.3 9.1 9.5 9.0 8.8 8.9 8.6
United Kingdom 4.1 4.4 4.6 5.3 5.9 5.9 5.8 6.9 6.7
Australia 5.1 5.2 5.9 7.8 7.4 7.7 7.8 8.5 8.3
Canada 6.0 6.7 6.9 7.2 7.5 8.4 8.7 10.2 9.3
Japan - - 4.5 5.7 6.5 6.7 6.1 6.6 7.3
United States 5.9 6.8 7.5 8.6 9.4 10.6 11.9 14.1 14.0
Source: OECD (1998).
Although public expenditure is the most significant source of health care 
finance in Spain, the Spanish health care system remains a mixed financed 
system. The four main sources of finance are, taxes and social contributions on 
the public side, and out-of-pocket payments and private insurance premia on 
the private side. However, public and private financing have historically 
followed different paths, and the balance between both today is not the same as 
in the sixties and seventies. Private finance nowadays is approximately 25% of 
the total expenditure in health. Out of this 25%, more than 90% are out-of- 
pocket payments on pharmaceuticals and on private medicine, particularly on 
those services that are not entirely covered by the public health system such as 
dentists, ginaecology and opticians. Public finance is now above 75% of total 
health expenditure. During the 1960-1987 period, public expenditure grew at 
a real annual rate of 9%, well above the rest of OECD countries, as shown in 
Table 1.6. This growth was consequence of greater public involvement in 
health care as policy area, which was also expressed in the forementioned 1974
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Financial Law19.
Table 1.6.
Public expenditure on health (% GDP)
Selected Countries 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
Spain 1.3 2.1 3.3 4.2 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.9 5.8
Italy 3.8 4.3 5.2 4.9 5.4 5.5 5.9 6.3 5.3
France 3.6 4.1 4.7 5.4 6.3 6.5 6.5 7.3 7.7
Germany 3.2 4.3 5.7 6.8 7.2 7.2 6.7 7.7 8.1
Netherlands 3.0 4.5 4.8 5.5 6.1 5.9 6.0 7.0 6.1
Sweden 4.4 5.8 6.3 8.3 8.7 8.1 7.9 7.7 7.1
United Kingdom 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.8 5.3 5.0 4.9 5.8 5.7
Australia 2.7 2.8 3.6 4.9 4.6 5.5 5.3 5.7 5.7
Canada 3.1 - 5.1 5.5 5.7 6.4 6.5 7.4 6.4
Japan - - 3.1 4.1 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.2 5.7
United States 1.5 2.6 2.9 3.6 4.0 4.3 4.8 6.1 6.5
Source: OECD (1998).
Public finance itself has undergone substantial changes in time, particularly in 
the balance of public sources, that is social constributions and taxes. The Social 
Security Act (Ley de Bases de la Seguridad Social) until 1986 and the GHA from 
1986 to 1989 relied on social contributions as their main source of public 
finance. In the sixties and seventies, the State's money contributions through 
taxes to the health system were less than 5% of the total public expenditure in 
health. By 1980 taxes already represented 10%, and from 1982 there was a 
rapid increase to reach 30% in 1988. As illustrated in Table 1.7, in 1993 the 
State's transfers were 80% of the total public finance and social contributions
19
Until the 1974 Financial Law, public finance accounted for just over half of the total expenditure 
in health.
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were down to 20% .20
Table 1.7.
Health care financing (1980 and 1993).
Sources 1980 (a) % Kakwani 
index (a)
1993 (b) % Kakwani 
index (c)
Direct Taxes 7.6 - 0.170 - 0.212*
Indirect Taxes 6.4 - 0.023 - - - 0.153*
Total Taxes 14.0 18 0.102 60.0 80 0.046*
Social Contributions 62.0 82 - 0.063 15.0 20 n.a.
TOTAL PUBLIC 76.0 100 - 0.032 75.0 100 n.a.
Private Insurance 3.0 12 - 0.079 2.5 10 -0 .180*
Direct Payments 21.0 88 0.016 22.5 90 n.a.
TOTAL PRIVATE 24.0 100 0.005 25.0 100 n.a.
TOTAL 100.0 -0.023 100.0 0.0004*
n.a -  not available.
*  1990 
Sources:
(a) Van Doorslaer et a/. (1993).
(b) L6pez Casanovas (1993).
(c) Rodriguez and Calonge (1998).
Note: Kakwani health finance index is based on the extent to which a tax system departs from 
proportionality, ranging from -2.0, when all pre-tax income is concentrated in the hands of the 
richest person and the entire tax burden falls on someone else, to 1.0, when pre-tax income is 
distributed equally and the entire tax burden falls on one person.
As regards equity in the finance of health care, the distribution and relative 
weight of the various sources is of primary importance. The cross-national study 
by Van Doorslaer et a/. (1993) points out, through the use of various equity 
indicators (Kakwani Index is one of them), the degree of inequity of the Spanish 
health financing system in 1980 (Table 1.7.). In an attempt to summarise the 
main points brought up in that study, four issues should be noted. First, the fact
The GHA did not introduce any drastic change in the way the public system was financed. 
However, the 1989 Law on General Budget explicitly set how the system should be financed, 
increasing State's participation and bringing social contributions at a much lower level. Today, in 
1999, social contributions to health care expenditure are almost inexistent.
that social contributions were found as slightly regressive, since they could be 
perceived as a tax on wages and these are proportionally a lower part of the 
final income in high income groups. Second, taxes were certainly more 
progressive, and so would be the finance of the system through the State's 
budget. However, we should question whether the progressive index for total 
taxes has changed after indirect taxes like VAT were introduced. Third, 
although universal coverage of public health assistance was almost 
accomplished there were still some minor groups for which private insurance 
premia were the only sort of health scheme available. This could help to 
explain the fact that private insurance was only slightly regressive. Finally, out- 
of pocket-payments were pointed to be progressive. This may be due to the fact 
that they are mainly payments on pharmaceuticals which are exempted for 
lower income groups such as pensioners. Progressivity in direct payments made 
the whole of private finance progressive since they represented 90% of the total 
amount. On the whole the Spanish system in 1980 was somewhat regressive. 
An equity study after the 1989 took account of the move towards a more tax- 
raised public finance and found the system today is more progressive. This is 
shown in the last column in Table 1.7 in which the Kakwani index for total 
expenditures is 0.0004, that is of a positive sign, pointing to the overall 
progressivity of the system, practically proportional. This could largely be 
explained by the positive effect of direct taxes on the overall equity of the 
system.
The change towards a more direct State financial provision was the outcome of 
three objectives. In the first place, the need to control and correct the financial 
difficulties the health agencies had, and still have, due to overspending (Table 
1.8). Second, the awareness that high social contributions were a burden to 
employers and firms. And third, to promote equity in the finance of public
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health care services.21
Table 1.8.
Public health budget deviations from original budget allocations (1984-1992)
(in percentages)
Years INSALUD Direct 
Management
Regions w ith  full 
competencies
TOTAL
1984 4.1 0.4 2.9
1985 6.2 1.7 4.7
1986 8.8 12.4 10.1
1987 16.1 7.6 13.2
1988 10.5 11.2 10.9
1989 18.2 10.0 14.1
1990 9.9 13.2 11.6
1991 9.1 15.3 12.7
1992 11.0 17.0 14.4
Source: Sanfrutos (1993).
Table 1.9.
Total expenditure in in-patient care as % of Tot. Exp. in health.
Selected Countries 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Spain 55.7 53.7 45.3 46.1 46.9 45.2 -
Italy 47.9 46.1 45.3 46.3 46.5 47.0 49.4
France 47.2 45.8 44.4 43.9 44.3 44.4 44.4
Germany 34.0 34.3 34.5 34.4 35.5 34.6 -
Netherlands 56.1 54.8 52.0 52.6 52.5 54.0 52.6
Sweden - - - - - - -
United Kingdom - 44.5 44.1 44.6 42.8 42.2 -
Australia 49.6 56.2 47.0 46.7 44.5 43.3 -
Canada 51.1 49.8 48.9 48.4 47.1 45.3 43.7
Japan 32.8 33.4 33.5 31.9 32.0 29.4 -
United States 46.4 46.0 44.4 44.3 43.5 42.6 42.0
Source: OECD (1998).
The financing model of health care in Spain does not allow for a regional analysis for Catalonia as 
regards equity aspects. Indeed, since taxes and social contributions are collected centrally and 
regionally distributed later according to population criteria, it becomes impossible to assess the 
degree of equity in the finance of services in each region.
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Despite having achieved a quite European level of expenditure in health care 
(according to GDP), Spain still faces an underdevelopment of public primary 
care services. Hospital care accounts for approximate!ly half of public 
expenditure in health care (as shown in Table 1.9), and although the table does 
not show separate data for primary care they represent 25-30% of total public 
expenditure.
The insufficient development of primary care and other ambulatory services 
(polyclinics) has become in Spain a public-private issue in a number of ways 
since it has fostered the growth of private practice by physicians, it has required 
the use of private clinics for some services, and has increased the amount of 
payments on pharmaceuticals. The socialist primary care reform in the eighties 
have not had the expected results since, first, there is still a generalised referral 
to hospital treatment, second, there is no important reduction in the 
consumption of pharmaceuticals and, third, there is a low level of community 
participation overall. The fact that physicians dedicate very little time to each 
patient visit (average 6 minutes), with the resulting inadequacies of care, 
persists as a major problem in ambulatory care in Spanish public health system.
In primary care, as De Miguel (1979) argues, there has been a heavy reliance 
on medication and referrals for hospitalisation because of inadequate diagnosis 
and treatment. Hospital emergency services were, and still are, increasingly 
used as an alternative to primary care, causing financial, organisational and 
other problems. Consequently, some patients use private physicians, paid 
either on an out-of-pocket basis or by private insurance premia, as a means to 
avoiding "unpersonal" treatment and waiting lists. These are also causes for a 
frequent referral of patients by public physicians to themselves as private 
practitioners, increasing the overall amount of out-of-pocket payments.
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The deficient primary care service forced health authorities to extend contracts 
with private clinics (similar to conciertos with hospitals and accounting for 25% 
of primary care expenditure by social security) for rehabilitation and other 
specialised services not available through public health care. The potential 
growth of these contracts in certain areas is still high. However, Kelley (1984) 
agrees this is a situation that was somehow intended by bureaucrats, politicians, 
physicians and patients, since the underdevelopment of primary care facilitates 
the development of private practice and benefits pharmaceutical industries. 
Whatever the causes, since not all patients are able to use private facilities, it is 
said that a two-tier system has developed in primary care -one for the poor 
(public health care) and another for the rich (private practices).
Regarding health care expenditures as a whole, it must be noted that over 95% 
are current expenditures allocated to personnel, goods and services, conciertos, 
and pharmaceuticals. Although the capital expenditure figure has increased 
slightly as a percentage of total expenditure since 1988 it only accounts for the 
remainig 5%, a very low investment rate in a system that has historically proved 
as highly dependant on the private sector.
Despite only spending 7.4% of GDP in health care, health outcomes in Spain 
are fairly good. Mortality rate for all ICD causes is among the lowest of the 
OECD countries considered in Table 1.10, infant mortality rate is below 
European average (fifth among the countries in the table) and life expectancy, 
both for women and men, are average of the countries analysed in Table 1.10.
As regards mortality per cause of death, Table 1.10 shows that the two major 
causes of death in Spain are circulatory diseases and cancer. However, in both 
cases Spain is one of the two countries with the lowest rates. As regards 
infectious diseases, digestive and respiratory system diseases, Spain ranks 
average among those countries in the same table.
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In brief, four main facts could be inferred from these sequence of tables and 
figures. First, Spain shows as one of the European countries where health 
outcome indicators are better, keeping health expenditures well among the 
European standards. In second place, the Spanish system has achieved 
universal coverage and is being mainly financed through taxes, which has 
benefitted the overall equity of the system as regards its finance. Third, health 
services are mainly provided by the public sector, through the hospital 
network, although the role of contracts with the private sector should be 
acknowledged. Such a relationship may better be understood as 
complementary. Despite minor improvements, primary care is still lagging 
behind as a service network in most of Spanish regions. Finally, the 
decentralisation of public health services is still to be completed in Spain, not 
only regarding the number of regions presently benefiting from full 
competencies, but also regarding the need to correct the standing inequities in 
the finance and delivery of services across regions.
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Table 1.10.
Life expectancy, mortality and morbidity indicators (1994).
Selected
Countries
Life 
expectancy 
Females 
at birth 
(years)
Life 
expectancy 
Males 
at birth 
(years)
Mortality 
causes, ICD 
All causes 
Deaths/100,000 
pop.
Mortality 
causes, ICD 
Infectious, 
parasit. dis. 
Deaths/100,000 
pop.
Mortality 
causes, ICD 
Neoplasms 
Deaths/100,000 
pop.
Mortality 
causes, ICD 
Circulatory 
system dis. 
Deaths/100,000 
pop.
Mortality 
causes, ICD 
Respiratory 
system dis. 
Deaths/100,000 
pop.
Mortality 
causes, ICD 
Digestive 
system dis. 
Deaths/100,000 
pop.
Maternal and 
infant mort. 
Infant Mort 
Death/1,000 
births
Maternal and 
infant mort. 
Perinatal 
Mort 
Death/1,000 
births
Spain 81.0 73.3 674.5 8.3 179.7 245.9 57.5 37.8 6.0 6.5
Italy 80.7 74.3 972.5 3.8 273..0 424.1 59.1 49.9 6.6 -
France 81.8 73.7 639.7 8.8 194.3 182.8 39.6 33.3 5.9 7.4
Germany 79.5 73.0 - 10.0 268.3 528.8 64.9 52.6 5.6 6.5
Netherlands 80.3 74.6 725.3 5.6 210.3 271.9 57.3 26.6 5.7 8.6
Sweden 81.4 76.1 646.2 4.5 159.5 296.0 43.7 21.5 4.4 5.4
United Kingdom 79.5 74.2 762.2 4.2 209.6 321.6 99.4 26.5 6.2 8.9
Australia 80.9 75.0 7.09.9 5.8 188.6 307.5 55.8 21.6 5.9 4.5
Canada 81.1 75.1 707.8 10.9 199.3 268.6 62.7 26.3 6.3 7.2
Japan 83.0 76.6 710.0 - - - - - 4.2 4.8
United States 79.0 72.4 875.4 28.9 205.2 362.9 81.2 29.7 8.0 7.9
Source: OECD (1998).
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Table 1.11.
Demographic and macroeconomic dimensions (1994).
Selected
Countries
Population 
(in 1,000s)
Dependency 
Pop < 2 0  and 6 5 + /  
pop.20-64
Labour
Force
unemploy.
GDP 
PPP/capita ($)
Tot Pub Exp. 
PPP/capita ($)
Spain 39,150 67.0 24.2 15,162 6,626
Italy 57,204 61.7 11.3 20,236 10,664
France 57,900 70.5 12.1 20,464 11,519
Germany 81,423 58.3 9.6 21,622 10,811
Netherlands 15,381 60.4 6.7 20,481 10,843
Sweden 8,816 73.1 8.7 19,419 14,063
United Kingdom 58,395 70.3 9.8 19,055 7,565
Australia 17,838 68.2 - 20,801 7,447
Canada 29,256 63.9 - 21,604 9,656
Japan 124,960 60.2 - 23,150 8,311
United States 260,682 71.0 - 27,821 9,098
Source: OECD (1998).
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1.4.1. Decentralisation and regional allocation of resources.
The decentralisation process in Spain has meant an important shift in the 
financial resources public management bodies use. In 1982, when only 
Catalonian regional authorities had direct control over health care resources, 
almost 85% of the total resources were allocated by central authorities. Along 
time, Andalucia (1984), The Basque Country and Valencia (1987), Navarre and 
Galicia (1990), and Canary Islands (1994), have joined Catalonia, increasing the 
share of resources directly managed by regional authorities from 8% in 1982 to 
54% in 1991.
The regional allocation of public health care resources in Spain remains today a 
matter of vivid debate and continuing negotiation between the different actors 
in the system, namely central health authorities and representatives of regional 
departments of health. The debate is rooted on the coexistence of two radically 
different systems, the common system and the so-called imputaciones de cupo 
system. The basis for the territorial allocation of resources under the common 
system is population. This criteria, also recognised in the GHA (Art.82), 
accounts for the population in the territory, either covered by the public insurer 
or included in the demographic census.
However, as stated, there are two Autonomous Communities in Spain, namely 
the Basque Country and Navarre, who run under a different system: the 
imputaciones de cupo system The resulting monnies allocated to each of these 
communities represent a higher percentage than what the corresponding 
allocation following the per capita criteria would be. Further, it is not just an 
issue of more resources but also a question of faster and less bureaucratic 
procedures to follow under this imputaciones de cupo system.
Catalonia follows the common system. That is Catalonia's public health care is 
financed according to censed population. When compared to the Basque
49
Country or Navarre, this implies a series of drawbacks such as fewer resources, 
the forementioned more bureaucratic procedures, and the extensive timing of 
the process. As a consequence, two financial principles are said to be in threat, 
the principle of sufficiency and the principle of autonomy. The first principle 
argues in favour of overcoming continuous regional budget deficits as a result 
of delayed payment and persistent underbudgetting from central authorities, 
which has forced the need for public debt. The lack of autonomy comes largely 
as a result of excessive financial dependency from central authorities in Madrid.
Further, detractors from the per capita criteria argue such a system does not 
acknowledge differences in health nor health care needs across regions, neither 
differences between utilisation rates or socioeconomic factors like income, age 
and gender distributions. Finally, the ruling system does not account for 
patients movements across regions nor for an increased number of population 
in seasonal waves as a consequence of turism .22
Health economists in Spain have dedicated research efforts to looking into 
alternative sets of criteria for the allocation of regional budgets. They have 
come to the conclusion that the GHA's population criterion should include 
additional criteria such as morbidity, socio-economic conditions, migrant 
patients, utilisation rate of services, coverage, and tourism. Despite this, there 
are important information lacks on hospital care, primary care and 
pharmaceuticals use so as to adequately target the issue. Policy-makers should 
take this fact into account, too, and balance the benefits of using a probably 
more adequate criteria and the cost derived from setting up a complex resource 
allocation formula, including overcoming data information needs.
22
Regarding this latter point there is a w ill to create either a new compensation fund for this purpose 
or modify the per capita criteria introducing a tourism corrector.
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Today the regional financing model consists of three separate funds. The first is 
the basic fund, also called general fund, which accounts for 98% of the total 
amount to be distributed to the regions. The criteria used for the regional 
allocation of these funds is only population. The second fund is mainly 
concerned about patients flows across regions and educational activities.
Finally, a third fund is added as a result of a series of governmental negotiations 
with the pharmaceutical industry from which some 65,000 mill I ion Spanish 
Pesetas have been saved to the budget. This sum, however, is also distributed 
according to population in each region (see Table 1.12).
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Table 1.12.
Regional distribution of resources 1998-2001 (in thousands of Pesetas).
Regions Population 
(in 1,000s)
% General
Fund
% Ear-marked
Fund
% Total
resources
(1)
% Pharm.
Savings
% TOTAL
Resources
(2)
%
Catalonia 6,069.5 15.50 593,665.3 15.75 30,827.8 45.09 624,493.1 16.27 10,237.2 15.75 634730.3 16.27
Galicia 2,729.7 6.97 260,559.7 6.91 5,282.9 7.73 265,842.6 6.93 4,493.1 6.91 270,335.7 6.92
Andalucia 7,064.8 18.04 681,160.9 18.07 12,334.2 18.04 693,495.1 18.07 11,746 18.07 705,241.1 18.07
Valencia 3,893.3 9.94 385,440.5 10.23 3,314.1 4.85 388,754.6 10.13 6,646.6 10.23 395,401.2 10.13
Canary Islands 1,535.3 3.92 153,310.5 4.07 1,099.7 1.61 154,410.2 4.02 2,643.7 4.07 157,053.9 4.02
Basque Country 721.6 1.84 205,263.7 5.45 3,536.5 5.17 208,800.2 5.44 35,396 5.45 212,339.8 5.44
Navarre 524.0 1.34 50,669.2 1.34 968.6 1.42 51,637.8 1.35 873.8 1.34 52,511.6 1.35
Subtotal 22,538.2 57.56 2,330,069.8 61.28 57,363.8 83.91 2,387,433.6 62.21 40,180 61.28 2,427,613.6 62.20
INSALUD 16,611.2 42.44 1,439,326.7 38.18 10,999.0 16.09 1,450,325.7 37.79 24,820 38.18 1,475,145.7 37.80
TOTAL 39,149.4 100.0 3,769,396.5 100.0 68,362.8 100.0 3,837,759.3 100.0 65,000 100.0 3,902,759.3 100.0
Source: Generalitat de Catalunya (1998)
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1.4.2. Broad remaining problems and reform proposals.
Despite all the above, there are important critical elements in the organisation 
and financing of Spanish health care system that should also be noted. Elola 
(1991) identified three aspects that critically represent the present situation, 
namely legitimation, financial and rational problems.
The legitimation component (political and professional acceptability, 
responsiveness to need, community allegiance to the system) is said to be the 
consequence of three combined features: lack of community participation, 
alienation of the system, and bureaucracy. Before the GHA was put through, 
the health system was perceived as both imposed on the medical professionals 
and foreign to the needs of the Spanish population. On the bases of this 
historical legitimation crisis, the 1986 reform was set as an alternative model.
As it has been already stated, the GHA tried to promote community 
participation through the establishment of a patients' charter. However, the law 
did not consider the patient as an active part in the planning and decision 
processes (typical from other National Health Services operating in Europe) but 
as a client asking for more and better services (increasing health consumption 
in the system). As a result, the Spanish NHS appeared as distant from the 
individuals benefiting from it as it was before, hardly adaptable to the 
population's needs, and therefore poorly legitimated, specially when 
rationalisation measures had to be implemented. Moreover, bureaucracy (a 
tradition inherited from the INP of the 1940s) did not help to bring the system 
any closer to its objective.
The critical financial component is a direct consequence of a persistent 
increase in health expenditure due to three incentives: the expansion towards 
universal coverage, the ageing of the population, the increasing use of new
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technology, and new health care demands23. Cost-containment measures in the 
mid eighties in Spain targeted on wages (of those professionals working in the 
public sector) and, in a minor scale, on holding back capital investment and 
controlling the number of conciertos. These policies were more concerned with 
short-term direct controls on budgetary expansion than in improving the 
efficiency of the system. However, their outcome could be judged as positive 
within that period, since the public health expenditure-GDP ratio was kept 
w ithin an acceptable margin. It was done, nonetheless, at a high political cost: 
the resulting confrontation with the medical professional organisations. Today, 
the pressure on the health budget is still high and it annually shows significant 
deficits. Accordingly, the government cost-containment policy has extended to 
areas such as pharmaceuticals, service provision, and efficiency.24
Finally, the criticisms regarding the rational component is a consequence of a 
decrease in both the efficiency and the effectiveness of the system to meet its 
objectives. The health authorities attempted to improve efficiency by the 
expansion of primary care services with no proper evaluation of outcomes, and 
by a hospital reform that has not improved productivity but prompted the 
medical professionals' discontent. In addition, the increase in chronic and 
degenerative illnesses together with the system's deficient adjustment to match
Rising expectations among the population about medical services together with a third payer 
phenomenon incentive to demand services, have also been argued as elements to explain increased 
expenditures in health systems in developed cointries.
The Ley del Medicamento (pharmaceutical law) has set tighter controls and selective exclusion of 
pharmaceuticals from the list of those eligible to be prescribed by NHS physicians. A redefinition 
of the services provided by the NHS has also been put through (although central health authorities 
claim it has been an adequate and necessary updating of the services offered by the public system). 
Finally, regarding efficiency issues, contracts between health agencies on one hand (INSALUD and 
Regional Health Services) and public hospitals on the other have increasingly been based on cost- 
per-case criteria. However, these measures have been more concerned with improving efficiency 
in the management of services rather than looking for the economic efficiency derived from a more 
competitive health market. In short, the financial constraints the health system has faced, and is still 
facing in the present, have been fought back with cost control measures, more in the line of an 
economistic policy than by improving the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the system.
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these population needs have culminated in the decline of the overall efficiency. 
The decrease in the effectiveness has come as a result of, first, the outlined 
decline in efficiency and the parallel increase in the health expenditure, 
second, the expansion in bureaucracy and, third, the unadequate use of new 
medical technology25.
The reform proposals under debate are concerned with overcoming the 
reported financial, rational and legitimation problems (Elola, 1991). The 
instruments to do so vary. The economism of the system (thought to bring 
down costs) would be replaced by a more efficient entrepreneurial 
management. Expansionism as a policy would be taken over by a proper 
evaluation of both technology and quality, promoting those services which are 
more efficient, according to equity and to the available resources. Finally, 
bureaucratisation would be corrected through a greater community 
participation closer of the original National Health Service concept.
There is a general agreement about the elements the reform should incorporate 
(those stated above) but there is still scope for the debate about how to 
implement the objectives of economic efficiency, evaluation and community 
participation. In short, about how to reform the health system so it could be 
more receptive to population needs and more flexible regarding its constraints. 
For this purpose, experts, health managers and politicians try to bring into the 
Spanish health care system the internal market practices and theories from 
other countries in Europe, specially Great Britain.
The first approach to a market reform in Spain was reflected in a Parliamentary 
Commission report, better known as Informe Abril, on the analysis and
A satisfactory technology evaluation and its assimilation by the health services are key elements to 
solve the rationality crisis in the system. Health Technology Assessment agencies in Spain have a 
major role to play here.
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evaluation of the National Health Service (Comision de Analisis y Evaluation 
del Sistema National de Salud 1991). This report acknowledged the present 
NHS has positively contributed to the well-being of the Spanish population, but 
argued at the same time that new trends in health demand made a restructuring 
necessary. The changes that were to be applied should aim at setting the ideal 
conditions to benefit from a greater level of decentralisation, managed 
competition and a clearer allocation of responsabilities. Its recomendations 
were divided in two groups, with regard to the organisational and financial 
aspects.26
This report, however, was put aside since the financial considerations it 
contained were not of the like of the socialist government, that is, not too 
viable, politically speaking. Despite the favourable comments of most experts
Regarding the organisation, any proposal of reform should take account of the fact that the system 
is immersed in a process of decentralisation that is still to be completed. Whatever the new 
organisation looks like, it would have to fit into the existing administration arrangements of the 
Estado de las Autonomfas. The lost of power by the central bodies due to the decentralisation 
process would coincide w ith the reinforcement of general strategical aspects at a central body. A 
reinbursement mechanism between regional authorities would also be attempted since there is an 
outstanding movement of patients across regions. I brief, the new model would imply an structural 
change in the existing system as well as new functioning rules (in the line of private law regarding 
hospitals and personnel). A division between the purchase and the provision of services (like in 
other European countries) would be necessary, making the gradual introduction of competition 
rules among providers possible and increasing, as a consequence, efficiency and choice in the 
system. New management bodies would also be necessary since today's INSALUD is too big for 
the purpose of such reform. The ideal size would either be the Areas de Salud (Health Areas) 
mentioned in the GHA or the smaller Zonas de Salud (Health Zones, similar to District Health 
Authorities in the British model). The regions w ill be in charge of coordinating the Health 
Areas/Zones in their territory, acting as holdings. The new management bodies would have greater 
autonomy and flexibility so as to more properly address the population needs, and would link their 
budgets -now more accurate and flexible- to the needs of the new management competencies. In 
this more competitive system, the private sector would have a more participative role. To enter this 
market, however, private organisations would need to show their financial viability and give credit 
of the quality of their services.
Regarding the financial side, the State's budget contributions would continue being the main 
source of financing the system, completed with the existing social contributions (these would not 
disappear), and some undetermined and originally minimal user co-payments regarding some 
services (in order to promote a concience over the cost of services) would be introduced. A clearer 
definition of those services covered by the NHS would be necessary, specifying which would be 
cataloged as basic, complementary or additional. A further user co-payment is conceived regarding 
pharmaceuticals if economic and budget conditions require it.
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in the area regarding the organisational issues (Lopez Casanovas, 1991;
Ventura, 1992 ; Moreu, 1993; Olavarrieta, 1993), the non-systematic appoach 
displayed in the report, the scarce comments on public health and primary care 
issues, and the combination of very detailed and too general aspects, turned 
the report into a declaration of principles.
The ideas that inspired this Comission's report, however, were also present at 
the level of some regions. Indeed, in April 1991 the Health Organisation Law 
by the Catalan Government {Llei d'Ordenacid Sanitaria de Catalunya-LOSC) 
set, in the scope of its competencies, the bases of a new organisational 
structure of health services In Catalonia. Catalonia was joined later by the 
Basque Country (Plan Estrategico Vasco), and together have become the 
reference to those other regional governments with full competencies in health 
care that are presently thinking of similar reforms in their Regional Health 
Services. The rest of the regions (INSALUD-direct management) still depend on 
decisions coming from central INSALUD in Madrid, and so far, very slight 
moves in this direction have been attempted.
Recent Ministry's policies such as the redefinition of services, the gradual 
economic evaluation of types of treatment, and the pharmaceutical law, have 
aimed at both the improvement in the quality and quantity of information, and 
at the amelioration of the public system's critical financial situation. What is 
relevant, however, is the fact that there has been a change in the Ministry's 
attitude towards the Catalonian experience. In the first place, the central 
government reaction to the Catalan law (LOSC) was a mixture of scepticism 
and very slight opposition. In two years time, this first opinion has changed 
drastically, and Madrid is now admitting this sort of policy may be the answer 
to its own difficulties. Yet, on the other hand, central authorities are not totally 
sure of how to deal with the negative effects the reform may have on the
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equity27 and universality of the present system. It is my belief that, since the 
decentralisation process is still on its way, and INSALUD would gradually 
disappear in the future (as Regional Services from the rest of regions w ill take 
hold of its competencies), the Ministry in Madrid is implicitly expecting 
regional governments to take hold of the reforms by themselves, avoiding the 
political cost these changes may carry, and at the same time learnig from pilot 
experiences like the Catalan and Basque's.28
Since the improvement of the health system is a common concern to all 
political parties, both regionally and nationally, parties' ideological strictness 
should be overcome in order to reach a common strategy towards change. 
Furthermore, the fact that any health reform embodies high political costs to 
the governmental party must convince politicians to reach a comprehensive 
agreement on the policy option. The Pactos de la Moncloa in 1977 was a valid 
experience of this sort of multi-party commitment in the past.
Finally, it should be noted that for any health care reform to succeed in Spain it 
w ill have to count on a plausible policy option to be applied and a favourable 
social and political climate, but should also account for the characteristics, 
objectives and values of the Spanish health care system, equity among them, 
and fit into the ongoing decentralisation process.
In 1989 a more tax-financed public health system was prompted aiming at achieving greater equity 
in the finance. This late-eighties effort could now be threatened by the reform proposal outlined 
in the Commission's report regarding the increase in the level of co-payments (out-of-pocket 
payments) in pharmaceuticals and services provided by the NHS. The consequent increase in 
direct payments would result in substantial social inequity, since these represent a greater part of 
income in the lower income groups.
The introduction of internal market policies in some regions and not in others could give way to 
a notorious spatial inequity. Those regions with full decentralised competencies and with a 
powerful private sector would be able to benefit from the expected increase in economic efficiency 
derived from a more competitive market, while the rest of regions would still depend on Madrid 
for such decisions.
58
1.4.3. The Catalan model within the Spanish health system.
Catalonia is one of existing seventeen Autonomous Communities in Spain. It 
accounts for approximately six million people, that is 15% of the Spanish 
population. Its population growth is extreamly low, around 1.9%, when 
compared with 3.1 in Spain and 3.9 in the EU (1996). Around 76% of the 
population live in the urban setting compared with 65% in Spain (1996). Per 
capita GDP is 15,054 ECU, which is 19% of total Spanish GDP (1995) (Cambra 
de Corner^, Industria i Navegacio, 1998).
As stated before, Catalonia enjoys an important range of competencies in the 
public sector policy area. Health is one of this area of policy devolved to 
Catalonia in the early eighties. In the early nineties Tha Catalan Parliament 
passed the Catalan Health Organisation Law {Llei d'Ordenacio Sanitaria de 
Catalunya -LOSC). This is the fundamental law in the organisation, planning 
and management of health care in Catalonia. Its main characteristic is the 
consolitation of a public-private mix system as regards the provision of health 
care services. As a consequence of a historical desequilibrium in the 
investment trend in the health care area in Spain, Catalonia had to bet on the 
available health care services network to cover the entire Catalan population. 
This network was, and remains, quite different in terms of ownership to that 
prevailing in the rest of Spain. Only 40% of available beds belong to the strictly 
speaking public health care network, while the remainig 60% are of a diverse 
ownership, including municipalities, districts, religious institutions, and for- 
profit institutions.
Following the Spanish health care system characteristics, the Catalan model 
can be also described as a mix financed model. Differently from the rest of 
Spain 25% of the population in Catalonia enjoy both public and private 
insurance. A series of health goals are recognised by the Catalan health care 
authorities and shown in Table 1.13. The organising structure of the public
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management bodies is graphically displayed in Figure 1.1.
Table. 1.13.
Health care goals in Catalonia.
AIMS MEANS
* H ealth  care is a public service, financed by 
public  sources.
* H ealth  care is provided to all the population  
under universal coverage principles.
* The Catalan health system is an integral 
system. Special emphasis on health 
prom otion and preventive mesasures is 
given.
* Equity and am elioration of geographical and 
social unbalances.
* Rationalisation, efficacy and efficiency in 
health care organization.
*  Create the Catalan Health Service as
a public body responsible for the provision  
of public health care services.
* Consolidation of the private-public m ix as 
regards provision of services.
* Formulation of a managed com petition  
model (diversity of providers, purchasing- 
provider split)
*  Decentralisation to the territory.
* Diversity in the management form ulae.
* Citizen and com m unity Participation in 
the management of the SCS.
Source: Adapted from LOSC (1991).
Figure 1.1.
Organising structure of the public management bodies in Catalonia.
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  H ea l t h
Catalan Health Central and
Service Territorial bodies
-
Public Catalan Institute
firm s o f Health
Catalan Institute 
of Health 
Studies
Source: G eneralitat de Catalunya (1997a)
60
The Department of Health is in charge of setting priorities in health care policy. 
It is clearly a planning body. It is also responsible for competencies in the areas 
of control, inspection and evaluation of health care activities and the Catalan 
Health Service. The Catalan Health Service is attached to the Department of 
Health. It is in charge of guaranteeing public coverage of medical assistance. It 
therefore acts as a public insurer and contracts health care services w ith both 
public and private providers (see Figure 1.2.). The provision of health care 
services is done on the bases of an acreditation mechanism, and the valid 
instrument for the purchase of health care services is the contract. The whole of 
providers that sign service contracts with the Catalan Health Service constitute 
the Catalan Network of Public Health Care Provision. In this respect, the 
Catalan Health Institute, the major public provider, is one more of these 
providers.
Figure 1.2.
Public-private mix system in the provision of health care in Catalonia.
i
i
Citizens
Econom ic and information  
flow s
Catalan Health 
Service
Providers
Planning
Financing
Purchasing
Assessment
Source: Generalitat de Catalunya (1992)
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The Catalan Health Organisation Law (LOSC) has been studied regarding many 
aspects and from diverse standpoints. It would then be extreamly difficult to 
show here a complete assessment of what has been produced in this respect. It 
is, however, illustrative to account for some interesting, albeit neccessarily 
broad, implications.
First, although the Catalan Health Organisation Law does not explicitly 
mention the purchaser-provider split, the system has evolved to a much clearer 
division of tasks among management and service bodies. At the purchaser 
level, the Catalan Health Survey acts as the public insurer and therefore 
finances, controls, assesses and buys services from a wide range of providers 
included in the public health care provision network. As stated, the contracts 
serve to this purpose. These contracts follow the guidelines and priorities 
pointed out in the Catalan Health Plan and the Catalan Plan for Sociosanitari 
Services.
At the provider level, the system remains a public-private mix. However, it is 
arguable there is any competition for contracts with Catalan Health Service, the 
purchaser. Although on the one hand, the LOSC may have meant a loss in 
public monopoly power, on the other hand it could well have implied a 
publicitation of the health care services network (Gallego-Calderon, 1999). The 
contract has served to the purpose of activity control, although it is unclear 
whether this control counts on the necessary assessment mechanisms, 
information sources and sanction power. What has become evident is the need, 
at the provider side, of better health services management, and managers.
Finally, at the user level it seems that the Catalan Health Organisation Law 
takes into account a greater degree of participation. It is therefore also to them 
the claim of a better service quality in terms of trained personnel, 
infrastructures and costs, as well as the possible trade-offs among these issues.
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1.5. Concluding remarks.
The four most distinguished elements in Spanish health care system today are 
universal coverage, public provision of health services, strength of the hospital 
network over primary care services, and decentralisation.
In some ways, the Spanish health care system is still based in some of the social 
security principles of the Francoist period. The GHA pointed to a change 
towards a National Health System, covering almost the entire Spanish 
population and being largely financed through State's budget transfers. Both of 
these are basic conditions to qualify the ruling system as a National Health 
Service type. However, some aspects of the organisation and the level of the 
services provided are proper to a social security system. Indeed, public finance 
accounts for 75% of the total finance, which places Spain among countries like 
Germany or Holland, rather than among those other like the UK or Sweden.
Secondly, health services in Spanish regions are mainly delivered in publicly 
owned centres and by NHS doctors and nurses. Only Catalonia provides 
health services mostly through the not-public sector (60% of total beds). The 
Basque Country, rating second in the same ratio, is down to 44% of the beds. 
The rest of regions vary enormously regarding the size of the private sector, 
from 5% in Extremadura to 33% in Navarre and Valencia. This has forced 
regional authorities in Catalonia to look to the private sector as a means to 
guarantee universal coverage principles.
Finally, decentralisation. Spain started in the eighties a slow process of health 
decentralisation to the regions that is far from being complete. Only seven out 
of seventeen regions benefit from full competencies in the health care area. 
Along time, this process has encountered various difficulties among which the 
unclear definition of responsabilities should be mentioned. In addition, a 
stronger coordination between regions' policies as well as between regions'
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health plans is needed if we are to avoid having a National Health Plan as a 
result of simply getting together seventeen different regional plans.
This research focusses on various of these aspects. Universalisation together 
with the decentralisation process have brought on the need to study whether 
Catalonia, a region endowed with full competencies in health and with a 
particular private-public mix in the provision of services, has achieved the 
equity objective. The next chapter is concerned with the equity principle as 
mentioned in the fundamental laws that rule Spanish health care, both at the 
national and regional level of Catalonia.
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CHAPTER 2.
Equity as a Policy Objective.
Equity is a key objective in most health care systems, particularly in terms of 
policy documents and policy statements (Mooney, 1994). However, much is 
debated regarding what is meant by equity and how equity should be 
measured. This chapter addresses both issues and brings in the results and 
conclusions of the most relevant studes on the topic in Spain.
The Spanish Constitution and the General Health Act (GHA) have commonly 
been given as suitable examples of these sort of aspirational priorities. The way 
both address the issue of equity in the health care arena could be defined as of 
general ambiguity. In this respect, articles 31 (Title I, Ch.2), 41, 43 and 49 (Title 
I, Ch.3) in the 1978 Spanish Constitution literally read:
Title I, Chapter 2, Section 2, A rt 31.2. Public expenditure would be allocated 
according to equity principles, and its planning and implementation would 
consider efficiency and economy criteria.
Title I, Chapter 3, A rt 41. Public authorities would keep a social security system 
for all citizens that would guarantee assistance and social services according to 
need situations, specially unemployment.
Art.43.1. The right for health protection is recognised. 2. It is competence of the 
public authorities the organisation and guardianship of public health by means 
of preventive services and the provision of the necessary health services. 
Forthcoming law enforcements would establish rights and duties in this respect. 
Art 49. Public authorities would create and promote the necessary policies for 
the treatment, rehabilitation and integration of those citizens with physical, 
psichological or other impairments to which specialised atention should be 
provided.
Note: Author's translation.
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The 1986 GHA, passed eight years later, developed more specifically these 
equity considerations raised in the Spanish Constitution:
Title I, Chapter 1, Art.3.2. Public provision of health care services will cover the 
whole of Spanish population. Access to these services would be under 
conditions of effective equity.
A rt 3.3. Health policy would be addressed to overcome territorial and social 
unbalances.
A rt 6.4. Health Authorities would address their action towards guaranteeing 
health care services provision in all cases when health status is lost.
A rt 12. Health Authorities will devote health expenditures to the correction of 
health and health care inequalities and to guarantee equity of access to public 
health care services in all the Spanish territory [...].
A rt 16. The rules of use of health care services should be equal for all, regardless 
of the condition under which the person has accessed these services. [...]
Title III, Chapter 1, A rt 46. The basic characteristics of Spanish Health Care 
System are: (a) Coverage of health care services to all the population.[...]
Note: Author's translation.
The decentralisation process, recognised by the Spanish Constitution and the 
GHA, has also brought the equity objective to the policy level of the 
Autonomous Communities. Indeed, the Catalan legal dispositions, of interest to 
this research, addressed equity issues in several of the Catalan Health 
Organisation Law (LOSC) articles:
II. Following the 14/1986 Spanish General Health Act, the present legal 
disposition recognises the constitutional right to health protection [...]. Within 
this framework the LOSC aims at the arrangement of the public health care 
system in Catalonia according to the principles of universal coverage, integration 
of services, [...]
Title I General dispositions, A rt 2. Health protection, and the arrangements and 
organisation of health services in Catalonia should comply with the following
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principles:[...] c. Universalisation of individual and colective health care 
services to all citizens in Catalonia. [...] f. Equity and overcoming of 
geographical and social inequalities in the provision of health care services.
Note: Author's translation.
From all the above, the equity objective stands out clearly in all the relevant 
legal dispositions in the context where the present research takes place. 
However, little is said as to how the assessment of equity should be approached 
and what to do to overcome inequalities in the provision of health care. 
Accordingly, we have few clues so as to how to assess whether the system has 
achieved or not one its most outstanding and explicit policy goals.
2.1. Equity, health and health care.
The notion of equity has been largely a matter of schools of thought and values. 
Thus, so as to attempt a definition of equity we should look into what are the 
different values within each of these schools and ideologies. We can find at 
least six distinct approaches to the term of equity in health care, each of them 
closely related to the role played by both the State and individual freedom in 
this policy area, and briefly revised here: (a) egalitarianism, (b) libertarianism,
(c) neo-libertarianism, (d) the utilitarian approach, (e) rawlsianism, and the (f) 
envy-free allocation theory.
The concept of equity in health care under egalitarianism needs some 
interpretation since the school did not originally addressed this particular policy 
issue in its formulation. The first interpretation proposed is that of equality of 
public expenditure, for example, where no regard was paid to differences in 
health status or need for health care. A second body of interpretation insists on 
equality of outcome, that is, on the distribution of health itself.
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Besides the interpretation taken, the school has been criticised for failing in 
relating detailed policy statements to its philosophical standpoint. The concerns 
w ith the egalitarian approach have been numerous. As stated, most of them 
concentrate on the difficulties in translating what the school defines as equity 
into valid policy recommendations. Further, if we are to equalise health 
outcomes this would require inmense ammounts of resources devoted to those 
with very poor health so as to get them from where they are to an equal 
situation with the rest of members of society, for which it has been described as 
too costly in terms of sacrifices to health and other good things in life (Mooney, 
1992a; 1992b).
A third interpretation, adopted in this research, takes into account the concept 
of need for health care services and, thus, equality of treatment for equal need. 
This interpretation does not imply equilising health outcomes and, as it w ill be 
shown later, has been translated into clearer policy recommendations.
Libertarianism as a doctrine conceives equity in terms of distribution according 
to entitlement. This proposition suggests that one is entitled to what the 
individual posseses provided that it was acquired justly. Nozick proposed that 
just acquisitions are based on earnings, inheritance or through redistribution by 
government of holdings acquired illegally (Pereira, 1993). Hence, what may be 
judged as an equal situation depends entirely on the process or path used to get 
to it.
It seems like the libertarian approach is clearly at a far distance from any equity 
statement in the policy area in most European countries. The doctrine envisages 
health and health care as commodities the individual may acquire, and hence it 
is in this process that equity should be defined in regard to health and health 
care. A drastical extrapolation of this approach would lead to consider as just 
situations one may normally judge as terribly unfair. Down syndrome, for 
instance, is a chromosomal abnormality. The individual is born with this
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malformation. There is nothing you can do about it since there is no possible 
treatment once born. It is consequenty inherited by the individual. Libertarians, 
would consider this situation as equitable leading to no action or redistribution 
of resources towards individuals in these situations. Further, this is also the case 
of most chronic medical conditions. In all these circumstances the resulting 
situation w ill be that of a fair distribution of health or health care since it was 
acquired either through entitlement or inheritance. Finally, libertarians suggest 
that the market is an additional source of fairness. Health care is not a right in 
itself, and only when the individual acquires this commodity through the 
market it could be considered to have a right over it.
Redistribution and the role of the state under strict libertarian thought are seen 
as unjust in themselves. Accordingly, no attention is paid to the worse-off, to 
those sick or ill, to the poor, to those with physical or psychological 
impairments. That is, no value is attached to caring, generosity, altruism nor 
solidarity principles. The market rules the way to fair acquisitons and the 
allocation of resources. Finally, this approach disregards issues such as public 
and social goods, externalities and consumer imperfect information, whose 
presence in the health care market cannot be denied.
Neo-libertarian doctrines tried to alleviate this extreme libertarian approach to 
equity by means of formulating the decent minimum proposition. This suggests 
a role by the State as the provider of some sort of safety net, that is, a standard 
below which individuals should not be allowed to fall. However, it is unclear 
whether this decent minimum refers to health or health care. Are we referring 
to a decent minimum of health, or to the provision of a minimum standard of 
health care? In any of these cases the State is reserved a minimal role in terms 
of providing that minimum standard to the poor and to those that do not 
actively participate in the market.
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Once more, the role of the State as a guarantee of a minimum does not match 
the European governments' involvement in health care policy at all, let alone 
the achievement of universal coverage as a policy objective.
Moreover, one of the main concerns with this approach is what constitutes a 
decent minimum the State should guarantee. The theory is certainly opaque in 
this sense. Should we take this decent minimum as given, static, constant across 
cultural heterogeneity, unchangeable with increased knowledge and the fast 
development of technology, invariable with the appearance of new needs and 
demands, and non-responsive to the availability of resources? All this suggests 
that the clarification of what is an acceptable minimum standard is a fairly 
complex, yet unsolved, issue.
The utilitarian school focusses attention on maximisation principles. According 
to this doctrine resources should be allocated so as to maximize total or 
aggregated utility. The relevant issue here would be the maximisation of health 
gain by means of providing health care services. Redistribution is clearly out of 
the way, and no role for State action is prioritised. It has been widely argued 
that it is not equity what the underlying propositions pursue, but a clearly 
defined concept of efficiency. Sen, for example, has clearly disclosed some of 
the criticisms to this approach, namely welfarism, sum-ranking and 
consequentalism (for a wider view on this issue see: Sen, 1993; Sen and 
Williams, 1982). Further, there are various technical and methodological 
difficulties and limitations in operationalising the utilitarian approach. If such an 
approach is to be used then we should find answers to questions such as, 
whose utilities matter? How should we attempt to measure them? How can we 
actually compare interpersonal utilities? How should we proceed in the 
aggregation of such utilities? All these questions are still part of the most vivid 
debate among health economists today.
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Rawls' maximin and the veil of ignorance suggest that social policies should 
seek to maximise the position of the least well-off. Accordingly, an inequitable 
distribution would be justified only on the grounds of favouring this group. 
Rawls standing point has been criticised on various bases (Le Grand, 1987a, 
1987b). How should the most disadvantaged group be defined? How can we 
tell whether inequalities are to their advantage or not?
Daniels has brought Rawlsian ideas into the health care domain. He argues in 
favour of including health in the set of Rawlsian primary social goods that 
should not be left to individual choice, since health care is necessary for 
species functioning. However, we still find some practical problems in terms of 
how such a rawlsian concept of equity may be applied to empirical analysis.
An alternative approach to equity is the envy-free allocation theory. Non-envy 
allocations do not count on external moral viewpoints so as to judge a 
distribution as equitable. The bases for such a judgement are individual 
preferences. Once more, criticisms have been raised as regards practical 
application problems.
The approach used in this research is a pro-egalitarian view of equity. 
Egalitarians may judge equity by assessing the extent to which health care is, in 
practice, distributed according to need, and financed according to ability to pay 
(Van Doorslaeer et a/., 1993). More specifically, whether individuals that could 
be catalogued as in equal need as a result of sharing a similar health status (as 
measured by a series of ill-health indicators), receive equal treatment as 
measured by the use of primary, specialist and inpatient care and their 
corresponding expenditures.
The reasons for such a choice are various. First, most European countries share 
this egalitarian viewpoint as regards equity in health care. Certainly, as seen 
from the Spanish Constitution, the 1986 GHA and the Catalan LOSC, the
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conceptualisation of the term equity in Spain and Catalonia seem to refer to 
equal treatment for equal need. Second, much empirical work to date on equity 
in health care in western countries has reflected also this egalitarian standpoint 
for similar reasons. Therefore, for the purpose of comparative research one may 
also argue in favour of using this approach. An additional interpretation of the 
term equity under egalitarianism refers to equality of access, particularly in 
reference to costs and time faced by individuals receiving health care. 
Acknowleging the relevance of this approach, given the universal coverage 
conditions in Spain and Catalonia, this research has focussed on equality of 
utilisation
2.2. Inequalities in health care.
Since the late 1970s inequalities in health care have been on the agenda of 
many researchers in the social sciences. For the last fifteen years, plenty of 
research efforts have contributed, both methodologically and empirically, to 
what has been, and remains, a vivid debate on inequalities in the European 
perspective (Le Grand, 1978,1982,1991; Collins and Klein, 1980; Puffer, 1985; 
lllsley and Svensson, 1986; ATach eta/., 1987; Mooney, 1987,1991; Culyer, 
1988,1991; Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993; Pope, 1988; Green, 1988; Fox, 1989; 
O'Donnell and Propper, 1991a, 1991b; Wagstaff et a/., 1991a, 1991b, 1991c,
1994,1997; Van Doorslaer et a/., 1992, 1993; Van der Meer et a/., 1996; 
Gerdtham, 1997; Marmot et a/., 1997; Poland et a/., 1998, among others). It 
has also formed part of a wider debate on inequalities in health, sparkled by the 
Black Report (DHSS, 1980) and much debated since (Anderson and Newman, 
1973; Dworkin, 1981; Whitelegg, 1982; Daniels, 1985; Sen, 1985; Baumol, 
1986; Le Grand, 1987a, 1987b; Fox, 1989; House and Kessler, 1990; Pereira, 
1990; Vagero, 1991; Monroe, 1992; Whitehead, 1992; Benzeval eta/., 1995; 
Blane, 1995; Blazer et a/., 1995; Lairson et a/., 1995; Siegrist, 1995; Arblaster 
eta/., 1996; Foster, 1996; Rosenberg and Hanlon, 1996; Blaxter, 1997,1998;
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Macintyre, 1997; Mackenbach and Kunst, 1997; Manor et a/., 1997;
Wadsworth, 1997; Bloom and Macintyre, 1998; Judge, 1998, among others).
In Spain, health and equity have been highlighted issues in different studies 
throughout the literature on the Spanish health care system. However, as it w ill 
be shown in the literature review later in this chapter, most of the research 
done to date has been largely devoted to inequalities in health rather than 
inequalities in health care.
Recently, some studies have addressed the issue of inequalities in health care in 
Spain, that is, inequalities in the delivery and financing of health care services. 
During the 1980's the first National Health Surveys were produced and, in 
consequence, a number of studies addressed more specifically the area of 
inequalities in health care (among the most important authors we should 
mention Gol, 1978; Duran, 1983; Lemkow, 1986; Gonzalez and Regidor,
1988; Murillo et a/., 1988; Alonso et a/., 1988; Ortun, 1990; Guillen, 1990; De 
Miguel and Rodrfguez, 1990; Bandres, 1991; Freire, 1993, Rodriguez et a/., 
1993; FOESSA, 1983,1994; Borras, 1994; Benach, 1995, Diez eta/., 1995; 
Ramis, 1995; Librero and Benavides 1995; Navarro-Rubio et a/., 1995;
Fernandez et a/., 1996; Regidor et a/., 1996; Fernandez et a/., 7996; Luengo et 
a/., 1996, Mann eta/., 1997; Abasolo, 1998; Fernandez eta/., 1999; Borrell et 
a/., forthcoming). Yet, only a minority of these studies were comprehensive 
enough to draw a full picture of health care inequalities in the Spanish health 
care system.
The scope of these studies on inequalities in health care was largely national, 
that is for the whole of Spain. No separate all-embracing regional analysis was 
performed. This indeed limited the usefulness of the information provided to 
regional health authorities since it was largely referred to inequalities at a 
higher level of analysis. This is particularly important since in the eighties, as 
stated, Spain embarked on a major decentralisation process of health care to the
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regions. Once decentralisation had taken place and regions were gradually 
devolved competencies in health care, studies of a national scope became 
insufficient since the tackling of inequalities in health care had became an area 
of major concern for regional authorities and the local governments. It is within 
this new scenario of three different levels of administration, namely national, 
regional, and local, that inequalities in health care should now be informed. 
National data should thus be complemented with regional and local data and 
analysis to draw a more accurate picture of inequalities in health care and 
better target health objectives and policy responses. This research addresses the 
regional level of analysis using specific data from Catalonia.
2.2.1. The measurement of inequality.
The measurement of inequalities in health have traditionally been based on the 
use of a series of measures and indices which are worth to briefly recapitule 
here. Wagstaff et a/. (1991c) have summarised these measures in six, namely 
Ranges, Gini Coefficients, Pseudo-Gini Coefficients, Dissimilarity Indexes, and 
Concentration Indexes. All of them address the notion of inequality as regards 
the distribution of health, and are ultimately used to the measurement of the 
distribution of health care across the population.
The first of the measures pointed out here are Ranges. This approach compares 
health indicators between top and bottom groups in a classification of 
individuals according to a given socio-economic variable. The results are given 
in the form of percentage point differences between groups or, alternatively, in 
terms of ratios including both groups. However, the use of ranges is not without 
shortcomings and limitations. Two main points are raised at this stage and 
briefly mentioned before. First, ranges fail to consider what happens in 
intermediate socioeconomic groups. The use of this measure also comes short 
to account for differences in the relative size of the groups. Not always the
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socio-economic groups considered include the same number of individuals 
and, consequently, using ranges would ignore changes in their relative size. 
Further, following from this last remark an additional problem arises and that is 
the one derived from making international comparisons on the bases of such 
measures.
The second set of the measures accounted for in Wagstaff et al. (1991 c) work 
are the Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients. Lorenz's curves plot cumulative 
proportions of population ranked by health, against the cumulative proportion 
of health. An equal distribution of health would result from a Lorenz curve that 
matches the diagonal in the box. The further the Lorenz curve moves away 
from the diagonal the greater the inequality. The area between the resulting 
Lorenz curve and the diagonal provides an additional measure of inequality, 
namely the Gini coefficient. This Gini index represents the area between the 
Lorenz curve and the diagonal as a percentage of the whole triangular area 
below the diagonal, and ranges from 0 to 1. Lorenz curves represent all people 
in a given population not just two extreme groups (i.e. bottom and top socio­
economic groups) as in the previous Ranges measures. Further, these Lorenz 
curves do not classify people according to their socio-economic group or any 
alternative measure of class or income classification. People are ranked 
according to health which overcomes any problems that a classification and 
size of groupings may hinge.
Flowever, this approach does not capture whether there are inequalities in 
health that are systematically related to socioeconomic status. Indeed, the 
Lorenz curves, as described above, fail to capture the socioeconomic 
dimension of inequalities in health, that is how health is distributed across 
socio-economic groups or any particular classification such as income level. 
This is an important criticims to the use of Lorenz curves since what it is 
intended in the measurement of inequality is to know not just whether 
inequalities in health exist, but rather if they are associated in anyway to
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inequalities in socioeconomic status.
Pseudo-Lorenz Curves and Gini Coefficients try to overcome this problem. 
Leclerc (1990), for instance, use group data instead of individual data. These 
groups do not reflect health classes but rather occupational classes, ranked by 
mortality starting with the lowest mortality class. Alternatively, the groups can 
also be formed on the bases of other criteria such as socio-economic groups or 
income. Pseudo-Lorenz curves then plot cumulative percentages of population, 
classified by socioeconomic variables such as occupational class, ranked by 
health, against cumulative percentages of deaths. As it could be deducted, this 
is not a proper Lorenz curve. However, pseudo-Lorenz curves also present a 
shortcoming worth mentioning here. Since socioeconomic gropus are still 
ranked according to their health, they fail to capture the socioeconomic 
gradient in the distribution. This translates, for example, in the incapacity of this 
measure to capture the fact of the lowest health group being full of millionaires, 
for example. This measure w ill tend, thus, to register positive inequality even 
when no class gradient exist.
Another set of measures included in Wagstaff et a/. (1991 c) contribution are the 
Dissimilarity Indexes. The idea behind them is straightforward. They try to 
measure differences between groups shares of population and groups shares of 
health:
D I - V a E j  |SJh-S ,JP1
where Sjh is the group "j" share of population and Sjp is the group "j" share of 
population's health. This approach, however, is insensitive to socioeconomic 
dimensions, since it also fails to show any class gradient in the measurement of 
inequalities and, accordingly remains insensitive to changes within this same 
class gradient.
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Slope and Relative Indexes of Inequalities overcome the outlined shortcomings 
in reflecting socio-economic dimensions in the measurement of inequalities in 
health. First, the mean health status of each socio-economic group is calculated 
and then groups are ranked according to a socio-economic variable, not health 
as before. The Slope Index of Inequality (Sll) w ill be defined as the slope of the 
regression line between both points in the axes using Weighted Least Square. If 
Sll is divided by the mean level of health then we have the Relative Index of 
Inequality (Rll). This approach, thus, avoids the defects of previous measures in 
so far, first, it reflects the experience in health of all the population not only 
extreme groups, second, it is sensitive to the distribution of population in socio­
economic groups, and third, it reflects the socio-economic dimension of health 
within the measurement of inequalities. At the same time this measure is 
sensitive to changes in mean health status.
Concentration Indexes are the last of the measures of inequalities mentioned 
above and examined here. According to this measure, people are ranked by 
socio-economic groups begining with the most disadvantaged groups, just the 
same as Sll and Rll do. Then, a concentration curve is defined by the line 
resulting from plotting the cumulative percentage of population, ranked by this 
socioeconomic dimension, against the cumulative percentage of health. An 
equal distribution is defined in comparison with the diagonal in the box. The 
further the concentration curve moves away from the diagonal the greater the 
degree of inequality in health. The resulting index offers a measure of 
inequality in health systematically associated with socio-economic groups or 
status. The index w ill fall between 1 and -1, reflecting curves above and below 
the diagonal, respectively. Concentration indexes avoid some of the outlined 
shortcomings in so far they reflect the entire population, and they are sensitive 
to changes in the distribution of the population across socio-economic groups, 
representing well enough the socio-economic dimension in health. The main 
difference beween pseudo-Lorenz curves and concentration indexes lies in the 
criteria used to rank individuals, health versus socio-economic status.
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Much of the empirical work on equity in health care has been based on 
previous work by Le Grand (1978), in which the distribution of public 
expenditure across socioeconomic groups in the UK is compared with the 
distribution of illness across these same groups of people. Le Grand's work has 
been criticised in various ocasions mainly through the work of Collins and 
Klein (1980), Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer and Paci (1991a), and O'Donnell and 
Propper (1991a).
Le Grand's approach to the analysis of equity explores along the equal 
treatment for equal need principle. The analysis lies on the fact that the total 
cost to the NHS per person reporting illness in each socio-economic group can 
be obtained. This is calculated dividing each group's total imputed expenditure 
by the number of persons reporting morbidity in each group. The share of 
expenditures received by each socio-economic group is then compared with 
the share of ill-health in each group. This approach assumes that persons 
reporting ill-health are in equal need and that only persons that report ill-health 
receive health care. Horizontal equity w ill therefore be achieved when those in 
equal need receive the same amount of public expenditure, that is, expenditure 
per person reporting ill-health w ill be the same across socio-economic groups.
If that is the case, then the share of expenditure going to each socio-economic 
group w ill be proportional to its share of reported ill-health. This analysis is 
done for a series of morbidity indicators considered as proxies to ill-health in 
the study.
A number of criticisms have been raised to Le Grand's approach. The first of 
them refers to the measurement o f inequality. It is argued that Le Grand relies 
on comparisons between bottom and top socio-economic groups, and therefore 
focussing only on two extreme cases, failing to take account of inequalities 
considering the rest of socio-economic groups. The second of the criticisms to 
Le Grand is based on the proportionality assumption. It is argued that Le Grand 
assumes that only people reporting ill-health receive health care. Collins and
78
Klein (1990) questioned this assumption. They argued that Le Grand assumed 
that the not-sick are not consumers of health care, and differently from what Le 
Grand's assumption may lead to, that the sick and those receiving health care 
may not be the same population. They go on discussing that Le Grand's model 
should include a variable accounting for the fact that not only people reporting 
ill-health finally receive medical care. Not introducing this additional variable 
in Le Grand's model would utlimately lead us believe that this approach is 
biased fostering the detection of inequalities favouring the rich.
These points have received a reply from Le Grand (1991) and a further answer 
from his colleages (Wagstaff et a/.,1991b,1991b), which has brought the issue 
of the distribution of public expenditure on health care back into debate, as 
well as the proposal of alternative models to the measurement of horizontal 
equity in health care.
In this respect, Wagstaff et a/, suggest a different approach to the measurement 
of equity. Their approach is said to overcome the main criticisms pointed out 
above. The authors classified individuals according to income levels and then 
construct illness concentration curves reflecting how illness is distributed 
according to income. If illness is concentrated among lower income groups 
then the illness concentration curve w ill be drawn below the diagonal that 
ideally represents proportionality. The illness concentration curves are then 
compared with the expenditure concentration curve. The latter w ill lie above 
the diagonal if lower income groups are greater users of health services than 
higher income groups. If those in lower income groups receive less medical 
treatment when ill than those other in higher income groups then the 
expenditure concentration curve w ill show below the illness concetration 
curve. If the illness concentration curves and the expenditure concentration 
curves are identical to each other, then expenditure is allocated across income 
groups in proportion to their share of ill-health. Given both types of curves, the 
extent of inequity w ill be assessed by looking at the size of the area between
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both concentration curves. The concentration curves approach outlined here 
overcomes only one of the problems in Le Grand's methodology, namely the 
use of ranges (comparing top and bottom groups in the scale) as measures of 
inequality.29
The third criticism raised to Le Grand's work addresses an additional 
assumption in Le Grand's model and that is that all people reporting illness are 
in equal need. Collins and Klein (1990) argue this is not neccessarily true since 
within the chronic label, for instance, one can find different conditions that, 
ultimately, imply a different consumption of health care services.
On the basis of self-reported health status Collins and Klein studied the use of 
GP services across socio-economic groups. To the standard set of morbidity 
indicators used in other studies on inequalities, namely acute sickness and 
chronic illness, they added the Not-Sick indicator (Collins and Klein, 1980). 
This indicator accounts for the fact that not only those reporting morbidity are 
consumers of health care services. This indicator w ill therefore include 
individuals that have neither reported acute nor chronic conditions but may 
also use health care services. The inclusion of the Not-Sick indicator has also 
been applauded by other authors such as Wagstaff et a/. (1991 a,1991 b), and 
O'Donnell and Propper (1991 a,1991b). Indeed, those not reporting ill-health 
may well be in need of health care, and what really happens is that their need 
is below some critical level. Not considering the not-sick as consumers of 
health care may lead to the fact that those sick and those receiving health care 
not being the same population.
29
Please, see also Chapter 3 for an extended explanation of these points.
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It looks like the current debate on inequalities has come largely as a result of 
using different definitions of "need". Indeed, the terms in which "need" is 
defined determines the set of morbidity indicators the authors use in their 
subsequent analysis of inequalities. Le Grand (1978,1991) operationalises the 
stated definition of equity defining "need" in terms of ill-health. It follows from 
this that people in different degrees of ill-health have different medical needs 
and that people in the same level of ill-health have the same need. An 
implication of using reported illness as the only basis for need is that those who 
do not report illness are not in need of treatment. As stated, other authors insist 
that those that do not report ill-health, i.e. not-sick, are also consumers of health 
care services and should be taken into account in the model.
A ll authors agree, however, that inequalities in health, as measured by any 
given set of indicators, is only one side of the coin. Albeit closely related, we 
must be able to tell apart two concepts. On one side, inequalities in health, and 
on the other, inequalities in the delivery of health care. If we want to know 
whether equal treatment is given to people in equal situations we first need to 
know how need is distributed across any socioeconomic classification of the 
population of study. Before embarking in the analysis of inequalities in health 
care, it is necessary to know about how health and ill-health are distributed 
across the population. Only after the distribution of health care becomes 
relevant and, consequently, whetehr such distribution mathches that of health 
and ill-health.
2.2.2. Morbidity and health indicators.
When measuring inequalities in health care we should not only settle on an 
appropriate measure of inequality from the ones reviewed above, but also on 
measures of both morbidity and utilisation. The definition of horizotal equity as 
equal treatment for equal need assumes that need is not distributed equally
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across society and that, whatever interpretation we give to the term need, 
health care services in the community should be distributed according to the 
different levels of need, so that people in greater need receive greater amount 
of health care services than those other in a lesser degree of need.
To this purpose, "need" as a concept has to be operationalised somehow. The 
approaches to this have been numerous and attending to various interpretations 
of the term30. However, there is wide agreement regarding the fact that when 
we talk about need we refer both to a gap and to the means to overcome this 
gap. Indeed, when mentioning the term need we implicitly assume that there is 
some distance between what the actual situation is and what a desired situation 
would be. The people falling under this ideal or desired standard are said to be 
"in need". But at the same time, it is argued that need implies some conception 
of action. The gap should be overcome, and those "in need" are certainly in 
need of something, for example health care services, that would eventually 
bring them from the deficient situation they are into an ideal or better position 
regarding health.
Intrinsically, we should therefore be interpreting differently need for health and 
need for health care. We should be separating these two concepts attending to 
ends in themselves and means to these ends. The end point is, therefore, a 
better health status or a better health in general, and the means used to get 
individuals to this end point include, among others, health care services. Health 
care as a means to an end is a useful interpretation of the role of health care 
authorities in the correction of not healthy situations. Further, it centres the role
The vey concept of need has centered debate in social economic disciplines over time. Visions 
on the term and its meaning and implications are numerous (Goodman and Craig, 1982; Culyer 
and Wagstaff, 1991 ;Ong and Humphris, 1994;Stevens and Raftery, 1994,1997; Hopton and 
Dlugolecka, 1995; Lightfoot, 1995; Shanks et a/., 1995; Soriano, 1995; W itkin and Altschuld, 
1995; Percy-Smith eta/., 1996; Riviere eta/., 1996; Sheaff, 1996; Sanderson e ta /.,1997;
Stevens and Gillam, 1998; W illiams and Wright, 1998; W right eta/., 1998).
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of health care authorities in satisfying health care needs and not health needs, 
which clearly requires of a broader approach of means including interventions 
of a wide number of areas of social policy such as housing, environmental 
policy, income mantenance, promotion of healthy life styles, or intervention on 
areas such as food inspection, diet, hygene, or education. Equity as a policy­
makers' objective should consider all these areas, but as regards to health care 
it comes down to the provision of equal health services to those in equal need 
of those services. We w ill see now how the two components of this definition, 
health care services and need, are operationalised.
Since health needs have been described as situations in which individuals are 
placed in reference to a given standard, and those falling under such a standard 
are said to be "in need", need is frequently defined in terms of ill-health. 
Different degrees of ill-health reflect different medical needs, and people in the 
same degree of ill-health are said to have the same need.31 The issue is then 
how to approach the term ill-health, that is, how to tell whether an individual 
or a group could be catalogued as in ill-health. I w ill use Blaxter's model and 
approaches, largely based on population health surveys, to relate self-reported 
morbidity as an indicator of need or ill-health. As Ignatieff argued, there are few 
presumptions in human relations more dangerous than the idea one knows 
what another human being needs better than they do themselves (Ignatieff, 
1984). Both authors clearly advocate for asking the individual, the population at 
large, whenidentifying and measuring needs. Who better ask than those who 
best know about their own health.
Blaxter points to the fact that in the measurement of inequalities in developed 
countries, morbidity or self-perceived general health status are increasingly
The operationalisation of need as ill-health is not, however, without criticisms (Wagstaff et a/., 
1991:17). It has been argued that given the existing limitations in data availability, fiability and 
completeness, ill-health could be taken as the best option to aproximate need. Accordingly, 
when measuring ill-health we intrinsically attempt to measure need.
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important indicators rather than more traditional indicators such as mortality 
(Blaxter, 1989). Without denying the importance of death, and specially 
premature dealth, as a dimension within health inequalities, Blaxter insists it 
may be the lifelong experience of health an illness of individuals that most 
clearly reflects the differences between socio-economic groups. Further, these 
measures of morbidity are better drawn from population health surveys rather 
than from epidemiological or disease-specific surveys, since they do not 
normally include all relevant socio-economic variables necessary to the 
adequate meaurement of health and health care inequalities.
Blaxter's contribution to the measurement of needs identifies three underlying 
conceptual models: medical, functional and subjective. The fact that Blaxter 
classification is present in most health surveys carried out in developed 
countries is of primary importance to this research. Indeed, Blaxter's 
classification operationalised a series of needs indicators, that stem for the 
aboventioned conceptual models, and are assessed in the form of questions in 
the health survey used in this research.32
The first conceptual model is the so-called medical or physiological-psychiatric 
model. The author argues that common to health surveys is the measurement of 
prevalence of diseases, specially chronic conditions, long-standing illness, 
lasting complaints, or health problems in general. This is done by means of a 
number of standard questions of the type: "Do you have any long-standing 
health problem or chronic illness?" This approach is questioned over the fact 
that only known diseases are reported and, therefore, silent disease stay in the 
shadow. Further, it also raises the issues of whether respondents to the question 
believe a given condition is worth mentioning at all. Blaxter offers two possible 
solutions to this. On one hand, the stressing of chronicity in the question using
32
In this research the 1994 Catalan Health Survey is used. I w ill be describing the main 
characteristics of this survey in a Chapter 3.
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the alternative terminology of "keeps recurring", or "which you have most of 
the time". On the other hand, a checklist of chronic conditions is offered, 
which additionally provides the respondent the necessary vocabulary, although 
stimulates reporting at the same time. An additional concern remains, however. 
People answering the survey may see that some of the conditions they suffer 
may have a social stigma attached and, therefore, avoid responding. This is 
frequently the case in mental health problems or sexual contagious diseases, for 
example.
The second conceptual model pointed out by Blaxter is the functional model, 
also called interactual model. It is frequently used in combination with the 
medical model to explore in which ways disease has an effect on people's daily 
life activities, that is, if it has an effect on the functional status of the individual. 
Functionality is conceived here as regards the limitation of activity or ability to 
perform normal tasks in any way. According to Blaxter, functionality is the 
"greatest mark of inequalities in health between social groups" (Blaxter, 
1989:210). The functional model uses a series of measures among which we 
find days lost from work, that is restricted activity days, reflecting incapacity 
rather than presence or absence of disease, and bed days, reflecting a more 
serious lost of social function. When these two measures are combined, 
restricted activity days and bed days, a third measure is constructed, namely 
sick days.
The last of the models outlined by Blaxter refers to self perception of health and 
is labelled as the subjective model. It reflects a more positive approach to the 
measurement of health, trying to describe health rather than illness. It is 
normally expressed by the individual answering to a question of the type "Over 
the last 12 months, would you say that on the whole your health has been 
good, fairly good, or not good?" The listed categories could, however, be more 
than the three mentioned here, reflecting a wider range of different health 
states. There are a number of complications or limitations to the use of this
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model, however. Among the most important, explicit mention should be given 
to distorsion factors such as education, age, family support or health experience 
in general.
The models outlined by Blaxter above have shaped the nature of morbidity 
indicators used in all the approaches to the measurement of inequalities in 
health care reviewed, from ranges to concentration curves. Indeed, self-reported 
morbidity measures such as health not good, acute sickness, chronic illness - 
limiting or not-, and not-sick reflect either one or another model, and 
comprehensively help us to describe how illness is distributed among the 
population of study as well as telling us about how those that have not reported 
ill-health at all are distributed across income groups.
In Chapter 3 I w ill take more precise account of Blaxter's conceptual models to 
build up the set of indicators to be used in this research, which w ill also reflect 
what the rest of authors mentioned here have suggested in this respect.
2.2.3. Measures of utilisation and allocation of expenditure.
The literature has approached the measurement of health services utilisation 
using a set of indicators that relate to the types of care available to the 
population. Collins and Klein considered only visits to General Practitioners, 
that is primary care services (Collins and Klein, 1980). In Le Grand's approach 
hospital services utilisation, both inpatient and out-patient, was added to 
primary care (Le Grand 1978,1982,1991). The source of data in both cases 
correspond to the General Health Survey in the UK and captured the number of 
GP consultations made by the respondent in a two week reference period, the 
number of out-patient attendances in a three months reference period, and the 
numbers of in-patient spells in a three months period and the number of days 
per spell. These data were then transformed into an homogeneous reference
86
period of one year and then translated into expenditure.
Utilisation results may be given in the number of days of stay in hospital and 
number of visits paid to the various types of care. So as to have a common 
measure of utilisation most studies that use concentration curves come up with 
the total cost of the services used by persons within each income group and 
morbidity group. The total cost w ill then be divided by the number of persons 
reporting illness within each group so as to obtain the expenditure per person 
in need ratio. Expenditure is, thus, the way by which the amounts of services 
received by each group is compared, and it comes as a result of translating into 
monetary units the use of resources in all levels of care considered. As it w ill be 
detailed in Chapter 3, this approach to the measure of utilisation of health care 
services is the one taken in this research.
2.3. Inequalities in health and health care in Spain: a review of the 
literature.
Global sociological studies as the FOESSA reports (FOESSA, 1966,1970,1975, 
1983, 1994) are good reference points to the chronological analysis of studies 
on inequalities in health and health care. These reports also contributed 
significantly to a much wider understanding of the main determinants of 
inequalities as well as to how macro policies in the health care arena have 
responded to them.
As seen from the review of the evolution of the Spanish Health Care System, 
the late sixties and early seventies have characterised by the birth of 
socialisation of medicine in Spain. This movement paid special attention to 
social justice principles in the organisation, finance and delivery of health care. 
Inherent to this concept was the creation of a National Health Service in the 
eighties, a system to cover the total Spanish population with a wide range of
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services. The socialisation of medicine translated, as De Miguel et a/, argued
(1994), in an increasing number of people covered by public insurance of any 
kind. In this respect, policies addressed social differences through the 
extension of the 1944 SOE to all social strata and to all regions and 
municipalities. The universalisation of coverage under SOE insurance was 
therefore a fundamental policy towards the correction of inequalities in health 
and health care.
In the mid seventies the significant extension of public system needed of 
unification. The policy responses to inequalities in health care were now 
twofold, to continue universalisation on one hand, and to pursue unification 
within the system, on the other. Health services were still provided according 
to social classs and not according to entitlement as citizens, that is, some 
conception of right to health, or better, right to health care. The scenario was 
that of a clear public-private divide, with hospital services for the rich and 
hospital services for the poor clearly differentiated. Further, it was argued that 
even within the public system there were important differences in use regarding 
social class. The 1975 FOESSA report claimed Spanish health care system was 
not an integrated one, still attending population according to their social 
position in society. The efforts towards universalisation of coverage had been 
important throughout the previous years but had resulted incomplete in so far 
the two extreme layers in society remained outside public coverage. Indeed, 
the SOE solved many of the problems associated with a large number of people 
not covered by public health care, specially those in lower social and income 
groups, but in 1978 the creation of INSALUD cristalised a dual system (De 
Miguel et a/., 1994) and hence inequalities.
In the early eighties the socialists came into power and health policies tried to 
overcome the outlined deficiencies with the creation of a proper National 
Health Service, further decentralised. That meant a serious effort towards the 
final unification of the public sector. In broad terms, the nature of the problems
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since then are somewhat different, specially regarding use of services. The 
public service covered the vast mayority of the population although social 
classes were said to make use of the available servicies in a different manner. 
While low classes used public services extensively, the upper classes used both 
public and private servicies better, using the latter only when thought to be 
profitable. It was the combination of public and private insurance that 
characterised upper and upper-middle classes in Spain. To a large extent this 
remains similar today.
Spain benefits nowadays from a good standard of health according to the major 
health indicators available. It has, however, become clear that an increase in 
resource devoted to health care does not necessarily come proportionally 
associated to an increase in the health status of the total population. 
Accordingly, policies should not now aim at improving the overall health status 
of the population, but should best be addressed to the correction of inequalities 
both in health and health care. To this aim, good quality information of the 
nature and characteristics of the remaining inequalities in health and health are 
an imperative.
This section reports on the most relevant studies on inequalities and health in 
Spain over the period 1980 to 1998. Its purpose is to account for the more 
specific areas and topics to which analysts have addressed their attention, to 
disclose the main characteristics of some selected studies relevant to this 
research and, finally, to explain how this research contributed to fill in an 
existing gap in the study of inequalities in health care in Spain.
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2.3.1. Major trends in the study of inequalities in Spain.
In the mid nineties Benach (1995) carried out a bibliometrical analysis of 
available studies on inequalities in health and health care in Spain over the 
period 1980 to 1994, reporting on what have been the major contributions to 
the study of inequalities in health status, in use and in access to health care 
services. The purpose of Benach's study was to determine the main 
characteristics of research efforts on inequalities accounting for subject - 
differentiating between conceptual reviews and empirical studies-, geographical 
origin, place of edition, and distribution over time. The author consulted the 
existing databases, used direct consultation on libraries, direct consultation with 
Public Health specialists, and direct sources of information, as well as sources 
reported as of difficult access. The results of Benach's analysis identified a 
volume of 233 studies within the referenced period, most of them not 
published in books nor journals. The great majority were conducted in two 
geographical areas, namely Catalonia and Valencia. An steep raise was found 
as regards the distribution over time, and a clear increase was reported on the 
number of studies as well as in their formal publication, specially starting in the 
1986-1988 period.
A later report on social inequalities in health showed a very similar pattern 
(Navarro and Benach, 1996a, 1996b). The report came as a result of a 
government appointed Commission to extensively study class, gender and 
regional inequalities. In their review the authors considered mortality, 
morbidity, health status, health behaviour and utilisation and access to health 
services as the variables of interest. These variables were also explored as 
regards their geographical dimension, distinguishing between national, and 
regional and local studies 33.
33
Navarro and Benach classified studies into six categories. I here account for some relevant 
contributions in each of these categories:
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Both reports showed that the increase in the number of inequality studies in this 
period came largely as a consequence of studies on mortality. The trend 
identified by Benach (1995) and Navarro and Benach (1996a, 1996b) has largely 
remained the same over the recent years. Among the most recent contributions 
we still find studies on inequalities in mortality (Arias and Borrell, 1998; Segura 
and Fernandez, 1998; Llorca et a/., 1998), morbidity studies addressed to 
specific clinical conditions (Rohlfs et a/., 1998; Luengo et a/., 1996; Latour- 
Perez et a/., 1995), mother an infant health (Dfez et a/., 1995; Navarro-Rubio et 
a/., 1995; Valero et a/., 1995; Sanchez-Fernandez et a/., 1995), specific services 
(Rufz et a/., 1995; Ibanez-Fraile and Tejedor, 1995), and disability (Regidor et 
a/., 1997), among others.
Relevant to my research are studies in the context of Barcelona and Catalonia. 
Trigered by the existance of good databases such as the Barcelona Health 
Survey we have seen numerous studies on inequalities and health in Barcelona, 
covering issues such as mortality (Borell et a/., 1988, 1993), utilisation of health 
services and public coverage (Cuervo et a/., 1985; Fernandez et a/., 1999; 
Borrell et a/., forthcoming), health determinants (Ginestal, 1987), morbidity 
(Plasencia et a/., 1991), women and infant health (Rohfls et a/., 1991, 1994; 
Valero et a/., 1994; Dfez et a/., 1995), and life styles, i.e. alcohol and
(i) Mortality at national level (Canela, 1985; Solas, 1988; Garcia et a/., 1989; Regidor and 
Gonzalez, 1989; Ministerio Sanidad y Consumo, 1989; Rodriguez and Lemkow, 1990; Lardelli 
eta/., 1991,1993a,1993b; Vazquez-Vizoso et a/., 1993; Regidor et a/., 1994,1995a;
Dominguez, 1994).
(ii) M ortality at regional and local levels (Latour et a/., 1987; Alonso and Anto, 1988; Costa, 
1989; Latour eta/., 1991; Armero et a/., 1991; Borrell et a/., 1991;Terol, 1991; Borrell, 
1992,1995; Nolasco et a/., 1992; Martin and March, 1992; Casi and Moreno, 1992; Borrell and 
Arias, 1993,1994,1995; Arias eta/., 1993; Perez-Dommguez eta/., 1993; Etxenike, 1994).
(iii) M orbidity and life styles at national level (Duran, 1983; INE, 1987,1989; Nebot eta/.,
1992; FOESSA 1994; Regidor et a/., 1994,1995a,1995b; Jovell, 1994; Collado and De Miguel, 
1995).
(iv) M orbidity and life styles at regional and local levels (Alonso and Anto, 1988; Silvestre et 
a/., 1990; del Llano, 1991; Peruga et a/., 1993; Valero et a/., 1994; Gutierrez et a/., 1994; 
Garrido et a/., 1994; Borrell, 1995).
(v) Use and Access to health services at national level (Gonzalez and Regidor, 1988; Cais et a/., 
1991; Guillen, 1991; Fernandez, 1993; FOESSA, 1994).
(vi) Use and Access to health services at regional and local levels (Alonso and Anto, 1988;
Cruz and Almises, 1990; Ruiz eta/., 1993; Rohlfs, 1994; Gutierrez et a/., 1994; Borrell, 1995).
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smoking. Given the fact that no regional health survey for Catalonia was 
available before the one used in this research (ESCA, 1996), we found an 
important lack of studies on inequalities in health and health care for the whole 
of the Catalan territory, although some studies need to be mentioned in 
reference to heart and liver trasplantation (Rovira, 1990), hepatitis B markers in 
the population of Catalonia (Salleras et a/., 1992), and gender (Fernandez et a/. 
1999).
2.3.2. Overall results and conclusions.
As early as 1976 De Miguel identified some of the most important factors in the 
study of inequalities in health, namely gender, age and social class, rural versus 
urban areas, and regions. As the author pointed out much later in one of the 
FOESSA reports (FOESSA, 1994) these same factors are still present today in 
many ways.
The greatest social inequalitiy was death (De Miguel, 1994). As seen in Benach
(1995) and Navarro and Benach (1996a, 1996b) reports, mortality has been a 
w idely studied issue in Spain. Morover, mortality and social inequalities largely 
correlate with morbidity, particularly hospital morbidity. Although mortality is a 
relevant variable to the study of social inequalties in health, we should also, 
even more, be interested in the way people live their lives and their health life 
experience (Blaxter, 1985). In this respect, it is studies on morbidity and 
utilisation which are of a wider interest to this research.
I here point to the most relevant findings and conclusions from the main studies 
on the measurement of inequalities in morbidity and utilisation in Spain since 
the 1980s. An illustrative comparative table is also given for a better reporting 
and understanding (see Table 2.1.).
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Numerous studies have used the information provided by hospital morbidity 
databases. For many years, this source of data has been widely used among 
researchers in Spain when measuring inequalities in health and health care, and 
has been used as a traditional way to disclose the existing inequalities in Spain, 
particularly inequalities according to diagnosis, gender and age. Great 
inequalities were pointed out when showing the percentage distribution of 
hospitalisation according to age groups, concentrating in the extreme poles of 
the scale, namely the youngest and the oldest. The lowest percentages 
corresponded to intermediate age groups. The use of hospital services 
according to age draws an interesting U shape curve. However, a difference 
was made regarding gender inequalities in hospitalisation. There is a great 
confounding factor in the analysis, namely reproduction and gynaecology.
Once this factor was ajusted for, it was found men used hospital facilities more 
than women. This fact remained constant through almost every cause of 
hospitalisation. These gender differences, moreover, seem to disappear when 
moving towards the oldest age group (De Miguel, 1994).
Alonso et a/. (1988) made use of the 1986 Health Survey for Barcelona to study 
inequalities in health by socioeconomic status, using occupation as the variable 
to classify individuals. Data on morbidity and use of health care services were 
later standardised for age and gender. The need indicators used were self-rated 
health status, chronic illness, limiting chronic, and restricted activity days. 
Findings pointed to higher social classes being in better health than lower 
social classes. As regards the use of services, the number of visits in the lower 
classes was higher than in the upper classes. The same occurred when looking 
into hospitalisation. While 100% of those in poor health in high classes visited 
the doctor, only 86% of those in lower classes did so. Similar findings were 
reported regarding inpatient days. This study concluded there were inequalities 
in health and health care in Barcelona regardless the indicator of need used in 
the analysis.
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Gonzalez and Regidor (1988) used the 1987 National Health Survey to the 
study of inequalities in the utilisation of health care services across income 
levels, educational levels, size of the habitat, and regions in Spain. The use of 
health care services was taken as doctor and dentist visits. The results showed 
social and geographical inequalities. Lower socioeconomic groups used doctor 
services in a greater degree whereas they also used dentists less. When adjusted 
for need the results pointed to smaller social inequalities.
Portella et a/. (1990) studied inequalities in the utilisation of primary health 
care services in one health care district in Catalonia, the Centre Region, w ith a 
population of 1,123,000 inhabitants. They explored in depth the influence of 
age, gender, occupational status and social security regime in the use of 
primary care services. The necessary data to run the analysis was drawn from a 
primary care information system (SIG-7), as well as from a complementary 
sample information source. The study accounted for how health problems and 
medical visists were distributed across the population. The conclusions 
suggested a higher use of primary care services among older people, closely 
related to chronic conditions. It was found that the characteristics of health care 
services supply conditioned the nature of its utilisation.
In 1990 Guillen (1990) performed an interesting exploratory exercise using the 
1987 National Health Survey. In agreement with most previous studies in the 
area, the author acknowledged that health and illness in Spain followed more a 
social pattern than a health care services pattern. He argued one of the most 
important sociological problems worth studying in depth was inequalities in 
access to health care services according to social class. In the analysis Guillen 
made use of lineal and logistic regression models, studying the relationship 
between social structure and the health of the population. Age was found as a 
highly influential variable in the use of health care services in general, and 
specially from 16 years old onwards. Further, women visited the doctor more 
frequently, either as a consequence of greater need (ill-health), higher number
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of visits per health problem, greater response and precision of responses in the 
survey, or simply as a consequence of being less socially conditioned towards 
(not) reporting illness and visits to doctors (see also Duran, 1983). Guillen, 
however, established that age and gender variables were not the only variables 
that explained access to health care services. Indeed, socio-economic variables 
were of utmost importance, too. Family income was among the first variables to 
consider here. Greater family income increased the probability of visiting a 
doctor.
Rodriguez and Lemkow (1990) examined how socioeconomic variables 
influenced health and illness in Spain. They studied, yet again, the social 
distribution of health -using subjective levels of health as need indicators-, as 
well as the relationship between health and poverty, living conditions and life­
styles. They found major economic, social and regional differences in health 
among the Spanish population. Poverty, living conditions, income and 
socioeconomic status played an important role in explaining such differences.
De Miguel et a/. (1994) pointed to the fact that quality and utilisation of 
services were major contributors to inequalities in Spain, too. It was not access, 
which had largely become universal, but the way the services were used and 
the quality of the treatment received that best explained the existence of 
inequalities. Despite the 1983 Barcelona Health Survey, for example, showed 
medium and low social classes paid visits to the doctor and hospital much often 
than lower classes, De Miguel argued there were still important differences in 
the way the different social classes were treated. While visits in lower social 
classes were less time consuming to the system, in 65% of cases less than five 
minutes, only 5% of visits paid by higher social classes lasted less than five 
minutes (see also Duran, 1983). It was therefore not a problem of different 
access but of different use of health care services.
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Jovell (1994) made use of another set of data (CIRES) to the study of inequalities 
in health and health care. He argued that besides mortality, self-reported health 
was shown as a useful indicator in the assessment of the population health and 
wellbeing, representing well enough how people valued their health status. 
Further, these measures were also of value as predictor variables, since they 
were said to be the triger to the decision to pay a visit to the doctor, and 
therefore of health care utilisation as well as morbidity, discapacity and 
mortality (Mossey and Shapiro, 1982; Kaplan eta/., 1988; Idler and Kasl, 1991). 
Jovell addressed the study of subjective health status and socio-economic 
groups, trying to capture the gradient effect and socio-economic dimension of 
inequalities in health by means of ordinal logistic regression analysis. These 
logistic regression models included the self-reported health status in the ordinal 
form as dependent variable, and age, gender, marital status, healthy life styles, 
chronic comorbidity, and socioeconomic indicators, i.e. education, family 
revenue and perceived social class, as predictor variables. The author's 
conclusions confirmed the existence of socio-economic inequalities in Spain 
when using subjective measures of health status. These inequalities were said to 
be independant of the measure used to approximate socio-economic status, and 
independant of the control variables included in the analysis.
Mann et a/. (1995) reported on socioeconomic determinants of utilisation of 
hospital emergency services. By means of a specific survey to 800 patients and 
bivariate and logistic regression methods, they explored the social predictors of 
emergency services utilisation. Results from the bivariate analysis showed there 
was a significant positive association between low income and low educational 
level to the use of emercency services. Further, stepwise logistic regression 
selected income and lifestyles, i.e. alcoholism, as the most relevant 
independant predictors.
Navarro-Rubio et a/. (1995) examined the relationship between socioeconomic 
status as measured by education, employment status, and total monthly family
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income, and preventive health care utilisation by children, as measured by 
vision, hearing and dental examinations. The authors introduced some control 
variables for confounding factors such as the presence of chronic illness, family 
size, and gender. The analysis was performed by means of weighted ordinal 
logistic regressions, and the results reported a positive relationship between the 
use of preventive services and socioeconomic status of families. The level of 
education and family income were found as the most influential variables in 
this relationship. The higher these levels the more likely to receive preventive 
examinations.
Among the most recent stduies on inequalities in health care we should 
mention those by Rodriguez et a/. (1993), Fernandez de la Hoz and Leon
(1996), Fernandez eta/. (1996), Navarro and Benach (1996a, 1996b), Regidor et 
a/. (1996), Abasolo et a/. (1998), Fernandez et a/. (1999), and Borrell et a/, 
(accepted for publication).
Rodrfguez et a/. (1993)34 study was among the first to use a similar 
methodology to the one proposed here to the study of inequalities in health and 
health care. The authors assessed both equity in the finance and delivery of 
health care in Spain. Equity in the delivery was taken as equal tretament for 
equal need, and made use of data from the 1987 National Health Survey. This 
survey reported information on the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
population as well as on utilisation measures and morbidity indicators. The 
authors set on four need indicators to try to capture different dimensions of 
health and ill-health, namely chronic illness, limiting chronic, health not good, 
and restricted activity days. Utilisation of health care services was expressed in 
terms of their associated expenditure. The Spanish population was split in
Rodriguez et a/, study (1993), among the most relevant to this research, focussed on equity 
issues in the delivery and finance of health care services, showing some interesting conclusions 
for the Spanish case follow ing the methodology outlined in the COMAC-HSR project.
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quintiles according to income and both expenditure and morbidity 
concentration curves were built to assess inequity in the delivery of services.
The results were given in the shape of illness concentration indices, as well as 
Le Grand's and Wagstaff's et a/, indices of horizontal inequity. Their overall 
conclusions suggested that the distribution of health services in Spain was not 
equitable, favouring the better-off, albeit to a small degree35.
Fernandez de la Hoz and Leon (1996) carried out a study of inequalities in the 
use of health services in Spain across socioeconomic groups making use of the 
1987 National Health Survey data set. Socioeconomic status was measured by 
education level and household income. Health care use was measured by 
doctor consultations and hospitalisation over a defined period of time. The 
authors used logistic regressions to the analysis of the relationship between self- 
reported health status as a measure of need and utilisation of health care 
services. The results suggested that among those with poorer self-reported 
morbidity it was the most privileged groups who used health services more 
often. These conclusions did not vary significantly according to gender.
Fernandez et a/. (1996), in an unpublished report to the Catalan Health Service, 
explored health and health care utilisation inequalities in Catalonia according 
to social class using the 1994 Catalan Health Survey. The authors used self­
perceived health status, restriction of activity, and presence of chronic 
conditions as indicators of neeed, and visits to health care professional, waiting 
times, unattended health problems and hospitalisatiions as indicators of 
utilisation and access. Logistic regressions were used to study the association 
among variables. Their conclusions point to inequalities in health, being lower
These same authors are presently working, also at national level, on the updating of this analysis 
both on the finance and the delivery sides using the 1993 version of the National Health 
Survey. To my knowledge no results have been reported on the delivery side so far. Only some 
new findings have been published regarding equity in the finance of health care which have 
been accounted for in Table 1.7.
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social classes in a worse health status. The utilisation of health services 
remained fairly equitable although differences were found in the use of 
particular services such as dentists, optometrists, and preventive measures to 
the disadvatage of the lower social classes.
Navarro and Benach (1996a, 1996b) devoted their efforts to the study of class, 
gender and regional inequalities in health status, health behaviour, utilisation 
and access to health care services. Four relevant findings should be highlighted. 
First, social inequalities in the use of health serveices have largely 
dissappeared, in Spain. On average, Class V, that is unskilled workers, had the 
same frequency of use of health services as members of Class I, that is 
managers and professionals with a university degree. Second, equality of access 
to health services had not led to the supression of the class gradient in health 
status in Spain. The upper classes continued to enjoy a much better health 
status than lower social classes. Third, if the term equity was taken in relation to 
need, then the findings point intuitively to the working class underusing the 
health services, since given their worse health status, i.e. greater need, they 
should be using these services in a more extensive way than those in upper 
classes (Navarro, 1997). Finally, inequalities in health status by gender class 
and region showed women live longer than men but had more health 
problems. They pointed out that the most dramatic gender differences were in 
health related behaviour, increasing smoking habits among women, for 
example.
Regidor et a/. (1996) used the 1993 National Health Survey to study 
inequalities in the utilisation and access to health care services according to 
socioeconomic status. Utilisation was measured by the use of inpatient health 
services, dentist consultations and gynaecologist consultations. Accessibility 
considered the time spent travelling to the health centre, waiting time at the 
health centre, and waiting time for admission at hospital. Socioeconomic status 
was aprproximated using education levels. The analysis was performed using
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logistic regression for utilisation, and multiple lineal regression for access 
variables and time. Independant variables included in the model were age, 
gender, size of habitat, public or private insurance, need i.e. poor health, 
chronic illness, and restricted activity, and related variables to odontological 
and gynaecological services, together with levels of education. The results of 
the study showed that although individuals in lower education levels made use 
of health care services more often than those in higher education levels, this 
overutilisation disappeared when predictor variables like gender, age, health 
insurance and need were taken into account. These results contrasted with 
other studies' results in Spain that showed lower social classes and lower 
education levels used health services less than higher social classes and 
education levels (Alonso and Anto, 1988; Gonzalez and Regidor, 1988; 
Fernandez de la Hoz, 1996). The authors concluded there were no differences 
regarding the use of inpatient facilities and doctor consultation once adjusted 
by age, gender and other confounding variables. Differences across education 
levels were found relevant in odontology and gynaecology utilisation, as well 
as in access to services in general. Lower education levels showed the longest 
average waiting times, only significant regarding time spent travelling to the 
centre and waiting times at the centre.
Abasolo et a/. (1998) have recently studied the use of GP and primary care 
services across Spanish population The authors applied econometric models to 
the 1993 National Health Survey data, paying particular attention to equity 
from a socioeconomic, geographical and intergenerational perspectives. They 
also made use of other variables such as demand, supply and demography to 
help to explain GP utilisation. The results showed the higher the medical need 
the higher the probability of contacting a GP, i.e. vertical equity. Differently, 
horizontal equity did not seem to be fulfilled. Socioeconomic, geographical and 
demographic characteristics seemed to affect the probability of using GP public 
services in Spain.
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Fernandez et a/. (1999) have recently studied inequalities in health and health 
care services utilisation between men and women in Catalonia. The authors 
used the 1994 Catalan Health Survey and logistic regressions. They studied 
how self-percieived health, restriction of activity and presence of chronic 
conditions were present in the male and female population, and how these 
variables together with age explained utilisation of hospital facilities, dentists, 
optometrists and visiting a health professional. Their results point to women in 
worse health than men as measured by all need variables in the analysis. The 
porportion of women visiting a health professional was slightly greater than that 
for men. The same was found for utilisation of dentists and optometrists. 
Differently, it was found that women used hospital facilities less than men. 
When taking account of self-reported health then women declaring good health 
reported a greater probability of counsulting a health professional, although no 
differences were found for utilisation of inpatient care, dentists or optometrists. 
They conclude that women despite being in greter need they do not use health 
services more frequently than men.
Borrell et a/, (forthcoming) studied inequalities in health and health care in the 
city of Barcelona according to social class. The data set used in the analysis is 
that of the 1992 Barcelona Health Survey and social class was obtained from an 
adaptation of the British Registrar General classification. The authors explored 
health status (self-perceived health status, restriction of activity, days in bed and 
presence of chronic conditions) and utilisation of preventive services, 
hospitalisation and visit to a health professional. Logistic regressions were used 
accounting also for age, employment status and family structure. The study 
concluded that there are still relevant inequalities in health among the 
population of Barcelona, with people in lower classes having worse health. No 
differences were found in visits to the doctor or hospitalisation, although 
preventive practices were undertaken in a lesser degree by those in lower social 
classes.
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2.3.3. Concluding remarks.
The study of inequalities in health have filled economists, sociologists, medical, 
professionals and philosofers' agendas in Spain for many years now. 
Traditionally, most studies have concentrated on inequalities in mortality. In 
recent years, however, we have witnessed important efforts towards the study 
of equity regarding utilisation of services, both specific services addressed to 
particular clinical conditions and utilisation of primary, specialist and inpatient 
care.
The available data sets in Spain have largely shaped the methodology to assess 
inequalities in health and health care. Indeed, as De Miguel put it, many of the 
difficulties to perform these studies during the seventies and eighties should not 
come as a surprise given information limitations (De Miguel et a/., 1994). The 
improvements in the studies come both as a result of better data sets becoming 
available, largely population health surveys, and the application of a wider 
range of methodologies to the assessment of equity, including ranges, 
concentration curves, and regression models. These improvements have 
opened a window of opportunity in many senses. My research takes advantage 
of them.
As regards policy relevant arguments contained in the published papers, De 
Miguel et a/. (1994) stated the creation of the SOE in the early forties was in 
itself a way to overcome some of the most important health problems of the 
most disadvantaged groups in the population, namely the industrial workers. 
The Social Security reform and the creation of the INSALUD as management 
body forced the appearance of a dual health care system, differentiating 
between those that receive public health services and those others, the better 
off, that gain access to a private and high technology medicine. The socialists 
government in power in 1982 tried to overcome this dual system with the 
creation of a NHS very much along the lines of unification of services to the
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entire population, i.e. universalisation. In this respect, Navarro (1997) has 
recently reported on the findings of a Government Commission on the study of 
inequalities in health, and argued that social inequalities in the use of health 
services have largely dissappeared, and that the main reason for that being the 
case was the extension of public universal coverage to almost 100% of the 
population during the eighties and nineties. The relevance of already existing 
studies as well as future research on inequalities should contribute to the way 
decision-makers shape policies towards the tackling of such inequalities. The 
design and implementation of successful policy responses to inequalities 
remains a major issue for research in health care in the coming century.
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Table 2.1.
Selected studies on inequalities in health and health care in Spain: Area, data used, methodology and main conclusions.
Study Area Data used Methodology Results and conclusions
Alonso et al. 
(1988)
(1) Inequalities in health
(2) Inequalities in health care 
* Utilisation of medical
services
1986 Barcelona Health 
Survey
(1) Ranges: Self preceived health status, RAD, Limiting chronic 
illness, Chronic illness across social class
(2) Use/need ratios: Total number of visits to doctor by total number 
of days in bed in same period and social class
(1) The lowest the social class the worst the morbidity indicators
(2) The higher the social class the higher the use/need ratio
Gonzalez and
Regidor
(1988)
(2) Inequalities in health care 
* Utilisation of medical 
services, and dentists
1987 National Health 
Survey
(1) Use/need ratios: Total number of visits to doctor by total number 
of days in bed in same period and education level, and income level
(1) The higher the education level the higher the use/need ratio in medical and 
dentist visits. Intermediate income levels show the highest use/need ratio in 
medical visits. The higher the income level the higher the dentists use/need ratio
Murillo et al. 
(1988)
(1) Inequalities in health 1986 Barcelona Health 
Survey
(1) Regression models
DV: Income (six income categories).
EV: Self-reported health status, chronic illness, RAD, pathologies, 
education, sociodemographic variables.
The higher the income level the better the health status. Human capital variable 
such as education and health are important to income level.
Rodriguez 
and Lemkow 
(1990)
(1) Inequalities in Health. 1983 DATA S.A. Study on 
System of Values in 
European Values Study
Correlation and regression coefficients
DV: Self-perceived health status and lifestyles
EV:Age, gender, income, socio-professional status
Poverty, living conditions, income and socio-professional statusplay an important 
part in explaining variations in health in Spain.
Portella et al. 
(1990)
(2) Inequalities in Health Care 
* Utilisation of Primary Care
SIG-7 Distribution of use according to: Age groups, gender, among centres, 
coverage
The oldest and women use primary care services more often. This may come 
explained by need, supply and access variables not explored here.
Guillen
(1990)
(1) Inequalities in health
(2) Inequalities in health care 
* Utilisation of Health
Services
1987 National Health 
Survey
Lineal and logistic regressions
DV: Utilisation of health services (primary care, ginecologist, 
psiquiatry, hospital
EV: income, education level, age, gender, rural-urban setting
Greater family income and age increases the probability of visiting a doctor. 
Women visit the doctor more frequnetly
Rodriguez et 
al.
(1993)
(1) Inequalities in health
(2) Inequalities in health care
1987 National Health 
Survey
(1) Morbidity concentration curves: HNG, Chronic illness, Limitic 
Chronic, RAD
(2) Expenditure concentration curves, Le Grand’s and Wagstaff 
Indexes, and regression models:
DV: Expenditure
EV: Morbidity indicators, income age and gender
(1) The highest the income level the better the need indicators
(2) Regardless of need indicator used, and the procedure to test inequity (shares, 
indexes and concentration curves, expenditure per prerson ill across income 
groups) there is a certain degree of inequity favouring the better-off.
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Table 2.1. (Cont.)
Selected studies on inequalities in health and health care in Spain: Area, data used, methodology and main conclusions.
Study Area Data used Methodology Results and conclusions
De Miguel et 
al.
(1994)
(1) Inequalities in Health
(2) Inequalities in Health Care 
* Utilisation of Health
Services
1993 FOESSA 5 Survey 
and
1980 and 1989INE 
Hospital Morbidity data
Percentage distributions
(1) Explored variables: Self-perceived health status, Discapacity and 
symptoms
According to age, gender, civil status, social class, education, 
occupation, rural-urban setting, region,
(2) Explored variables: Doctor type, Dentisit, and Hopital visits 
According to age, gender, civil status, social class, education, 
occupation, rural-urban setting, region, and diagnosis
Multiple conclusions. See FOESSA report for details.
Jovell
(1994)
(1) Inequalities in Health 1990 CIRES Survey Logistic regressions
DV: Self-perceived health status
EV: Income, education level, socail class, gender.age, marital status, 
lifestyles
The higher the socioeconomic status the worse the self-perceived health 
indicators. This remains the same when controlling for age, lifestyles and co­
morbidity.
There is a dear socioeconomic gradient in self-perceived health status, 
regardless of the indicator of socioeconomic status used.
Marin et al. 
(1995)
(2) Inequalities in health care 
* Utilisation of Emergency 
Services
Sample of 800 patients 
attended in one Hospital
Bivariate analysis and Stepwise logistic regression 
DV: frequency of visits
EV: Age, gender, rural-urban, income, education, occupation, 
lifestyles, domestic violence, loneliness
Low income, low educational levels, alcoholism and violence were significantly 
correlated to utilisation of emergency services.
Logistic regressions selected income and alcoholism as independant predictors.
Femdndez la 
Hoz et al. 
(1996)
(2) Inequalities in health care 
* Utilisation of Health 
Services
1987 National Health 
Survey
Logistic regressions
DV: Visits to doctor and hospital
EV: Education level and household incom, self-perceived health 
status
The more priviledged have higher levels of health service (visits to doctor and 
hospital) use than others
Regidor et al. 
(1996)
(2) Inequalities in Health Care 
* Utilisation of Health 
Services
1993 National Health 
Survey
Logistic regressions
DV: Visits to doctor, hospital, dentist and ginecologist 
EV: Education level, age, gender, size of household, coverage, self­
perceived health status, limiting chronic. RAD
Individuals in lower education levels make use of health care services more often 
than those in higher education levels. When gender, age, health insurance and 
need are taken into account differences disappear
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Table 2.1. (Cont.)
Selected studies on inequalities in health and health care in Spain: Area, data used, methodology and main conclusions.
Study Area Data used Methodology Results and conclusions
Navarro and
Benach
(1996)
(1) Inequalities in Health
(2) Inequalities in Health Care
1987 and 1993 National 
Health Surveys
Descriptive analysis and Logistic regressions
(1) DV: HNG, RAD, chronic, lifestyles
EV: Social class, education level, region, occupational status, civil 
status,income, age, gender
(2) DV: Medical visits to Primary Care, hospital days and dentist 
EV: Social class, education level, region, occupational status, civil 
status,income, age, gender
All morbidity indicators worsen when moving from high social class to lower social 
class. Inequalities increase with age.
Between 1987 and 1993 there has been an increase in medical visits but this is 
attributed to the period when the survey was carried out.
The overall conclusion as regards mmedical visits is that is that inequalities 
decreased over the period.
Hospitalisation do not show inequalties either. Dentist visits show a clear 
inequaltiy pattern among social classes.
Lower education levels tend to use health care sen/ices more often than higher 
education levels, this overutilisation disappears when predictor variables like 
gender, age, health insurance and need are taken into account.
Fernandez et 
al. (1996)
(1) Inequalities in Health
(2) Inequalities in Health Care
1994 Catalan Health 
Survey
Logistic regressions (most relevant variables):
(1/2)) DV: Medical visits, hospital days, dentist, optometrists, 
preventive measures
EV: self-rated health, RAD, chronic, social class, age, gender, 
waiting times
Inequalities in health by social class persist. The utilisation of health services 
remain fairly equitable although differences were found in the use of particular 
services (dentist, optometrists, preventive measures) to the disadvantage of the 
lower socioeconomic groups.
Ab&solo et al. 
(1998)
(2) Inequalities in health care 
* Utilisation of Primary Care
1987 National Health 
Survey
Regressions models 
DV: GP Visit
EV: morbidity, demography, geography, socioeconomic, 
lifestyles,demand, supply, others
Socioeconomic, geographical and demographic characteristics significantly affect 
the probability of using GP services
Fernandez et 
al. (1999)
(1)Gender Inequalities in 
Health
(2) Gender Inequalities in 
Health Care
1994 Catalan Health 
Survey
Logistic regressions (most relevant variables):
DV: Medical visits, hospital days, dentist optometrists 
EV: Self-rated health, RAD, chronic, gender, age
Women are in worse health than men. The porportion of women visiting a health 
professional, dentists and optometrists was slightly greater than that for men. 
Differently, women used hospital facilities less than men. When taking account of 
need, women declaring good health reported a greater probability of counsulting 
a health professional, although no differences were found for utilisation of 
inpatient care, dentists or optometrists. They conclude that women despite being 
in greter need they do not use health services more frequently than men.
Borrell et al. 
(forthcoming)
(1) Inequalities in Health
(2) Inequalities in Health Care
1992 Barcelona Health 
Survey
Logistic regressions (most relevant variables):
DV: Medical visits, hospital days, dentist, optometrists 
EV: Self-perceived health status, RAD, chronic, days in bed, 
gender, age, social class, employment status, family structure.
There are still relevant inequalities in health among the population of Barcelona, 
with people in lower classes having worse health. No differences were found in 
visits to the doctor or hospitalisation, although preventive prcatices were 
undertaken in a lesser degree by those in lower social class.
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CHAPTER 3. 
Methodology.
This research relates the distribution of expenditure on health services to that of 
health in order to see whether individuals in equal need for health care really 
get equal share of health care services across income groups. To this aim I have 
followed a combination of methods. On one hand, I have incorporated the 
contributions made by Le Grand, as well as the later criticisms and approaches 
raised by Wagstaff et al. (1991 a, 1991 b) and O'Donnell et al. (1991 a, 1991 b) 
and Collins and Klein (1980) to the measurement of inequalities in health care. 
On the other, I have used logistic regressions to explain in more detail how the 
different variables in these regression models, namely age, gender, need and 
socioeconomic varaibels are associated to the utilisation of the available types 
of care.
The contents of this Chapter 3 includes, first, a specification of objectives and 
hypotheses of the study. Second, there is a brief description of the data set used 
in the analysis, that is the 1994 Catalan Health Survey (ESCA, 1996). Third, an 
account is given of how the allocation of the sample to five income groups has 
been done. Fourth, I illustrate how a comprehensive set of morbidity indicators 
was built on the bases of the information contained in the Catalan Health 
Survey (CHS). Fifth, I specify how expenditure was estimated for each type of 
care and how both Le Grand, and Collins and Klein use/need ratios were 
calculated, as well as how the concentration curves and concentration indices 
were built. Finally, the logistic regression approach is detailed as regards 
methods and variables included.
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3.1. Study objectives and hypotheses.
The study hypotheses were two. On one hand, it was considered that given 
universalisation of coverage to the entire population, the Catalan Health 
System was largely providing services according to need. The second 
hypothesis tested in this research accounted for the possibility that despite an 
overall equitable provision of services it may be the case of distinct patterns of 
utilisation according to income, age and gender in the three types of services 
studied, namely primary care, specialist care and inpatient care.
The aim of this research was to test the above hypotheses. The general 
objective was therefore to assess in which way the Health System in Catalonia 
delivered health care services according to need criteria. More specific 
objectives were to study inequalities in health in Catalonia accounting for a 
series of need indicators, to get to know better the plausible different patterns of 
utilisation of the various services across income groups, and to study which and 
how different variables, namely age, gender, need, and socioeconomic 
variables such as income and education were associated to utilisation of 
primary, specialist and inpatient care.
3.2. The 1994 Catalan Health Survey.
In this research I have used the 1994 Catalan Health Survey (CHS) (Enquesta de 
Salut de Catalunya, ESCA 1996) as the principal data source. One of the 
aspects that adds particular importance to my research is precisely the use of 
this data set to the measurement of horizontal equity in a decentralised policy 
area. Other horizontal equity studies in Spain has focussed on the national level 
since the only data set available then was either the 1987 or 1993 National 
Health Surveys. The fact that the CHS has recently become available allows for 
the study of inequalities at regional level, and that is probably the most 
adequate level to inform policy decisions once decentralisation of health care
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has taken place.
The CHS, performed by the Catalan Regional Health Service in 1994, is a 
survey sample of 15,000 individual interviews, geographically distributed 
across the eight health districts in Catalonia. The main characteristics of the 
CHS are described in Table 3.1.
Access to the CHS data set was gained on software format which has made the 
data processing a manageable task through SPSS 7.5 for Windows software. The 
use of this data set, together with the approach to the measurement of 
inequalities in health care, makes this study an empirically innovative piece of 
research in Spain.
Table 3.1.
Main characteristics of the 1994 Catalan Health Survey.
Scope: Regional (Catalonia), accounting for the eight health districts into which the territory 
of Catalonia is divided according to the Catalan Health Plan.
Universe: Population living in Catalonia (6,059,494).
Size: 15,000 interviews for the whole of Catalonia. All interviews targeted individuals. 
Sampling error: The sampling error is fu lly acceptable.
Number of questions: 151.
Main issues raised in the questionnaire:
* Sociodemographie data (family).
* Sociodemographic data (individual).
* Self-reported health status.
* Restricted Activity.
* Chronic morbidity.
* Accidents.
* Medical Visits.
* Hospitalisation (in-patient care).
* Preventive medicine.
* Drugs and pharmaceutical consumption.
* Life styles and nutrition, physical activity, smoking and alcohol consumption.
* Disabilities and handicaps.
* Mental health.
* Family expenditure in private health services.
* General opinion and satisfaction with health care services.
* Family income.
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3.3. Social groups classification.
There are several ways of dividing the population. Much of the research carried 
out both in the UK and in Spain has used occupation as the variable of choice 
so as to classify the population into groups. Other ways of proceeding include 
income, education, gender, etnicity, or place of residence. I have set on 
income, and later on education, to break up the population of Catalonia. I have 
intentionally avoided the use of occupation to classify individuals in the sample 
for three important reasons. First, because according to existing studies in Spain 
(Duran, 1993) occupation has been found as a misleading variable in many 
ways since over 50% of the population in Spain cannot be classified according 
to the occupation variable as a consequence of either being students, 
housewives, retired persons, or unemployed. Second, the occupational 
classification table used for such a purpose in Spain is rather old and the labour 
market has changed considerably since then. Finally, what this research tries to 
ascertain is whether people in equal need get equal treatment, irrespective of 
income, allowing also for a national and international comparison of results 
with other studies that also used income as the socioeconomic variable of 
interest.
The sample was divided into quintiles according to household income so as to 
assess whether there was a trend in the distribution of health services favouring 
the better-off. As stated, in addition to income, education levels were used, 
particularly in regard to the logistic regression models described later in this 
chapter. The variable education has been used in many of the studies on 
inequality in Spain reviewed in chapter two. I wanted to test whether the use of 
a different socioeconomic variable made any difference to the results, either 
when used alone or in combination with other variables.
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3.4. Quintiles definition.
I hereby account for the way in which quintiles groups according to income 
have been defined. Question Q#151 in the CHS allows for a classification 
according to household income. The total number of individuals that answered 
this question and were finally included in the analysis was 10,272.
Q#151. Refers to HOUSEHOLD CROSS INCOME per year (12 categories).
The list of 12 categories in Q#151 was reduced to 5 categories accounting for 
20% of the population each. The allocation of individuals to one of the five 
income groups followed proximity first, and randomisation by means of SPSS 
7.5 windows software. The final composition of quintile groups was the 
following:
Croup-a (Bottom) -  2,022 (income groups 1,2,3) + 32 (individuals randomised from 
income group 4) -  2.054
Croup-b -  2,055 (individuals from income group 4) -  2.055
Croup-c = 325 (individuals left from income group 4) + 1,729 (individuals randomised 
from income group 5) = 2.054
Croup-d -  311 (individuals left from income group 5) +1,383 (income group 6) + 361 
(individuals randomised from income group 7) -  2.055
Croup-e (Top) = 602 (individuals left from income group 7) + 1,452 (income groups 8, 9, 
10, 11 and 12) -  2.054
For further use I created a new variable "income" in the file accounting for the 
new income groups and taking values 1 for group-a (lowest income group) to 5 
for group-e (top income group) as in the box.
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3.5. Distribution of morbidity and need indicators.
The selection of a good indicator of morbidity has been a problem outlined 
throughout the literature. All the existing indicators have deficiencies of one 
kind or another and, since a choice must be made and restriction of data 
availability are present, it is agreed that a set of acceptable indicators is that 
derived from health interviews surveys (Le Grand, 1978). Accordingly, I have 
selected a set of morbidity indicators from the CHS that try to capture different 
aspects of health: Acute sickness and Limiting Chronic illness, as used by Le 
Grand (1978), and Health Not Good and Not-sick, as used by other authors 
such as O'Donnell and Propper (1991a). Further, these indicators reflect the use 
of the three models of needs assessment outlined by Blaxter in the literature: 
Medical, Functional, and Subjective.
Following the review of studies on inequalities in health care, both nationally 
and internationally, I have used five morbidity measures as proxies to ill-health, 
namely, Health Not Good, Acute sickness, Limiting Chronic illness, Not-sick 
and Sick.361 hereby briefly describe the process of building such new variables 
into the data set.
(A) Health Not Good.
Self-rated health status was appraised by the CHS in Question 28 (Q#28) using 
a list of ordinal categories, ranging from a perfect health to a very poor health 
status. Individuals were asked to position themselves in an ordinal scale 
according to what they believed was their health status at the moment of the
36
The CHS used in this study only consider living and not institutionalised individuals. Thus, the set 
of need indicators I have used here do not include mortality measures nor consider patients w ithin 
hospital at the time the survey was carried out.
112
interview.
Q#28. "How would you describe your health status?" Five possible answers are offered: 
excellent, very good, good, fair and bad.
Individuals that answered YES to any of the last two categories (Fair and Bad 
health) were classified as Health Not Good. The Health Not Good (HNG) 
indicator is used here as a way to approach the concept of ill-health using an 
interpretation of Blaxter's subjective perceptions of health status, as discussed 
in Chapter two.
(B) Acute Sickness.
The acute sickness indicator reflected ill-health status when the cause of such a 
poor health is an acute problem that has resulted in a restriction of individual 
activities, either main or secondary daily activities, at some point in time and 
for a small number of days, as opposed to limiting chronic or long term. Acute 
sickness indicators correspond in many ways to what Blaxter defined as the 
functional component. The CHS identified acute sickness in a number of 
Questions (Q#32 to Q#40) where acute conditions are defined as illness or 
injury that resulted in a restriction of activity at any time during a two week 
reference period.
Q  #32. "During the last 15 days have you had to stay in bed including in-patient care 
because o f a health problem (illness or injury)?" Yes/No answer.
Q #33. Referring to Q #32: ”How many days?"
Q #34. Only for those working, studying or housewives. "In addition to those days in Q#32 
have you stopped your main activities (not going to work, not studying or not doing 
housework) during the last 15 days because o f your health?" Yes/No answer.
Q  #315. Referring to Q#34: "How many days?"
Q  #36. "In addition to those days in Q#32 and Q#34 have you stopped your other activities 
(walking, sports, shopping...) during the last 15 days?". Yes/No answer.
Q #37. Referring to Q#36: "How many days?"
Q  #38. "What caused the restriction on your activities in Q#32-34-36?". Open answer.
Q #39. "Would that problem last for less than three months?" Yes/No answer.
Q  #40. "Has it  been caused by an accident?" Yes/No answer.
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Acute sickness was thus used here as an additional morbidity indicator 
(ACUTE), classifying individuals in reference to their answers to some relevant 
questions in this list. Indeed, so as to classify a person as "Acute" I looked for 
YES answers to any of the questions Q#32-34-36, and a NO answer to Q#39.
(C) Limiting Chronic Illness.
The chronic indicator selected was Limiting Chronic Illness (LIMCRO). This 
indicator identifies long-term health problems that have resulted in a limitation 
of activities in any way. It corresponds to both the medical and functional 
models identified by Blaxter since it refers to a functional limitation of activity 
and chronic diseases or conditions are listed in the form of checklist in the 
survey. Questions Q#41 to Q#46 in the survey identified long-term health 
problems that resulted in a limitation of activities in some way.
Q  #41. “During the last 15 days have you had to cut down your main activity as a result o f a 
chronic illness?". Yes/No answer.
Q #42. "In addition, have you had to cut down your other activities as a result o f a chronic 
illness?". Yes/No answer.
Q  #43. If the answer to Q#41 and Q#42 has been YES then: "What was the cause?".
Q #44. Related to Q#43: "When d id  the problem start?"
Q  #45. "Do you suffer from any o f the conditions in this list?". A check-list with 16 categories 
of chronic illnesses is given.
Q #46. "Do you suffer from any other illnesses not included in list and identified by the 
doctor?” . Open answer.
On the bases of individual answers to these questions I built the Limiting 
Chronic indicator which I named LIMCRO. So as to determine whether a 
person fell in this morbidity group I looked for YES answers to any of the 
following questions: Q#41-42-45-46 (if completed) and Q#39 (see previous 
box).
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(D) Not-sick and Sick.
Some authors' contributions and criticisms to previous work in the area of 
equity in health care have also been found relevant to the specification of the 
set of morbidity indicators, and have consequently been incorporated to this 
research. These contributions take into account the fact that what is being 
measured is inequalities in reference to service utilisation. Consequently, 
although ill-health morbidity measures are of primary importance they are not 
to be judged as the only ones. Other, rather more positive health indicators, 
may also explain utilisation. This is the reason for including the Not-Sick 
indicator. Not-sick tries to capture in the analysis one of the criticisms raised by 
Wagstaff et al. (1991a, 1991b) and O'Donnell et al. (1991a, 1991b) and Collins 
and Klein (1980) to Le Grand's approach. That is, the fact that those who do not 
report neither restricted activity (acute sickness) nor long-standing chronic 
illness may also benefit from the use of health care services. The construction of 
the indicator using the CHS has come as a combination of the same questions 
used to define the Acute and Limcro indicators. Instead of looking for YES 
answers to Q#32-34-36-39 (ACUTE) and Q#41-42-45-46 (LIMCRO), this time I 
have looked for NO answers to both sets of questions. Finally, the Sick 
indicator was relatively easy to build since it could be defined as: Sick = 1 - 
Notsick.
All morbidity indicators described here were included in the data set as new 
variables, taking a value of 1 =YES and 0 = NO for each individual answer.
3.6. Utilisation of health care services.
Within the CHS the utilisation of the various services and types of care is 
included under questions Q#52 to Q#74. A first group of questions (Q#52 to 
Q#67) refer to medical visits (GP, pediatrician and nurse, as wells as out-patient
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visits). The rest of questions are related to in-patient care (Q#58 to Q#74).
As regards Primary Care, I selected the questions that were relevant to this 
exploration, particularly Q#52, Q#59 and Q#63. However, Q#52 is not a 
single question but a multiple response question. The data set accounts for this 
by splitting Q#52 into several Q#52_"j", taking "j" as many as thirteen possible 
values representing equal number of health personnel categories attending the 
visit. The categories that are relevant to Primary Care services utilisation are 
Q#52_1, Q#52_2 and Q#52_8 since they referred to either General 
Practitioners, Pediatricians and Nurses, respectively. These same questions 
account for the absolute number of visits to these professional categories during 
the last twelve months. I created a new variable in the data set accounting for 
"primary care utilisation". I named it "pc" and accordingly assigned individuals 
values 0 = no (being zero no visits paid) or 1 =yes (answers greater than 0, that 
is if {Q#52_1 > 0 or Q#52_2 > 0 or Q #52_8>0 }.
Q#52. "What type o f health professional did you visit?". A list of 13 categories is given 
(Q#52_1 to Q#52_13), The question refers to the last 12 months and also gives account of 
how many times had the respondent visited the doctor.
Q #53 . "When was the last time you visited a health professional?”. Open answer.
Q#54. "Have you made any consultation on the telephone?". It refers to the last 15 days. It 
is a Yes/No answer.
Q#55. Related to Q#54: "How many times?".
Q#56. "Have you visited a health professional during the last 15 days?". It is a Yes/No 
answer.
Q#57. Related to Q#56: "How many times?".
Q#58. "When was the last time you visited a health professional within the last 15 days?". 
Open answer.
Q#59. Related to Q#58: "Where was the visit paid?". A list of 10 categories is given.
Q#60 . Related to Q#59: "How long did you have to wait in the waiting room?".
Q#61. If answer to Q#59 has been answer #3 or #4, then: "What was the reason for the 
visit?".
Q#62. "Why did you pay the visit?". It is an open answer.
Q#63. "What type of health professional d id you then visit?". A list of 13 categories is given. 
Q#64. " Which specialty d id the professional belong to?". A list of 5 categories is given. 
Q#65. "Which was your level o f satisfaction w ith that visit?".
Q#66. "D id you have a problem that you think required medical assistance but did 
not go?”. It is a Yes/No answer and it refers to the last 15 days.
Q#67. Related to Q#66: "Why did you not go?". A list of 9 categories is given.
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Specialist Care was the second type of care explored as regards utilisation. The 
information needed to build up the utilisation variable, as well as to quantify 
the number of visits paid to specialist care services, was contained in one of the 
categories within Q#52, particularly Q#52_3. I created a new variable in the 
files accounting for "specialist care utilisation". I named it "esp" and assigned 
individuals values 0 = no (being zero no visits paid) or 1 =yes (answers greater 
than 0, that is if Q-52_3 > 0 ).
In-patient Care is considered in the questionnaire under Questions Q#68 to 
Q#74, separate from primary care and specialist care visits. I selected 
individuals according to their answers to Q#68. I then created a new variable in 
the files which I named "ip" and assigned individuals values 0 = no or 1 =yes 
(a YES answer to Q#68). Another question in the CHS (Q#70) allowed for the 
quantification of the number of days in-hospital during the reference period.
Q#68. "Have you been in-patient care during the last 12 months?". It is a Yes/No 
answer*
Q#69. Related to Q#68: "How many times?". Open answer.
Q#70. "On: the who!e/ how many days during the last 12 months?". Open answer.
Q#71. "Where did the stay take place the last time?". Open answer.
Q#72. "What was the cause o f your stay the last time?". Open answer.
Q#73. "How many days in hospital dis you stay the last time?". Open answer.
Q#74. - Nhat is your level o f satisfaction with the last stay?". A list of 5 categories is given.
So as to relate utilisation, and ultimately expenditure, to the distribution of 
morbidity, those reporting illness in each of the groups were studied regarding 
their utilisation of health services. The level of utilisation of health services is 
given by the number of visits paid to a GP, pediatrician or nurse, in the case of 
primary care, visits paid to the out-patient ward (Q#52 and Q#57) for specialist 
care, and the number of days in care in hospital (Q#70).
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3.7. Expenditures.
The utilisation of each of these services per quintile group was then translated 
into expenditure. In all cases official 1994 reimbursement tariffs from the 
Catalan Health Service authorities were used.
As regards inpatient care, the total cost of one hospital stay in Catalonia used 
here depended on both the type of hospital where that stay took place as well 
as the number of days in hospital (Q#70). Hospitals in Catalonia have 
traditionally been classified under three different categories, namely type A: 
Basic General Hospital, type B: Reference Hospitals, and type C: High 
Technology Hospitals. Despite this functional-assistance classification there are 
five finance categories to reimburse hospital stays, one category for each type of 
hospital described above and two additional categories, namely types A/B and 
B/C. The latter two take into account the fact that there are hospitals that do not 
fall strictly under the three first categories either because they would have an 
intermediate number of beds or simply because of their location. These two 
extra categories, A/B and B/C, only respond to financial needs, and they do not 
mean a difference regarding the assistance level, only regarding the economic- 
financial level.
Hospitals are largely financed by means of Basic Care Units-UBA (1 UBA 
equals 1 inpatient day). According to the type of hospital the UBA receives a 
value in Spanish Pesetas which is revised annually. Table 3.2. shows for 1994 
the approved value in Pesetas of one UBA according to the five hospital 
categories. The CHS, however, does not provide enough information as regards 
hospital category used in all individual inpatient stays for which a weighted 
system must be used. The Soanish and Catalan hospital statistics (INE, 1996; 
Generalitat de Catalunya, 1994a, 1994b,1995c) allows for the construction of a 
weighted system to calculate the average cost per stay in a Catalan hospital 
accounting for (i) financial category, (ii) health region, (iii) number of discharges
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and, (iv) average number of days. The weighted value of one UBA in 1994 
taking into account all these factors is also given in Table 3.2. The in-patient 
expenditure for each individual in the sample is calculated multiplying number 
of days in hospital by the weighted value of 1 UBA.
Table 3.2.
Hospital care financial categories and expenditure.
Hospital Financial Category Tariff applied to 1 UBA 
(in 1994 Pesetas)
A 17,110
A/B 20,320
B 23,030
B/C 26,000
C 30,590
Weighted Value of 1 UBA 24,512
Sources: Generalitat de Catalunya 1994a, 1994b, 1995c; INE, 1996.
According to the values shown in Table 3.2., individual expenditure in 
inpatient care was calculated as follows:
Exp_IP = Q#70 * 24,512 Pesetas
The Basic Care Unit-UBA is also used in Catalonia to reimburse the cost of out­
patient visits. The equivalence is stated as follows:
1 In-patient day = 1 UBA = 24,512 Pesetas (as in Table 3.2.)
1 Out-patient visit = 0.4 UBA (first visit) =9,805 Pesetas
= 0.2 UBA (further visits) = 4,902 Pesetas
Since the questionnaire gives us exact information about the number of visits 
paid to outpatient or other specialist care services outside hospital, largely 
policlinics, the total expenditure per individual in this type of care is easily 
calculated. However, as stated above, a differentiation must be made between
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first and following visits.
Exp SPEC = 9,805 + (Q#52_3 -1) * 4,902
The only type of care that is not reimbursed according to UBAs is Primary care. 
Since no formal tariff has been established for these purposes I opted for 
looking into the total 1994 expenditure in Primary care services in Catalonia 
(225,676 million Pesetas)37 and divide it by the total number of visits to primary 
care services in Catalonia the same year 1994. Official statistics (Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 1995b; ESCA, 1996) provided the average number of visits per 
inhabitant in each Catalan health district as well as the population within each 
health region. That gave a total number of 63,612,080 visits to primary care 
services for the whole of Catalonia during 1994. The resulting figure allowed us 
to approximate the cost per primary care visit to be 3,552 Pesetas. Primary Care 
expenditure for each individual is then calculated as:
Exp_PC = (Q#52_1 + Q#52_2 + Q#52_8) * 3,552
Total expenditure for health care services for each individual in the sample 
could then be calculated as the summatory of three types of expenditure. A 
new variable is then created, namely Exp TOT:
Exp_TOT = Exp_PC + Exp_SPEC + ExpJP.
The use of expenditures as proxy to treatment and the use of these measures of 
unit costs impose a series of limitations which are discussed in Chapter 7.
37 Generalitat de Catalunya (1995a).
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3.8. Use/need ratios.
In this research, each need indicator is explored separately as regards utilisation 
of health services. As described above, the needs indicators used here have 
been Health Not Good, Acute Sickness, Limiting Chronic, Not-Sick and Sick. 
The use of the various health services is measured by the resources used in the 
different types of care expressed in number of visits to primary care, out-patient 
visits, and days in hospital. Further, an aggregate measure was used to express 
the use of these resources in monetary units. As stated, the calculation of 
expenditure was possible by multiplying the average cost of each visit or day in 
hospital by the number of episodes.
Two disaggregated use/need ratios were used to assess the extent of inequalities 
in health care, namely Le Grand's and Collins and Klein's. The Le Grand Index 
of Inequity (HI LC) is calculated by dividing total expenditure allocated to 
income group-i on the various types of services, by the total number of persons 
in the selected morbidity group and income group-i. This is done for each 
income group and morbidity indicator. Differently, Collins and Klein (HI CK) 
index takes account of expenditure allocated to those in income group-i who 
report morbidity divided by the number of those in income group-i who 
reported morbidity. This is also done for all need indicators and income groups. 
Both indices were later standardized for age and gender.
The distribution of ill-health and expenditure across income groups together 
with the distribution of expenditure draw a series of concentration curves in a 
box diagram. The differences between ill-health curves and expenditure curves 
determine the value of the concentration indices. This was also done for each 
need indicator.
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3.9. Standardisation of morbidity and expenditure.
A standardisation process assesses the extent to which the results to be 
standardised vary if a standard age and gender composition was taken instead 
of the one in the sample or subsample. It is likely that both age and gender w ill 
be associated to income, to the reporting of morbidity, and to the utilisation of 
health care relative to morbidity. Therefore, the standardisation process aims at 
controlling for the fact that age and gender might influence use and need in 
different ways. The method used here was direct age/gender standardization 
(O'Donnell and Propper, 1991 a; 1991 b) using the whole CHS sample as the 
standard age/gender distribution.
The formula used here to calculate the age/gender standardised number 
reporting morbidity for each morbidity indicator was38:
age group, "k" gender group.
Plijk = Number of individuals in the "i" income group and "j" age group, "k" 
gender group.
n,.. = Number of individuals in the "i" income group.
Income groups considered are five (accordingly, "i" takes values from 1 to 5). The gender groups 
considered are two, male and female. The age groups considered are four (accordingly, "j" takes 
values from 1 to 4): j(1)= People 0-16; j(2)= People 17-39; j(3)*= People 40-59; j(4)= People 
over 60.
where:
bijk = Number of individuals reporting morbidity in the "i" income group, "j
38
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n.jk = Number of individuals in the "j" age group, "k" gender group.
where:
clmijk = Health care use by individuals in morbidity group "m", income group 
"i", age group "j" and gender group "k".
rimijk = Number of individuals in morbidity group "m", income group "i", age 
group "j'' and gender group "k".
rimjk = Number of individuals in morbidity group "m", age group "j" and 
gender group "k".
Nm  =Total number of individuals in morbidity group "m".
This process was done for each type of care, namely inpatient care, primary 
care and specialist care.
Morbidity groups considered are four. Accordingly, "m" takes the following names: m(1) = Health 
Not Good (HNG), m(2)=Acute sickness (ACUTE), m(3) = Limiting Chronic (LIMCRO), m(4) = Not 
Sick (NS). Income groups considered are five (accordingly, "i" takes values from 1 to 5). The gender 
groups considered are two, male and female. The age groups considered are four (accordingly, "j" 
takes values from 1 to 4): j(1)= People 0-16, j (2) — People 17-39, j(3) = People 40-59, j(4) = 
People over 60.
N  = Number of individuals in the sample.
The formula used to standardise utilisation indicators 39:
39
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3.10. Logistic regressions.
Logistic regressions have widely been used in many applied areas of social 
sciences, including inequality studies, with the purpose of examining the 
simultaneous influence and association of a given set of variables with a 
defined dichotomous dependant variable. Thus, the objective of this research 
was to explore how the variables included in the models, namely need 
indicators, age, gender and socioeconomic variables are associated to the 
utilisation of the various types of care. Logistic regressions results w ill also 
allow us to know whether the size of the effect of any variable in the utilisation 
of health services is significant or not. Since some of these variables are 
represented in terms of categories, particularly age and income, logistic 
regressions w ill give also us a detailed information of how any of these 
categories are associated to utilisation in reference to a given category within 
the same variable.
A series of models were run including different combinations of variables. 
Improvement in the models was measured by decreases in the -2 Log 
Likelihood ratio. Both forced and stepwise methods have been used to define 
the different models. In brief, 36 logistic regressions models were ran (see 
Tables 3.3.). Each model explored utilisation of services by the total population 
in Catalonia, the male population and, finally, the female population group.
As stated, primary care, specialist care and inpatient care have been considered 
as the dependant variables in all cases. Logistic regression models consider the 
dependant variable as a dichotomous variable, that is, taking a 0 value when 
there is no utilisation, and a 1 value when utilisation takes place.
The rest of the variables are considered as utilisation explanatory variables. All 
the variables in the model are fully described in Table 3.4., accounting for the 
categories, coding and the reference category used for comparison purposes. In
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addition a series of regression models were used changing the reference 
category for age and income variables, selecting the immediate superior 
category as reference category for comparison.
In building the regression analysis models for the purpose of this research, 
income was the socioeconomic variable selected first. This was consistent with 
the analysis of the distribution of health and health care at the global level.
Later in the research it was considered relevant to include an additional 
socioeconomic variable, namely education level, to assess whether it made any 
difference to the analysis of equity at the level of primary care, outpatient care 
and inpatient care services. Accordingly, the education variable was included 
in the regression models together with income. The Catalan Health Survey 
explored education level in Question Q# 11. A recoding of the variable was 
needed to account for four differential categories or levels of education, namely 
illiterate, primary education, intermediate/secondary education, and higher 
education. Since there might be a case of multicolinearity between income and 
education categories, the regression analysis results are shown for both 
education and income on their own, and together, which allows for a better 
interpretation.
The results of logistic regressions are given in the form of odds ratios and 
significance levels (99%, 95%, and not significant) in all cases. The results are 
presented in a series of tables.
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Table 3.3.
Logistic regression models for primary care, specialist care 
and inpatient care.
Files Explanatory variables in the model Dependant variables (Utilisation)
Primary Care Specialist Care Inpatient Care
Catalonia [age, gender, hng, income] (PC-A) (SC-A) (IPC-A)
Catalonia Males [age,hng, income] (PC-A-Male) (SC-A-Male) (IPC-A-Male)
Catalonia Females [age, hng, income] (PC-A-Female) (SC-A-Female) (1 PC-A-Female)
Files Explanatory variables in the model Dependant variables (Utilisation)
Primary Care Specialist Care Inpatient
Care
Catalonia [age, gender, hng, sick, income] (PC-1) (SC-1) (IPC-1)
[age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, 
income]
(PC-2) (SC-2) (1 PC-2)
Catalonia Males [age, hng, sick, income] (PC-Malel) (SC-Male 1) (IPC-Malel)
[age,hng, acute, limcro, income] (PC-Male2) (SC-Male2) (IPC-Male2)
Catalonia Females [age, hng, sick, income] (PC-Femalel) (SC-Female 1) (IPC-Femalel)
[age, hng, acute, limcro, income] (PC-Female2) (SC-Female) (IPC-Female2)
Files Explanatory variables in the model 
(a)
Dependant variables (Utilisation)
Primary Care Specialist Care Inpatient Care
Catalonia [age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, 
income, education]
(PC-E) (SC-E) (IPC-E)
Catalonia Males [age,hng, acute, limcro, income, 
education]
(PC-E-Male) (SC-E-Male) (1 PC-E-Male)
Catalonia Females [age, hng, acute, limcro, income, 
education]
(PC-E-Female) (SC-E-Female) (IPC-E-Female)
(a) The regression models using Education as an additional variable considered as Need 
variables: HNG, Acute and Limcro.
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Table 3.4.
Variables in the models: categories, codes used and reference category.
Variable Categories or Groups Coding Reference category 
(a)
PC (Primary Care) Dichotomical [ no, yes ] [ 0 , 1 ] -
SPC (Specialist Care) Dichotomical [ no, yes ] [ 0 , 1  ] -
IP (Inpatient Care) Dichotomical [ no, yes ] [ 0 , 1  ] -
Age Categorical [ 0-16, 17-39, 40-59, 60 or more] , [ 1 , 2 ,  3, 4] (a) 4 -  60 or more
(b) Immediate superior
Gender Dichotomical [male, female ] [1, 2] 1 -  male
HNG Dichotomical [ no, yes ] [ 0 , 1 ] 0 -  not HNG
Acute Dichotomical [ no, yes ] [ 0 , 1 ] 0 -  not Acute
Limcro Dichotomical [ no, yes ] [ 0 , 1 ] 0 -  not Limcro
Sick Dichotomical [ no, yes ] [ 0 , 1 ] 0 -  Not Sick
Income Categorical [ quintiles ] [ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5] (a) 5 -  top quintile
(b) Immediate superior
Education Categorical [illiterate, primary, intermediate, 
higher]
[ 1 , 2 ,  3, 4 ] 4 -  higher education
(a) In some cases the reference category was changed to explore a different hypothesis (see 
Chapters 4 and 5).
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CHAPTER 4.
The Distribution of Need.
The study of the distribution of need and morbidity is a first step in the study of 
inequalities in health care. This chapter explores the distribution of need in the 
population in Catalonia as regards the five indicators outlined in the previous 
chapter. Following the methodological chapter, I first looked into the 
percentual distribution of the five indicators across income groups. This alloed, 
later, for the construction of illness concentration curves and the calculation of 
concentration indices. Both standardised and not standardised results are 
reported.
4.1. The distribution of morbidity and need indicators.
As stated in Chapter 3: Methodology, I have clustered the population surveyed 
in Catalonia into five quintile groups according to household income, each 
representing exactly 20% of the sample. The final distribution of individuals in 
the file is given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1.
Sample distribution across income groups.
Income groups 
(from bottom to top)
CATALONIA
Group-a (lowest) 2,054
Group-b 2,055
Group-c 2,054
Group-d 2,055
Group-e (highest) 2,054
TOTAL 10,272
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I then explored how these income groups accounted for morbidity, ill-health 
and health. As mentioned, I have selected five need indicators: Health Not 
Good, Acute sickness, Limiting Chronic illness, Not-sick and Sick, and new 
variables were created in the file corresponding to the presence or not of these 
need indicators for each individual entry.
Table 4.2. shows the distribution of Health Not Good (HNG) distribution 
according to income groups for Catalonia. In the table, N  indicates the number 
of individuals categorised as HNG according to their answer to Q#28 in the 
survey. The %HNG column indicates the percentage distribution across income 
groups of people that said HNG, adding up 100%. Finally, the %Pop. in group- 
/ that answered HNG  column alludes to the percentage of people, within each 
income group, that answered HNG. The distribution of HNG was then 
standardised following the direct standardisation procedure described in the 
methods chapter. The same steps and standardisation procedure were followed 
and applied to the rest of morbidity indicators used in this research.
Table 4.2.
Distribution of HEALTH NOT GOOD across income groups in Catalonia.
NOT STANDARDISED STANDARDISED
Income N % % pop. in group-i % % pop. in group-i
Groups HNG that answered HNG that answered
HNG HNG
Group-a 910 33.94 44.30 25.85 33.83
Group-b 678 25.29 32.99 22.40 29.31
Group-c 478 17.83 23.27 19.41 25.40
Group-d 375 13.99 18.25 17.64 23.07
Group-e 240 8.95 11.68 14.70 19.24
TOTAL 2681 100.0 26.10 100.0 26.17
The second indicator explored was Acute Sickness. Both unstandardised and 
standardised results are displayed in Table 4.3.
129
Table 4.3.
Distribution of ACUTE sickness across income groups in Catalonia.
NOT STANDARDISED STANDARDISED
Income
Groups
N %
ACUTE
% pop. in group-i 
that answered 
ACUTE
%
ACUTE
% pop. in group-i 
that answered 
ACUTE
Croup-a 277 27.32 13.48 26.01 13.04
Group-b 224 22.09 10.90 21.33 10.68
Group-c 191 18.84 9.30 18.96 9.51
Group-d 171 16.86 8.32 16.98 8.51
Group-e 151 14.89 7.35 16.72 8.38
TOTAL 1014 100.0 9.87 100.0 10.02
The need indicator used within the analysis of Chronic illness was Limiting 
Chronic. That is, individuals whose chronic pathologies or clinical conditions 
have resulted in a limitation of their activities in some way. Results are reported 
in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4.
Distribution of LIMITING CHRONIC across income groups in Catalonia.
NOT STANDARDISED STANDARDISED
Income
Groups
N %
LIMCRO
% pop. in group-i 
that answered 
LIMCRO
%
LIMCRO
% pop. in group-i 
that answered 
LIMCRO
Group-a 234 24.30 11.39 20.66 9.57
Group-b 210 21.81 10.22 22.02 10.19
Group-c 189 19.63 9.20 20.87 9.66
Group-d 174 18.06 8.47 18.33 8.48
Group-e 156 16.20 7.59 18.12 8.38
TOTAL 963 100.0 9.37 100.0 9.26
The last two need indicators explored were Not-Sick and Sick. Not-Sick tries to 
capture the fact that there are individuals that despite feeling healthy still use 
health care services. The distribution across income is reported in Table 4.5. 
Sick captures an aggregate measure of Acute and Limcro. It is relatively easy to 
build since it comes as a result of individuals saying NO to the Not-Sick 
indicator. The distribution of individuals reporting Sick is given in Table 4.6.
130
Table 4.5.
Distribution of NOT-SICK across income groups in Catalonia.
NOT STANDARDISED STANDARDISED
Income N % % pop. in group-i % % pop. in group-i
Groups NOTSICK that answered NOTSICK that answered
NOTSICK NOTSICK
Group-a 133 7.63 6.48 13.00 10.55
Group-b 239 13.70 11.63 17.13 13.90
Group-c 390 22.36 18.98 22.48 18.26
Group-d 470 26.95 22.87 23.61 19.17
Group-e 512 29.36 24.93 23.78 19.31
TOTAL 1744 100.0 16.98 100.0 16.24
Table 4.6.
Distribution of SICK across income groups in Catalonia.
NOT STANDARDISED STANDARDISED
Income N % % pop. in group-i % % pop. in group-i
Groups SICK that answered SICK that answered
SICK SICK
Group-a 1921 22.53 93.52 21.80 91.83
Group-b 1816 21.29 88.37 20.44 86.06
Group-c 1664 19.52 81.02 19.40 81.75
Group-d 1585 18.58 77.13 19-20 80.80
Group-e 1542 18.08 75.07 19.16 80.70
TOTAL 8528 100.0 83.02 100.0 84.23
All the relevant data derived from the distribution of the morbidity indicators 
explored above across income has been synthesized through a series of tables 
and figures. I have also accounted here for the illness concentration curves 
originating from the distribution of morbidity across income groups as 
measured by the indicators above.
The HNG distribution shows a negative slope. This slope is a pronounced slope 
when compared with the rest of indicators used. This negative gradient 
indicates, first, that people in Catalonia that answered HNG are distributed 
differently across income groups and, second, that people that say HNG are
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much more numerous in the lower income groups that in higher income 
groups. Indeed, when moving towards lower income groups the %HNG 
increases. From all individuals in the Catalonia file that answered HNG only 
9% are in income group-e while 34% are in group-a, that is four times as much 
as in the highest income group-e.
As regards the column %Pop. in group-i that answered HNG, the average for 
Catalonia is 26%. That is, on the whole and regardless of income group, 26% 
of the people in Catalonia affirm their health was not good. When looking into 
income distribution in the same column, important differences across groups of 
income were found, varying from 12% of the population in income group-e, to 
44% in group-a, almost 4 times as much. Standardised results for HNG flattens 
the income slope considerably.
Acute as an indicator of ill-health has a less sharp a gradient than HNG. Up to 
27% of the people that answered Acute are in the lowest income group-a, 
while the top income group-e only accounts for 15%. On average, almost 10% 
of the population of Catalonia responded Acute, although this percentage varies 
from 13% in the lowest income group-a to approximately 7% in the highest 
income group-e. That is, individuals in the bottom income group-a restrict their 
activities as a result of an acute condition twice as much as those in group-e.
Limiting Chronic as a need indicator invokes restriction of activity as a result of 
a chronic condition. The gradient for the population in Catalonia is again 
negative, showing that the lower the income level the higher the value of the 
indicator. However, this slope is less pronounced than that of HNG or Acute, 
meaning that for limiting chronic conditions there is not as much difference 
according to income groups as there are regarding the previous two ill-health 
indicators. Around 24% of the population in Catalonia that restrict their activity 
as a consequence of a chronic condition are allocated in bottom income group- 
a, while in the top income group-e they come down to 16%. On average, just
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above 9% of the population in Catalonia state Limcro, ranging from 7.6% in 
group-e to 11.4% in the lowest income group-a, that is 50% more in the bottom 
income group.
Not surprisingly, Not-sick is the only indicator of need that follows a positive 
gradient, that is, the higher the income the higher the Not-sick indicator. Only 
7.6% of those that assert not-sick in Catalonia are allocated in income group-a, 
compared with almost 30% in the highest income group-e. On average around 
1 7% of the population of Catalonia are considered as not-sick, but there is a 
considerable disparity across groups. Indeed, almost 25% of the population in 
the top income group-e state Not-sick while in income group-a they fall down 
to 6.5%, that is almost four times less.
The distribution of Sick across the defined income groups is fairly horizontal 
with a very smooth negative gradient, reflecting, once more, the fact that 
people in lower income groups are sicker than in higher income groups. 
According to this need indicator, while approximately 22% of the people that 
say to be sick are in income group-a, in group-e the percentage is close to 18%. 
The difference between these two extreme income groups is therefore of just 
over four percentage points. Differences are higher when it comes to describe 
what happens in the second column, that is %Pop. in group-i that answered 
sick. Certainly, while 93% of the people in group-a said they were sick at any 
time within the reference period due either to an acute or a chronic condition, 
in income group-e they only represented 75% of the population in the group.
In brief, the results above suggest an income gradient in the way ill-health is 
distributed across the Catalan population. Table 4.7. shows both standardised 
and unstandardised results. The standardisation process applied does not 
change drastically the overall described picture of inequalities in health. Age 
and gender standardisation has an overall smoothing effect on the distribution 
of ill-health across income groups in the population of Catalonia (see Figure
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4.1.). This smoothing effect proves the existence of a different age and gender 
distribution across income groups in the sample. Despite the standardised 
results diminish the existing differences across groups we can still argue that 
low income groups are in poorer health than higher income groups, and that is 
regardless of the ill-health indicator used.
Figure 4.1. shows complementary graphical displays of the same data, nt 
percentages according to each need indicator (in the case of HNG, %hng = N- 
hng in group-i / N-hng Total), both unstandardised and standardised results are 
given.
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Table 4.7.
Summary of needs indicators results for Catalonia.
NOT STANDARDISED
Income
Groups
HNG ACUTE LIMCRO NOTSICK SICK
%hng
g rau |i;
%acute %Pob
group-i
%limcro %Pob
group-i
%nosick % pob:
group-i
%sick
g ^ p - i
Group-a
Group-b
Group-c
Group-d
Group-e
33.94
25.29
17.83
13.99
8.95
44 30 
32.99
18:25
11.68
27.32
22.09
18.84
16.86
14.89
13.48
10.90
9.30
8.32
7.35
24.30
21.81
19.63
18.06
16.20
11.39
10.22
9.20
8.47
7.59
7.63
13.70
22.36 
26.95
29.36
6.48
11.63
18.98
22.87
24.93
22.53
21.29
19.52
18.58
18.08
93.52
88.37
81.02
77.13
75.07
TOTAL 100.0 26.10 100.0 9.87 100.0 9.37 100.0 16.98 100.0 83.02
STANDARDISED
Income
Groups
HNG ACUTE LIMCRO NOTSICK SICK
%hng % acute %Pob
group-i
%limcro %Pob
group-i
%nosick %Pob
8rouP".......
%sick %Pob
Group-a
Group-b
Group-c
Group-d
Group-e
25.85
22.40
19.41 
17.64 
14.70
33.83
29.31
25.40
23.07
19.24
26.01
21.33
19.96
16.98
16.72
13.04
10.68
9.51
8.51 
8.38
20.66
22.02
20.87
18.33
18.12
9.57
10.19
9.66
8.48
8.38
13.00
17.13
22.48
23.61
23.78
10.55
13.90
18.26
19.17
19.31
21.80
20.44
19.40
19.20
19.16
91.83
86.06
,, ■
81.75
80.80
80.70
TOTAL 100.0 26.17 100.0 10.02 100.0 9.26 100.0 100.0 100.0 84.23
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Figure 4.1.(a)
Needs Indicators and Income Groups in Catalonia.
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Figure 4.1.(b)
Needs Indicators and Income Groups in Catalonia.
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4.2. Illness concentration curves and indices.
If we are to measure how ill-health is distributed according to income, and give 
a numerical value to the income gradient in the distribution, we ought to be 
using illness concentration curves and indices. Illness concentration curves 
represent cumulative illness distribution and cumulative population distribution 
ranked by income, being group-a the lowest income group and group-e the 
highest. Accordingly, Figure 4.2. included here also represent how illness is 
distributed across income groups in Catalonia. The different curves account for 
the various ill-health indicators, namely HNG, Acute, Limcro, Not-sick and 
Sick. The diagonal line has been included to represent a perfect proportional 
distribution of need and income (the 45s line). Points along this 45Q line show 
distributions where ill-health is equally distributed across income groups, that 
is, people in group-a (20% of the population) represent exactly 20% of all those 
that say their health was not good, for example. Illness concentration curves 
would be plotted above the 452 line if poor health is concentrated in lower 
income groups, and below the diagonal if the opposite is the case. The closer 
the concentration curve is to the 45e diagonal the less inequitable the 
distribution of ill-health. Once more, both standardised and unstandardised 
results are reported, which allows for a better picture of the smoothing effect of 
standardisation.
The degree of equity in the distribution of ill-health can be measured by the 
indices resulting from illness concentration curves. Concentration indices are 
symbolised here by CHNG , CAcute , CLimcr0, CNotsick/ and Csickand reported in 
Table 4.8. They are calculated as minus twice the area between the selected 
concentration curve and the diagonal (45s). Their values would range from -1 to 
+1, speaking for maximum inequity in the distribution of ill-health, to the 
advantage of the least well-off and the best-off individuals, respectively. Indices 
w ill take the value 0 when all individuals have the same ill-health regardless of 
the income group they are in.
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Figure 4.2.
Illness concentration curves in Catalonia.
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Table 4.8.
Illness concentration indices in Catalonia.
CATALONIA
Unstandardised Standardised
C h n g -0.24514 -0.10772
r'-Acute -0.12036 -0.09172
r^
Limcro - 0.07980 -0.03508
c'—NotSick 0.22684 0.11216
^-“Sick - 0.04764 -0.02162
As stated, the concentration indices quantitatively illustrate the degree of 
inequality regarding the distribution of ill-health across income groups. Table 
4.8., therefore, exhibits how the distributions differ from proportionality. Not- 
sick is the only need indicator with a positive value, that is, above zero in the 
given range [+1 to -1]. Not standardised concentration indices point to HNG 
and Not-Sick as the two indicators with the highest value, and hence expressing 
greater inequity, albeit in a different direction. HNG concentration index 
clearly indicates inequity towards the poor40 while the Not-Sick indicator 
distinctly favours the rich. All the other indicators show negative values in 
various, although smaller, degrees.
Standardisation of results by age and gender flattens the illness concentration 
curves and reduces the resulting indices. Indeed, all indices come closer to 
proportionality (value = 0) when the standardisation process takes place. Once 
more, all indicators, except Not-Sick, show a negative sign, although this time 
their values are closer to proportionality.
40
Inequalities towards the poor refers to situations in which ill-health is distributed mainly among the 
lowest income groups.
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So far I have explored the ways the different ill-health indicators behave across 
income groups in Catalonia, both unstandardised and standardised by age and 
gender. The findings point to an income gradient in the distribution of ill-health 
and health, regardless of the ill-health indicator used. The magnitude of this 
gradient, however, does depend on the indicator used and the effect of 
standardisation by age and gender.
This research now needs to show whether this income gradient is matched by a 
similar distribution of health care services. The next section deals with this 
issue and discloses the use the different income groups make of the services 
available. What is central to this research is to assess whether the distribution of 
services follows, or not, a similar pattern as the distribution of ill-health, and 
thus those in need get their proportional share of health care resources.
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\CHAPTER 5.
The Utilisation of Health Care Services.
5.1. The utilisation of primary, specialist and inpatient care.
Having explored how need is distributed across income groups in Catalonia we 
hereby looked into how these income groups suse the different services. The 
utilisation of the various services and types of care is appraised by the Catalan 
Health Survey in Questions 52 to 74. The analysis of utilisation of services for 
each need indicator is thus done according to Primary Care, Specialist Care 
and Inpatient Care. Full description of the steps here is given in Chapter 3: 
Methodology. Table 5.1. shows how I proceeded to the analysis of the 
utilisation by need indicators throughout the file.
Primary Care was the first type of care explored regarding utilisation. The data 
set gives statement of the number of visits paid to general practitioners, nurses 
and pediatrics by the population surveyed. Specialist Care, as mentioned 
before, includes here not only all out-patient care within hospital centres but 
also all other specialist care still provided in other health care centres, primarily 
policlinics. Both primary care and specialist care utilisation were calculated 
according to the number of visits paid to each type of service. Utilisation of 
Inpatient care services was measured in number of days in hospital.
The analysis of utilisation of services is done for each indicator of ill-health 
considered before. Results are reported in the form of how much amount of 
services was used by those that said their Health was Not Good, by those that 
said they suffered Acute Sickness or Limiting Chronic Illness, and by those 
other that fall under Not-Sick and Sick categories. All results are included in 
Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, picturing primary care, specialist care and inpatient
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care across income and need, respectively. At this stage only unstandardised 
results are given. Once translated into expenditure both standardised and not 
standardised results w ill be presented.
Table 5.1
Classification of files according to utilisation and needs indicators.
Primary Care Specialist Care Inpatient Care
H NC Croup-a pchng-a eshng-a iphng-a
Croup-b pchng-b eshng-b iphng-b
Croup< pchng-c eshng< iphng-c
Croup-d pchng-d eshng-d iphng-d
Croup-e pchng-e eshng-e iphng-e
ACUTE Croup-a pcac-a e^ac-a ipd i-j
Croup-b pcac-b esac-b ipac-b
Croup< pcac-c esac< ipac-c
Croup-d pcac-d esac-d ipac-d
Croupe pcac-e esac-e ipac-e
LIMCRO Croupa pclc-a eslc-a iplc-a
Croup-b pclc-b eslc-b iplc-b
Croupe pclc-c eslc-c iplc-c
Croup-d pclc-d eslc-d iplc-d
Croupe pclc-e eslc-e iplc-e
NOT-SICK Croupa pcns-a esns-a ipns-a
Croup-b pcns-b esns-b ipns-b
Group-c pcns-c esns-c ipns-c
Croup-d pcns-d esns-d ipns-d
Croupe pcns-e esns-e ipns-e
SICK Croup-a pcsic-a essic-a ipsic-a
Croup-b pcsic-b essic-b ipsic-b
Croupe pcsic< essic-r ipsu'-r
Croup-d pcsic-d essic-d ipsic-d
Croupe pcsic-e essic e ipsic-e
These results can best be commented when using illustrative charts, 
concentration curves and indices (see Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5).
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Table 5.2.
Unstandardised utilisation of primary care services according to needs indicators and income groups in Catalonia.
INCOME
GROUPS
HNG ACUTE LIMCRO NOT-SICK SICK
N.
Visits
%
Visits
J.v' . V
HNG-PC 
"  “
HNG-tot.
N.
Visits
%
Visits
Acute-PC
'
Acute-tot.
N.
Visits
% | Limcro-PC
i
Visits — ~
| Limcro-tot.
N.
Visits
% I NotS.-PC
Visits I ------— -
:
j NotS- tot.
N.
Visits
%
Visits
Sick.-PC
* - '
Sick- tot.
Group-a 9848 39.62 90.77■ 3383 38.77 93.50 . 3000 35.29 | 92.31 202 11.09 | |  54.13 14492 32.65 84.17
Group-b 6608 26.58 2103 24.10 91.96 1968
am
23.15 j 93.33 243 13.34 |  49.79 10848 24.44 82.49
Group-c 3902 15.70 84.94 1433 16.42 87.43 1396 16.42 j| 87.30 396 21.73 |  47.49 7410 16.69 77.52
Group-d 2710 10.90 81.86 1075 12.32 85.38 1391 16.37 i f ]  90.23 467 25.63 |  51.06 6550 14.76 76.91
Group-e 1790 7.20 80.83 732 8.39 82.12. 746 8.75 |  84.61: .. . ....... . 514 28.21 j 49.80 5083 11.46 70.79
TOTAL 24858 100.0
-
86.91 8726 100.0 88.95 8501 100.0 I  89.93 1822 100.0 | 50.05 44383 100.0 79.19
Note: The columns in grey represent, for each morbidity indicator, respondents that used primary care services as a percentage of those within each 
morbidity group.
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Table 5.3.
Unstandardised utilisation of specialist care services according to needs indicators and income groups in Catalonia.
INCOME
GROUPS
HNG ACUTE LIMCRO NOT-SICK NOT-SICK
N.
Visits
% I HNG-SC 
■
V isits j ~ — —
N.
Visits
% j Acute-SC 
Visits I — -— —
■ H R  f
i Acute-tot.
N.
Visits
%
Visits
Limcro-SC N.
Visits
%
Visits
NotS.-SC 
NotS- tot.
N.
Visits
%
Visits
Sick.-SC
Limcro-tot. - Sick-tot.
Group-a 2697 30.92 I 59.34■ 875
i m
25.76 • 61.37: 842 21.23 75.64 116 8.17 33.08 3714 23.72 46.95
Group-b 2267
m
25.99 | 64.01 930 27.38 i 67.41 974 24.56 75.24 190 13.37 29 71 3512 22.43 47.68
Group-c 1570 17.99 : 65.48iM w  - - 576 16.96 I  60.73 855 21.57 76.72 224 15.77 24.61 2974 18.99 48.37
Group-d 1268
i I2P& ' - 
14.54 : 64.53 : 542 15.95 i 646 16.30 j 77.01 340 23.94 31.27. . . . . . . .  ______ 2808 17.94 51.54
Group-e 921 10.56 |  71.66 474 13.96 |  60.26 648 16.34 82.69 551 38.75 48.83 2648 16.92 54.41
TOTAL 8723
•
100.0 ! 65.44 3397 100.0 f  62.13 3965 100.0 77.15 1421 100.0
.
31.99 15656 100.0 49.58
Note: The columns in grey represent, for each morbidity indicator, respondents that used specialist care services as a percentage of those within each 
morbidity group.
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Table 5.4.
Unstandardised utilisation of inpatient care services according to needs indicators and income groups in Catalonia.
INCOME
GROUPS
HNG ACUTE LIMCRO NOT-SICK SICK
N.
Days
%
Days
1 Ikl/^ I f-s
\
niNo-ioi,
N.
Days
%
Days
Acute-IP N.
Days
%
Days
Limcro-IP
' , <■;< - f •
Limcro-tot.
N.
Days
%
Days
NotS.-IP N.
Days
%
Days
Sick.-IP.rw..
■
Acute-tot. NotS- tot. Sick- tot.
Group-a 2410 33.28 15.93 732 31.11
■
16.06 778 19.73 22.22 92 20.22 5.26 3152 29.26 10.98
Group-b 1743 24.07 19.30 539 22.91 ! 16.07: ......... 794 20.13 23.33 139 30.55 2577 23.92 9.80
Group-c 1616 22.31 14,UZ 502 21.33
COT—T- 1094 27.73 28.04 47 10.33 2.82 2247 20.86 8.47
Group-d 932 12.87 14.66 301 12.79 12.28 539 13.67 24.71 66 14.51 3.62 1438 13.35 8.89
Group-e 541 7.47 ' 279 11.86 13.91 739 18.74 26.28 111 24.39 ...... 1358
12.61 7.91
TOTAL 7242 100.0 |
-
14.77 2353 100..0 14.89 3944 100.0 24.71 455 100.0 4.30 10772 100.0 9.29
Note: The columns in grey represent, for each morbidity indicator, respondents that used inpatient care services as a percentage of those within each 
morbidity group.
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Figure 5.1.
Unstandardised utilisation of services by HNG in Catalonia:
Percentual distribution and Concentration curves.
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The chart bar in Figure 5.1. shows the percentage distribution of utilisation of 
services across income groups of those that stated their health was not good.
The first bar in each group represents the distribution of HNG seen in the 
previous section. The other three bars show the share of services received by 
each income group. As seen from the chart, HNG and utilisation are distributed 
across income in a similar way. The higher the income the smaller the need 
and also the utilisation of services. However, despite this being a well 
stablished trend, it seems like different patterns could be observed across 
income groups. Indeed, the utilisation of primary care seems to decrease 
proportionally in a greater amount than HNG when moving from lower income 
groups to higher levels of income. Specialist care follows a similar but opposite 
pattern, decreasing less than proportionally as income raises. Inpatient care 
seems to behave rather homogeneously across income groups, although middle 
income group-c) shows the highest utilisation of this type of care relative to ill- 
health when HNG is used.
Concentration curves in Figure 5.1. confirm this picture. The first aspect to 
notice is the fact that all curves lie above the diagonal (45s), meaning that both 
ill-health, as measured by HNG, and utilisation of the various types of services 
are distributed in the direction of the less well-off. That is, the lowest the 
income group the greater the need (HNG) and, at the same time, the highest 
the utilisation of the different types of care considered here. The HNG curve is 
denoted by a red line in the box, and could serve as a reference to the study of 
equity in the delivery of services. Conceptually, when the HNG curve lies 
above the services curves then the need is greater among lower income groups 
than the proportion of services received by this same group. That is the case for 
Specialist Care, and only partly for Inpatient Care in Figure 5.1. Contrarily, if 
the service curve lies above the need curve, then services are distributed 
inequitably to the advantage of the lowest income groups since their share of 
utilisation is greater than their share of ill-health. This is clearly the case of 
Primary Care services here.
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When looking into the distribution of utilisation by those that state restriction of 
activity as a consequence of an Acute episode we find both some similarities 
and differences with that shown when HNG was used as indicator of need.
First, once more, ill-health as measured by Acute, decreases as income raises, 
although the slope is smoother and the corresponding utilisation of services 
also diminishes with income. However, the concentration curves plotted in 
Figure 5.2. point to a fairly inequitable distribution of utilisation of all typed of 
services to the advantage of the least well-off. Indeed, all services curves in the 
box lie above the diagonal but also above the illness concentration curve for 
Acute. This means lower income groups receive proportionally a greater share 
of the various services than higher income groups do, and these shares of 
services received are also greater than their respective share of ill-health 
(Acute). According to the concentration curves in the diagram, the most 
equitably distributed service when using this indicator as a proxy to need is 
Specialist care, followed by inpatient care and primary care, in that order.
The results displayed in Figure 5.3 show utilisation and illness distribution of 
those that stated Limiting Chronic conditions. The yellow line in the 
concentration box identifies how Limcro is distributed across groups of income. 
The rest of curves in the diagram reveal the distribution of the utilisation of the 
various types of care made by those that affirm Limcro.
The resulting picture allows for a pattern of primary care services being used 
substantially more by lower income groups. Middle income groups (group-c) 
seem to use inpatient care facilities much more than the rest of income groups. 
The concentration curves identify primary care services as being clearly 
inequitably distributed to the advantage of the least well-off, while the other 
two types of care remain fairly equitably distributed, slightly favouring the 
better-off.
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Figure 5.2.
Unstandardised utilisation of services by ACUTE in Catalonia:
Percentual distribution and concentration curves.
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Figure 5.3.
Unstandardised utilisation of services by LIMCRO in Catalonia:
Percentual distribution and concentration curves
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Figure 5.4.
Unstandardised utilisation of services by NOT-SICK in Catalonia:
Percentual distribution and concentration curves.
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The Not-Sick indicator displays a completely different picture to what the other 
indicators have shown up to now. As seen from Figure 5.4, those that state Not- 
Sick are more numerous in higher income groups than in the lower strata. The 
pattern of utilisation follows also a similar trend, concentrating in the upper 
income groups. However, some relevant points must be made in this respect. 
First, while the distribution of primary care and specialist care are within the 
trend of the indicator, the distribution of inpatient care is rather irregular. 
Indeed, the two bottom income groups account for over 50% of total inpatient 
care utilisation of those that said they were not-sick. Second, the utilisation of 
inpatient care, from income group-c onwards, clearly increases with income. 
The concentration curves allow for a clearer identification of these two 
remarks. Indeed, the inpatient care concentration curve cleanly separates from 
the rest of services concentration curves, crossing the diagonal once, but 
overall to the advantage of the least well-off. We refer to a population that do 
not report neither suffering form acute nor chronic conditions but visit the 
hospital facilities proportionally more than the rest. This could be the effect of 
maternity as a whole, or also the case of other services provided at the 
inpatient care level such as accidents. The other two services concentration 
curves, primary and specialist care, follow a similar path to each other, both 
favouring the better-off overall. This reinforces the idea that those that say Not- 
Sick use these two types of services proportionally to the number of people 
stating Not-Sick.
As illustrated in Figure 5.5, the sick indicator shows the smoother picture of all. 
Both illness and utilisation of services decrease as income raises. The resulting 
concentration curves for utilisation of services all lie above the diagonal. When 
compared with the illness concentration curve, the utilisation of the different 
services are to the advantage of the least well-off groups of income. According 
to the diagram, the distribution of specialist care is the closest to the 
distribution of illness (Sick). The other two types of care clearly lie above the 
Sick curve disclosing inequity to the advantage of the worse-off.
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Figure 5.5.
Unstandardised utilisation of services by SICK in Catalonia:
Percentual distribution and concentration curves.
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Figures 5.6, 5.7. and 5.8 illustrate the grey columns in Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 
5.4. They show for each indicator of need the percentage of individuals within 
each income group that said that used primary, specialist and inpatient care 
facilities, respectively.
For instance, Figure 5.6. shows that over 90% of those that said their health 
was not good in income group-a used primary care services. The graph 
indicates that this percentage decreases slightly when moving towards higher 
income groups, not only for HNG as indicator but also for the rest of ill-health 
indicators. This suggests that lower income groups seem to use primary care 
more often than upper income groups since the number of individuals that did 
so being in similar need, i.e. same need indicator, decreases in number as we 
move towards higher income groups.
As regards specialist care utilisation, Figure 5.7. shows the oppossite picture. 
Indeed, the percentage of people in each need indicator that used specialist 
care increases with income. Consequently, the picture is that of upper income 
groups using specialist care more often given their need. This is the case for all 
ill-health indicators explored exception made of Acute. Finally, Inpatient care 
displays quite an blurred picture.
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Figure 5.6.
Utilisation of Primary Care as a percentage of population in need.
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Figure 5.7.
Utilisation of Specialist Care as a percentage of population in need.
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Figure 5.8.
Utilisation of Inpatient Care as a percentage of population in need.
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An additional comment must be made. It has become clear that when looking 
into the Not-Sick indicator of need we find that people within all income 
groups use services of the three kinds. That is, despite explicitly stating their 
health status is good in general term, i.e. no acute nor limiting chronic 
conditions, they still make use of health care services, particularly primary and 
specialist care. In the case of primary care the percentage of people decreases 
slightly with income, quite the opposite to what happens at specialist care 
level.
To sum up, we have explored how morbidity and the utilisation of services are 
distributed across income groups in Catalonia. Unstandardised results overall 
point to inequalities to the advantage of the least priviledge groups in the way 
services are distributed when need is considered. In addition, some patterns 
seem to emerge. Lower income groups are greater users of primary care 
services, in relation to their share of ill-health, than higher income groups. 
Specialist care seems to allow for an opposite pattern since utilisation of such
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services favours the upper income groups. Inpatient care services shows an 
unclear picture as regards which income groups use this type of services in 
greater proportion given their needs.
We now need to know whether, overall, the utilisation of services favours the 
better-off or the worse-off. Further, we should allow for a standardisation of 
these utilisation results by age and gender across income groups. These issues 
are dealt with in the coming section, where an aggregate measure of utilisation 
is proposed, namely expenditure, and the standardisation of utilisation, and 
hence expenditure, is performed.
5.2. The standardisation of utilisation and expenditures.
The translation of utilisation into expenditures is a necessary step so as to assess 
whether individuals in equal need really receive equal health care services, i.e. 
treatment. The way proposed here is to consider treatment to be expenditure 
resulting from the utilisation of the various types of health care services, i.e. 
primary care, inpatient care and specialist care. The expenditure per visit or per 
day to each type of care in Catalonia in 1994 is shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5.
Expenditure per visit/day according to type of service.
Type of Care 1994 Spanish Pesetas
Inpatient Care 24,512 (day)
Specialist Care 9,805 (first visit)
4,902 (subsequent visits)
Primary Care 3,552 (visit)
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Tables 5.6 and 5.7 present both unstandardised and standardised results of 
expenditure across income groups according to the various ill-health indicators 
considered here. Each table is split according to the type of services used 
(inpatient care, primary care and specialist care). Thus, in each of the cells 
three sets of figures are ordered vertically. The figure at the top represents the 
absolute amount of Spanish Pesetas -in thousands- allocated to each category of 
ill-health, income and service used. The second figure shows for each income 
group the percentage distribution of expenditure resulting from the utilisation 
of each type of care. Finally, the third figure represents the percentage of the 
total utilisation of the service allocated to each income group and category of 
ill-health.
Figures 5.9 to 5.13 are graphical representations of the data in Tables 5.6 and 
5.7. They compare patterns of utilisation across income groups and for each 
category of need, that is how the total amount of expenditure allocated to, for 
example, HNG and income group-a, is distributed across the types of services 
used. Each figure exhibits both unstandardised and standardised results.
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Table 5.6.
Unstandardised results of expenditure according to need indicators in Catalonia (In thousands of Pesetas).
INCOME
CROUPS
HNG ACUTE LIMCRO NOT SICK SICK
PC ESP IP TOT PC ESP IP TOT PC ESP IP TOT PC ESP IP TOT PC ESP IP TOT
Group-a
[%]
(%)
34707
[31.92]
(39.44)
15310
[14.08]
(30.22)
58706
[54.00]
(33.16)
108722
[100.0]
(34.44)
13293
[37.94]
(40.81)
5142
[14.68]
(25.85)
17502
[47.38]
(30.58)
35037
[100.0]
(32.20)
10387
[30.47]
(34.74)
4991
[14.64]
(21.43)
18703
[54.89]
(19.42)
34083
[100.0]
(22.80)
718
[19.11]
(11.02)
784
[20.87]
(8.10)
2255
[60.02]
(20.22)
3757
[100.0]
(13.74)
51476
[34.01]
(32.65)
22629
[14.95]
(23.21)
77261
[51.04]
(29.26)
151366
[100.0]
(29.15)
Group-b
[%]
(%)
23383
[29.47]
(26.57)
13226
[16.67]
(26.11)
42724
[53.86]
(24.13)
79333
[100.0]
(25.13)
7647
[29.05]
(23.48)
5466
[20.76]
(27.48)
13212
[50.19]
(23.08)
26325
[100.0]
(24.20)
6948
[21.74]
(23.24)
5540
[17.34]
(23.79)
19463
[60.92]
(20.21)
31951
[100.0]
(21.37)
934
[16.61]
(14.34)
1280
[22.77]
(13.23)
3407
[60.62]
(30.55)
5621
[100.0]
(20.56)
38532
[31.28]
(24.34)
21462
[17.42]
(22.01)
63167
[51.30]
(23.92)
123161
[100.0]
(23.72)
Group-c
[%]
(%)
13860
[22.11]
(15.75)
9221
[14.71]
(18.20)
39612
[63.18]
(22.38)
62692
[100.0]
(19.86)
5204
[24.95]
(15.98)
3353
[16.07]
(16.86)
12305
[58.98]
(21.50)
20862
[100.0]
(19.17)
4930
[13.36]
(16.49)
5137
[13.93]
(22.06)
26816
[72.71]
(27.84)
36883
[100.0]
(24.67)
1407
[34.01]
(21.60)
1578
[38.14]
(16.31)
1152
[27.85]
(10.33)
4137
[100.0]
(15.13)
26320
[26.34]
(16.69)
18525
[18.54]
(19.00)
55078
[55.12]
(20.86)
99924
[100.0]
(19.25)
Group-d
[%]
(%)
9690
[24.34]
(11.01)
7397
[18.58]
(14.60)
22723
[57.08]
(12.84)
39809
[100.0]
(12.61)
3825
[26.63]
(11.74)
3157
[21.98]
(15.87)
7378
[51.39]
(12.90)
14360
[100.0]
(13.20)
4895
[22.32]
(16.37)
3819
[17.42]
(16.40)
13212
[60.26]
(13.72)
21926
[100.0]
(14.67)
1627 
[29.09] 
(24..97)
2348
[41.98]
(24.27)
1618
[28.93]
(14.50)
5593
[100.0]
(20.45)
23266
[30.50]
(14.75)
17771
[23.29]
(18.23)
35248
[46.21]
(13.35)
76285
[100.0]
(14.69)
Group-e
mi
(%)
6358
[25.31]
(7.23)
5505
[21.91]
(10.87)
13261
[52.78]
(7.49)
25124
[100.0]
(7.96)
2600
[21.29]
(7.98)
2770
[22.69]
(11.91)
6839
[56.02]
(19.94)
12209
[100.0]
(11.23)
2735
[9.22]
(9.15)
3799
[12.81]
(16.31)
18114
[77.97]
(18.81)
29648
[100.0]
(16.48)
1829
[22.21]
(28.07)
3686
[44.75]
(38.09)
2721
[33.04]
(24.40)
8236
[100.0]
(30.12)
18055
[26.38]
(11.45)
17094
[24.98]
(17.53)
33287
[51.36]
(12.60)
68436
[100.0]
(13.18)
TOTAL
mi
(%)
87998
[22.87]
(100.0)
50659
[16.05]
(100.0)
177026
[56.08]
(100.0)
315680
[100.0]
(100.0)
32569
[29.94]
(100.0)
19888
[18.28]
(100.0)
57236
[51.78]
(100.0)
108793
[100.0]
(100.0)
29895
[20.00]
(100.0)
23286
[15.58]
(100.0)
96308
[64.42]
(100.0)
149491
[100.0]
(100.0)
6515
[23.83]
(100.0)
9676
[35.39]
(100.0)
11153
[40.78]
(100.0)
27344
[100.0]
(100.0)
157670
[30.37]
(100.0)
97481
[18.77]
(100.0)
264041
[50.86]
(100.0)
519172
[100.0]
(100.0)
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Table 5.7.
Standardised results of expenditure according to need indicators in Catalonia (In thousands of Pesetas).
IN C O M E
C R O U P S
HNG ACUTE LIMCRO NOT-SICK SICK
PC ESP IP TOT PC ESP IP TOT PC ESP IP TOT PC ESP IP TOT PC ESP IP TOT
Group-a
[%]
(%)
25239
[28.95]
(25.09)
10980
[12.59]
(20.66)
50976
[58.46]
(26.74)
87195
[100.0]
(25.32)
9930
[33.25]
(32.44)
4728
[15.83]
(23.48)
15205
[49.08]
(27.39)
29863
[100.0]
(28.10)
6674
[31.29]
(23.19)
4166
[19.53]
(17.74)
10489
[49.18]
(10.52)
21329
[100.0]
(14.03)
1105
[14.32]
(16.81)
1372
[17.78]
(13.91)
5237
[67.90]
(37.16)
7714
[100.0]
(25.26)
41017
[30.07]
(25.42)
21965
[16.10]
(26.14)
73419
[53.83]
(25.25)
136401
[100.0]
(24.56)
Group-b
m
(%>
20382
[29.28]
(20.27)
11984
[17.21]
(22.55)
37242
[53.51]
(19.54)
69608
[100.0]
(20.21)
6900
[28.30]
(22.54)
4992
[20.47]
(24.79)
12492
[48.77]
(22.50)
24384
[100.0]
(22.95)
6599
[20.47]
(22.93)
5649
[17.53]
(24.09)
19981
[62.00]
(20.03)
32229
[100.0]
(21.20)
1080
[16.55]
(16.42)
1536
[23.32]
(15.57)
3969
[60.13]
(28.16)
6585
[100.0]
(21.57)
34600
[30.72]
(21.44)
20652
[18.34]
(24.57)
57380
[50.94]
(19.73)
112632
[100.0]
(20.28)
Group-c
[%]
(%)
26322
[32.44]
(26.16)
10754
[13.25]
(20.24)
44086
[54.31]
(23.13)
81162
[100.0]
(23.57)
5543
[25.20]
(18.11)
3353
[15.24]
(16.66)
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Figure 5.9.
HNG as indicator of need and expenditures by service in Catalonia.
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Standardised results from Table 5.7. and Figure 5.9 indicate those individuals 
within the lowest income group-a receive over 25% of the total expenditure 
allocated to HNG, while the top income group-e gets approximately 15% of the 
amount. However, the way the total amount of expenditure is distributed across 
services is very similar across income groups, ranging form 32% to 25% for 
primary care, 13% to 20% for specialist care, and 51 % to almost 59% for 
inpatient care. Probably, the greatest differences refer to the use of specialist 
services for which utilisation is relatively higher among the upper income 
groups. Overall, however, income groups distribution of expenditure across 
services is fairly homogeneous in the case of HNG, specially when 
standardisation takes place. The resulting general pattern for those in HNG as 
regards expenditure is that of 29% for primary care, 15% to specialist care, and 
over 55% to inpatient care.
As regards Acute, the differences among income groups are more visible, both 
regarding the total amount of expenditure allocated to each group and how this 
total amount is distributed across services. As regards the first, while lowest 
income group-a receives over 28% of the total expenditure in Acute, the top 
income group-e gets less than 10%. The income gradient is of a clear negative 
sign, that is, the highest the income the smaller the expenditure, similar to how 
Acute sickness is distributed. Different income groups use the three types of 
care in rather similar ways, too (see Figure 5.10), although differences across 
groups are higher than when using HNG. Overall almost 29% is spent in 
primary care, almost 20% in specialist care, and 52% in inpatient care.
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Figure 5.10.
Acute as indicator of need and expenditures by service in Catalonia.
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The expenditure allocated to Limcro as ill-health indicator is distributed across 
income groups in a rather different way than either using HNG or Acute.
Indeed, as seen from Table 5.7, expenditure is greater among middle-low and 
upper income groups primarily as a result of utilisation of inpatient care. While 
income group-a receives 14% of total expenditure, income group-c, -b and -e 
get over 20% each. Figure 5.11 also shows differences as regards how this 
expenditure is divided across types of care. Clearly, income group-a's use of 
primary and specialist care is the highest of all income groups. That means, that 
the share of total expenditure in the other income groups is markedly dedicated 
to inpatient care when limiting chronic is considered as the variable of interest.
Expenditures to the not-sick are distributed to the advantage of lower income 
groups, and that seem to be because the use of inpatient care services is greater 
among these groups (see Figure 5.12). The middle and upper income groups 
use primary and specialist services to a greater degree than lower income 
groups. These differences between low income groups on one hand, and 
middle and upper income groups on the other are clearly reflected both in 
Table 5.7 and Figure 5.12.
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Figure 5.11.
Limcro as indicator of need and expenditures by service in Catalonia.
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Figure 5.12.
Not-Sick as indicator of need and expenditures by service in Catalonia.
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Figure 5.13.
Sick as indicator of need and expenditures by service in Catalonia.
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When looking into what happens at the level of the Sick indicator, although the 
distribution of total expenditure across income groups is once more to the 
advantage of the least priviledged groups, the use of service across groups is 
fairly similar (see Figure 5.13).
In brief, only when looking at the Limcro and Not-Sick groups it could be 
argued that there are remarkable differences across income groups as regards 
how they use the services offered. The rest of ill-health indicators show quite a 
similar pattern across income groups. Despite this, the total amount of 
expenditure assign to each income group tends, overall, to be to the advantage 
of the least well-off. It is, therefore, mandatory to look into how both 
expenditures and morbidity are distributed to ascertain the degrees of inequality
in the delivery of health care in Catalonia. The way to operationalise this is by
means of Le Grand and Collins and Klein use/need ratios.
5.3. Le Grand and Collins and Klein use/need ratios.
I hereby illustrate how unstandardised and standardised results of morbidity and 
utilisation, i.e. expenditure, build up both Le Grand's and Collins and Klein 
use/need ratios. The Le Grand use/need ratio for each need indicator, is 
calculated by dividing total expenditure allocated to income group-a on the 
various types of services, by the total number of persons in income group-a 
who report a particular kind of morbidity, e.g. HNG. This is done for each 
income group. Differently, Collins and Klein use/need ratio take account of 
expenditure allocated to those in income group-a who report HNG divided by 
the number of those in income group-a who report HNG. This is also done for 
all ill-health indicators. Table 5.8. accounts for the results of calculating both 
use/need ratios for Catalonia in the format of expenditure per person in need.
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Table 5.8.
Expenditure per person in need: Le Grand and Collins and Klein use/need ratios.
_______________ Le Grand Use/need ratios (in Spanish Pesetas)_______________
NEED INDICATORS
INCOME GROUPS
HNG ACUTE LIMCRO NOT-SICK SICK
Not Standard. Standard. Not Standard. Standard. Not Standard. Standard. Not Standard. Standard. Not Standard. Standard.
Group-a 170,465 207,360 560,010 537,742 662,918 735,281 1,166,338 664,124 80,751 76,413
Group-b 189,944 198,035 574,920 541,895 613,248 570,416 538,837 416,843 70,915 67,392
Group-c 217,702 227,331 544,824 605,872 550,590 593,693 266,823 315,053 62,537 70,366
Group-d 218,339 206,013 478,814 558,000 470,559 561,207 174,206 247,843 51,657 58,825
Group-e 319,470 287,615 507,767 663,855 491,492 663,854 149,752 287,615 49,723 68,868
Collins and Klein Use/need ratios (in Spanish Pesetas)
NEED INDICATORS
INCOME GROUPS
HNG ACUTE LIMCRO NOT-SICK SICK
Not Standard. Standard. Not Standard. Standard. Not Standard. Standard. Not Standard. Standard. Not Standard. Standard
Group-a 119,475 125,460 126,487 111,429 145,654 108,821 26,428 35,548 78,795 72,323
Group-b 117,010 115,628 117,522 110,836 152,147 154,206 23,519 23,024 67,820 63,670
Group-c 131,155 155,781 109,225 112,789 195,148 194,266 10,607 10,877 60,050 63,514
Group-d 106,159 115,844 83,976 84,714 126,011 127172 11,900 12,007 48,129 55,975
Group-e 104,684 129,655 80,854 88,320 158,000 218,936 16,086 18,703 44,381 64,389
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Figures 5.14 and 5.15 show four graphical displays of the data contained in 
Table 5.8, accounting for both use/need ratios under unstandardised and 
standardised scenarios, and taking income group-a as a baseline for comparison 
(group-a = 100). Unstandardised results of Le Grand use/need ratio show how, 
when using the different ill-health indicators, the expenditure per person in 
need varies. When considering HNG as indicator of ill-health the expenditure 
per person in need increases as income increases. Le Grand use/need ratio 
when using the rest of ill-health indicators show an opposite trend. Indeed, 
expenditure by person in need when making use of Acute, Limcro, Sick and 
Not-sick decrease when moving away from the lowest income groups, showing 
that inequalities regarding these indicators favour the least well-off.
When standardising by age and gender, differences among Le Grand use/need 
ratio are much less pronounced. However, we still find HNG and Acute as the 
two ill-health indicators for which the use/need ratio favours the rich. The other 
three use/need ratios, resulting from using Limcro, Sick and Not-Sick, still 
favour the poor, albeit to a smaller degree. Once more the standardisation 
process acts as a smoothing agent to the use/need ratios under Le Grand's 
Indices of inequity.
Unstandardised Collins and Klein ratios also show some degree of inequity. 
When moving towards higher income groups the use/need ratios change, 
favouring the rich in the case of Limcro, or to the advantage of the worse-off in 
the case of the rest of indicators. When standardisation is in place, these results 
change considerably specially regarding the Limcro and the Not-Sick indicators, 
accentuating their use/need ratios towards favouring the better-off and worse- 
off respectively. The rest of ill-health indicators under standardisation are 
smoother, albeit still to the advantage of lower income groups overall (see 
Figure 5.15).
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Figure 5.14.
Le Grand's use need ratios (income group-a = 100).
Unstandardised
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
Group-a Group-b Group-c Group-d Group-e
Income Groups
Key
HNQ ACUTE LIMCRO NOT-SICK —-------  SICK
Standardised
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
60
Group-c Group-d Group-e
Income Groups
Key
HNQ ACUTE LIMCRO NOT-SICK —-------  SICK
172
Figure 5.15.
Collins-Klein's use/need ratios (income group-a = 100).
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In brief, both Le Grand and Collins and Klein use/need ratios for Sick and Not- 
Sick under standardisation show inequalities to the advantage of the poorer. 
Only in the cases of HNG and Acute indicators as regards Le Grand ratio, and 
the case of Limcro under Collins and Klein's, we find inequalities favouring the 
better-off. Differently, the Le Grand use/need ratio for Limcro shows inequities 
to the advantage of the worse-off.
Further, concentration curves and indices allow for a quantification of the 
magnitude of the disclosed inequalities. As seen from Figure 5.16, 
unstandardised Le Grand expenditure concentration curve remains above all 
the illness concentration curves in the box, except for HNG's. This implies that 
all resulting Le Grand indices (HI LC) w ill be of a negative sign except for HNG. 
A negative sign points to inequality to the advantage of the least well-off. 
Standardised results do not alter this picture much. Under this scenario, the 
index when using Acute changes to a positive sign, meaning the better-off 
receive a greater share of expenditure than their share of need. The rest of 
indices, that is for HNG, Limcro, Not-Sick and Sick indicators, keep their 
positive or negative sign unchanged, although their values are reduced as a 
consequence of the smoothing effect of standardisation. This is both shown in 
Figure 5.16, where it can easily be observed how concentration curves move 
closer to the diagonal when standardised, and Table 5.9, at the end of this 
chapter, where the exact values of the indices are given.
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Figure 5.16.
Concentration curves and Le Grand index of Inequity.
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A series often graphs (Figures 5.17 to 5.21) are needed to represent all Collins 
and Kleins need and expenditure concentration curves and resulting indices 
(HIc_k). Each pair of graphs represent standardised and unstandardised results 
for each need indicator used. When using HNG (see Figure 5.17), the results of 
the Collins and Klein index point to a very small degree of inequity, that is, 
HNG and expenditure concentration curves almost overlap. Differences should 
be noted when reporting standardised results for this need indicator, since the 
index changes its sign from negative to positive once standardised for age and 
gender. This change, although important regarding the sign, does not imply a 
huge alteration in the value. Both standardised and unstandardised indices are 
very close to proportionality and, thus, to equity.
Figure 5.17.
HNG and expenditure concentration curves under Collins and Klein.
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The Collins and Klein index when using Acute as indicator of need shows 
inequalities to the advantage of the worse-off, both under unstandardised and 
standardised scenarios. Once more, Figure 5.18 shows the smoothing effect of 
standardisation by age and gender on both distributions.
Figure 5.18.
Acute and expenditure concentration curves under Collins and Klein.
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Limcro is the other Collins and Klein index that favours the highest income 
group, although differences between standardised and unstandardised are very 
small (see Figure 5.19). The other two indices resulting from using Sick and 
Not-Sick both show inequalities to the advantage of the worse-off groups, albeit 
to different degrees (see Figures 5.20 and 5.21, respectively).
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Figure 5.19.
Limcro and Expenditure Concentration curves under Collins- Klein.
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Figure 5.20.
Not-Sick and Expenditure Concentration curves under Collins-Klein.
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Figure 5.21.
Sick and expenditure concentration curves under Collins an Klein.
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When comparing HI LC and HI C.K some interesting points should be made. 
Both types of indices agree on the sign when Not-Sick and Sick are used as ill- 
health indicators37. However, they disagree regarding Acute and Limcro. HNG 
seems to be a bit controversial, no such a clear statement can easily be made. 
However, in this case, I would argue both indices approximate each other 
once standardised.
Table 5.9 gathers up all the above information, where positive and negative 
values reflect inequity to the advantage of the better-off and worse-off, 
respectively.
37
An agreement in the sign of both indices point to inequalities going in the same direction.
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Table 5.9.
Not standardised and standardised results of HI Le Grand and 
HI Collins and Klein indices.
Not Standardised
C Exp LG C Exp C-K C ill HI Le Grand HI Collins-Klein
HNG -0.15072 -0.26192 -0.24514 0.09442 -0.01678
Acute -0.15072 -0.21184 -0.12036 - 0.03036 -0.09148
Limcro -0.15072 - 0.07728 - 0.07980 - 0.07092 0.00252
Not-Sick -0.15072 0.14448 0.22684 -0.37756 - 0.08236
Sick -0.15072 -0.16396 - 0.04764 -0.10308 - 0.06088
Standardised
C Exp LG C Exp C-K C ill HI Le Grand HI Collins-Klein
HNG - 0.05484 -0.10000 -0.10772 0.05288 0.00772
Acute - 0.05484 -0.14640 -0.09172 0.03688 - 0.05468
Limcro - 0.05484 0.05944 - 0.03508 -0.01976 0.09452
Not-Sick - 0.05484 -0.03184 0.11216 -0.16700 -0.14400
Sick - 0.05484 - 0.05684 -0.02162 - 0.03322 - 0.03522
Key:
C Exp lc  “  Le Grand expenditure concentration index 
C ExpC-K -  Collins and Klein expenditure concentration index 
C ill -  Illness concentration index 
HI Le Grand -  Le Grand inequality index 
HI Collins-Klein -  Collins and Klein inequality index
To sum up, Table 5.9 has shown how much the results of the different indices 
favour either the richer or the poorer. Differences among both sets of indices, 
Le Grand and Collins and Klein, follow from the way each index is calculated. 
While the denominator remains the same to both indices, that is the 
distribution of morbidity, the numerator, namely expenditure distribution,
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differs. Indeed, Le Grand's index incorporates to the numerator total 
expenditure to each income group, whereas Collins and Klein index only 
accounts for that expenditure allocated to individuals falling within each ill- 
health indicator. Only when total expenditure and expenditure to each need 
indicator coincide w ill the resulting Le Grand's and Collins and Klein's indices 
be the same. This is only the case, and not entirely, under the Sick scenario in 
our research.
As Gerdtham pointed out (Gerdtham, 1997) the departure from income related 
equity at global level does not reveal where in the health care system inequity 
arises, e.g. is there inequity in primary care or hospital care? It does not reveal, 
moreover, whether it is the behaviour of the individual or that at the provider 
that changes with income. Finally, it could also be argued that income related 
equity infromation at the level of the entire system does not even disclose 
whether it is income for sure that affects utilisation or some other, related or 
not, variables such as health information, attitudes or behaviour at the time of 
seeking care. The next section tries to overcome some of these limitations by 
means of logistic regression within each type of care.
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CHAPTER 6.
Logistic Regression Models.
Logistic regression methods have been widely described elsewhere (Cox and 
Hinkley, 1974; Hosmer and Lemeshow/1989). In essence their aim is to 
examine the simultaneous influence of a given set of variables on a dependent 
dicothomous variable. The main difference w ith multivariate regression stems 
from the presence of dummy variables, distinctly in the dependant variable, in 
our case utilisation of the various types of care.
The purpose of this section is to ascertain, first, which variables, namely age, 
gender, ill-health/need, income and education levels, best explain the 
utilisation of the different types of care explored above, i.e. primary care, 
specialist care, inpatient care. Secondly, this section attempts to disclose the 
relative importance of the presence of each variable, and whether they are 
statistically significant or not.
A total of thirty-six logistic regressions models were ran. The models explored 
utilisation of services by the total population in Catalonia, the male population, 
and the female population separately. Full decription of the characteristics of 
the models as regards to variables, categories and codes w ithin each variable is 
given in Chapter 3: Methodology.
As stated, primary care, specialist care and inpatient care are the dependent 
variables studied in the models. Logistic regression models take these 
dependant variables as dichotomous variables, that is taking a 0 value when 
there is no utilisation, and a 1 value when there is utilisation. The rest of 
variables are considered as utilisation explanatory variables.
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The regression models built here offer a complementary picture of how health 
care resources are distributed across the Catalan population. The proposed 
models explore in which way are the different types of care used by men or 
women, different ages, different conceptions of the terms need, and different 
income and education levels. The results are presented in the form of odds 
ratios and their respective 95% and 99% confidence intervals. Only a summary 
table is given here. Full account of the results of all logistic regressions is 
included in the annexes.
6.1. Logistic regressions and primary care utilisation.
Table 6.1. offers a comprehensive picture of primary care utilisation as regards 
the selected variables. The use of primary care across age categories shows a 
clean U shape in which 0-16 years old is the category that most uses primary 
care services, followed by the top 60 or more category, used here as a reference 
category and identifying the eldest group of individuals. Intermediate age 
groups, ages from 17 to 59, overall make a relatively lower use of primary care 
services than the identified children (0-16 years old) and old people (60 and 
over) groups.
In the study of age, if we take as a reference category for comparison not the 
last category but the next category to the one studied, we find that the picture 
changes slightly. Significant differences were still found between 0-16 and 17- 
39 age groups, although this time the odds ratios rised to 3.0. No significant 
differences were found between 17-39 and 40-59 age groups as regards 
utilisation of primary care. Gender differences are also present in the use of 
primary care services. Women use primary care more than men in all models 
(95% IC).
Ill-health indicators, HNG and Sick in the first model, and HNG, Acute and 
Limcro in the second model in Table 6.1., all show odds ratios greater than 1,
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revealing that those in the HNG, Sick, Acute and Limcro categories make a 
significant greater use of primary care services than those that do not fall under 
these need categories.
Finally, the odds ratios regarding income categories in the models show a 
certain pattern of inequality to the advantage of the lower income groups in the 
utilisation of primary care services. Indeed, the results point to the lower 
income groups being greater users of primary care services than the top income 
groups. The gradient as regards income categories exhibits a clear downstream 
slope, starting with the lowest income groups using primary care services the 
most, and the top income group the least, regardless of using Sick or Acute and 
Limcro as ill-health/need variables. Differences between the richest group and 
the third and fourth income groups, however, are not significant. Statistically 
significant differences in income are found only when the two lowest income 
groups are compared with the top income group. If we take income (2) as 
reference category for comparing income group (1) the results point to not 
significant differences as regards primary care utilisation.
184
Table 6.1.
Summary of regression results for primary care utilisation.
Variable in 
PRIMARY CARE
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA Males
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA Females
(a) using Sick
-last category as 
reference-
(b) using Acute 
and limcro 
-last category as 
reference-
(c) using Acute 
and limcro 
-next category as 
reference-
(a) using Sick
-last category 
as reference-
(b) using Acute 
and limcro 
-last category as 
reference-
(c) using Acute 
and limcro 
-next category as 
reference-
(a) using Sick
-last category as 
reference-
(b) using Acute 
nd limcro 
-last category 
as reference-
(c) using Acute 
and limcro 
-next category as 
reference-
Age
0-16
17-39
40-59
1.3326 * *  
.6054 * *  
.5558 * *
1.3407 * *  
.4466 * *  
.4591 * *
3.0017 **  
.9729 n.s. 
.4591 * *
1.2756 * 
.5671 * *  
.5366 **
1.2439 n.s. 
.3895 * *  
.4191 **
3.1933 **  
.9295 n.s. 
.4191 * *
1.4168 * 
.6596 * *  
.5683 * *
1.4712 * 
.5229 **  
.5013 **
2.8133 **  
1.0432 n.s. 
.5013 * *
Gender 1.1743 ** 1.1876 * * 1.1876 ** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
HNG 2.1981 ** 2.1283 * * 2.1283 ** 1.8407 * * 1.9270 * * 1.9270 ** 2.6227 * * 2.4172 * * 2.4172 * *
Sick 2.4150 * * n.a. n.a. 2.4465 * * n.a. n.a. 2.3971 * * n.a. n.a.
Acute n.a. 2.0348 ** 2.0348 * * n.a. 2.2376 * * 2.2376 * * n.a. 1.8404 * * 1.8404 * *
Limcro n.a. 2.5789 * * 2.5789 * * n.a. 3.0478 * * 3.0478 * * n.a. 2.2668 * * 2.2668 * *
Income
Group 1 (bottom) 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4
1.2662 * *  
1.2478 * *  
1.0219 n.s. 
1.1031 n.s.
1.3264 * *  
1.2989 * *  
1.0251 n.s. 
1.0975 n.s.
1.0212 n.s. 
1.2671 * *  
.9340 n.s. 
1.0975 n.s.
1.1721 n.s. 
1.0631 n.s. 
.9319 n.s. 
1.1211 n.s.
1.2817 * 
1.1073 n.s. 
.9294 n.s. 
1.0971 n.s.
1.1575 n.s 
1.1914 n.s 
.8471 n.s 
1.0971 n.s
1.3947 * 
1.5257 * *  
1.1553 n.s. 
1.0910 n.s.
1.4196 * 
1.5729 * *  
1.1619 n.s. 
1.1023 n.s.
.9025 n.s. 
1.3537 * 
1.0541 n.s 
1.1023 n.s.
* *  p<0.01 * p<0 .05 n.s. Not significant n.a. Not applicable
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Differences between the two models, the first using Sick as need indicator and 
the second one using Acute and Limcro, are not worth a full separate 
commentary. Both models allow for the same pattern, that is primary care 
services in Catalonia are used mostly by lower income groups, women, and 
children and old age groups.
When looking closer to the differences between male and female in the 
utilisation of primary care, the picture remains overall similar, albeit w ith some 
interesting shades to highlight. Neither in the male nor in the female groups is 
income a significant variable in all cases, just the same as in the analysis for the 
whole of Catalonia. Despite lower income groups within the female population 
use primary care services more than the upper income group, no statistically 
significant difference were found within the male population as regards 
utilisation of primary care, exception made of one of the models. In brief, 
income is shown as a significant variable in explaining utilisation of primary 
care by the female population but not by the male population.
As regards age, both male and female share the same a distinct U shape, in 
which the extreme age groups, namely children and old age groups, use 
primary care services significantly more than intermediate age groups.
Finally, in terms of ill-health indicators the Limcro variable shos significant both 
in the male and the female groups. HNG and Acute are significant, too, albeit 
with a minor odds ratio. The importance of HNG versus not HNG as indicator 
of need in the female group is much greater than it is in the male analysis. 
However, the oppossite is true when using Acute and Limcro as indicators of 
need.
To sum up, the study of primary care utilisation by means of logistic regression 
anaysis has allowed for the identification of significant variables in explaining 
such utilisation, namely, age, gender, need and to some extent, income. The
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results point, overall, to children, old-aged, and female making a greater use of 
primary care services. Moreover, the income variable was found significant 
only when comparing the most disadvantage groups with the top income 
group. As regard need variables, all of them were found significant although 
differences betwen female and male should be noted41.
6.2. Logistic regressions and specialist care utilisation.
Table 6.2. for utilisation of Specialist Care renders a different picture from that 
of Primary Care utilisation. Age differences in the utilisation of specialist 
services displays an inverted U shape, quite the contrary to what was observed 
for primary care. Taking the total of the sample, the age groups that make 
greater use of specialist services are middle age groups, that is 17-39 and 40-59, 
whereas children and old ages remain as relatively minor users of this type of 
care. This is true for both models, that using Sick and the other using Acute and 
Limcro together, although in the latter no statistically significant differences 
where found between the 40-59 age group and the over 60 group.
Gender differences seem to increase in the use of specialist care, but remaing 
females as greater users than male. In all cases, difference between gender 
groups are significant at 99% IC.
The two models also show significant and important differences between those 
in need, as measured by HNG, Sick, Acute and Limcro, and those not 
categorised as in ill-health. Need, is therefore a relevant explanatory variable in 
the use of specialist services, too.
In the Annexes a much simpler model is included in which the only indicator of need considered 
is HNG. This simple model is justified not only on the bases of simplicity but also on the possible 
colineality among need variables. The results of this simple model in which the variables included 
have been age, gender, HNG and income, confirm the pattern disclosed above in primary care 
utilisation and the odds ratios vary only slightly.
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Table 6.2.
Summary of regression results for specialist care utilisation.
Variable in 
SPECIALIST CARE
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA Males
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA Females
(a) using Sick
-last category as 
reference-
(b) using Acute 
and limcro 
-last category as 
reference-
(c) using Acute 
and limcro 
-next category as 
reference-
(a) using Sick
-last category  
as reference-
(b) using Acute 
and limcro 
-last category as 
reference-
(c) using Acute 
and limcro 
-next category as 
reference-
(a) using Sick
-last category 
as reference-
(b) using Acute 
and limcro 
-last category as 
reference-
(c) using Acute 
and limcro 
-next category as 
reference-
Age
0-16
17-39
40-59
.5466 * *  
1.4819 * *  
1.1920 * *
.5592 **  
1.1503 * 
1.0098 n.s.
.4862 **  
1.1391 * 
1.0098 n.s.
.6695 * *  
.8959 n.s. 
.7391 * *
.6404 * *  
.6219 * *  
.5686 **
1.0297 n.s. 
1.0938 n.s. 
.5686 * *
.4400 * *  
2.3786 * *  
1.9291 * *
.4682 * *  
2.0140 **  
1.7585 **
.2425 * *  
1.1453 n.s. 
1.7585 **
Gender 1.9469 * * 1.8979 * * 1.8979 * * n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
HNG 2.2670 * * 2.1555 * * 2.1555 * * 2.4477 * * 2.4673 * * 2.4673 * * 2.1856 * * 1.9589 * * 1.9589 **
Sick 2.3062 ** n.a. n.a. 2.3715 * * n.a. n.a. 2.1518 ** n.a. n.a.
Acute n.a. 1.2796 * * 1.2796 * * n.a. 1.4545 * 1.4545 * n.a. 1.1726 n.s. 1.1726 n.s.
Limcro n.a. 2.9912 * * 2.9912 * * n.a. 4.4845 ** 4.4845 * * n.a. 2.7814 ** 2.7814 **
Income
Group 1 (bottom) 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4
.5138 * *  
.5962 * *  
.6408 * *  
.7888 * *
.5351 * *  
.6220 * *  
.6492 * *  
.7906 * *
.8603 * 
.9580 n.s. 
.8212 * 
.7906 **
.5802 * *  
.6636 **  
.6479 * *  
.7785 *
.6268 * *  
.6824 * *  
.6455 * 
.7645 * *
.9186 n.s. 
1.0571 n.s. 
.8444 n.s. 
.7645 *
.4308 * *  
.4675 * *  
.5581 * 
.7360 * *
.4374 * *  
.4811 **  
.5642 * 
.7412 * *
.9092 n.s. 
.8526 n.s. 
.7612 * *  
.7412 **
* *  p<0.01 * p <0 .05  n.s. Not significant n.a. Not applicable
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The income variable behaves in a complete different way than in the case of 
primary care utilisation. In specialist care the differences among income groups 
are all statistically significant, being the lowest income group the one that uses 
specialist services less and the top income group the most. The income 
gradient, therefore, is a clear one, the closer to the highest income group the 
greater the use of specialist care. Only when comparing income group (2) with 
(3) no statistical differences were found.
Income is a significant variable in explaining utilisation of Specialist Care both 
for male and female. In the two analyses the upper income groups use these 
type of services more often than the less well-off. Further, there is a clear 
ascending trend. That is, as we move towards the highest income group the use 
of specialist services increases for both gender groups. Inequalities exist here 
clearly to the advantage of the better-off.
Age, however, affects utilisation of specialist services differently according to 
gender. In the male group, the closer to the eldest group the greater the use of 
specialist services. This trend is not matched by what happens in the female 
group, in which intermediate age groups, markedly maternity ages, are of 
utmost relevance to the use females do of specialist services.
Finally, as regards need, the Acute indicator is only significant as a need 
variable in the female group. In both gender groups, however, it is Limcro and 
HNG which stand out as the two ill-health indicators that show significant 
differences in utilisation.
From all the above a specific pattern in the use of specialist care emerges. The 
use of specialist care is greater among women than men, among middle ages 
rather than among children and old people, and in upper income groups rather 
than lower income groups. Need indicators are seen significant for the entire 
sample but of different importance according to male or female.
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6.3. Logistic regressions and inpatient care utilisation.
Finally, Table 6.3. regarding in-patient care utilisation allows for a third picture 
in the use of health care services by the population of Catalonia. As regards 
age, it is the eldest group (60 or over) which uses in-patient care services more 
than any other age group considered. No statistically significant differences 
where found, however, between the 17-39 years group and the reference 
group.
Gender differences have not been found significant in the first model, that is, 
when using Sick as indicator of need. In the second model in the Table, men 
use in-patient care services more than women but only significant at p<0.05.
Ill-health and need, once more, behaved as a clear explanatory variable in the 
use of in-patient care services. Those catalogued as in need by the different 
indicators make a greater use of hospital facilities than those other not in need. 
In the case of HNG, those falling under this category use hospital beds more 
than those that say their health status is good, very good or excellent. The Sick 
and Limcro indicators reflect a similar pattern. On the contrary, Acute does not 
show as a significant variable in any case.
Differently from primary and specialist service utilisation, income did not show 
as a significant variable to the use of inpatient care services for the whole of the 
Catalan sample. That is, the regression analysis did not find the use the 
population made of hospital services varied according to income, suggesting 
other variables, particularly age and need, could better explain the use of such 
facilities.
The main points revealed for Catalonia as a whole remain fairly steady in the 
gender analysis, particularly in the male group. Indeed, income remains as not 
significant to the male utilisation of inpatient services, while it is to some extent
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relevant in the female group. In this sense, female in the upper income groups 
use inpatient care services more than those in intermediate income groups. Age 
is a significant variable to both gender groups. In general terms, the oldest make 
more use of inpatient care services, although intermediate age groups in 
females are even more important users than the eldest group. Finally, Acute 
remains as a not significant variable, neither for male nor female when 
explaining inpatient care utilisation. HNG, and particularly Limcro, stand out as 
strong predictors of utilisation, and that seems greater in men than in women.
To sum up, regression results for in-patient care has offered a third pattern of 
use marked by intermediate age groups in female and old age groups in male, 
slightly greater use among men, and no statistical significance of the income 
variable. Need, particularly Limcro, was found as a highly important variable in 
explaining utilisation in all cases.
6.4. Logistic regressions using education level as additional socioeconomic 
variable.
The results of incorporating education level as a variable in the model are 
reported in Tables 6.4 to 6.6. It could be argued that, although the odds ratios 
changed slightly since a new variable has been included, the main findings are 
not altered as a consequence of considering education levels together with 
income as socioeconomic variables in the models. Indeed, the three patterns of 
service provision outlined above remain the same as when only income was 
considered in the analysis. In this respect, low education levels are associated 
to a greater utilisation of primary care services, and to a lesser utilisation of 
specialist care facilities, just the same as the income variable. As regards 
inpatient care utilisation, neither income nor education were found significant 
variables for the whole of the Catalan sample. This points to a certain 
consistency in the results when controlling for an additional socioeconomic 
varible such as education.
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Table 6.3.
Summary of regression results for inpatient care utilisation.
Variables in 
INPATIENT CARE
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA Males
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA Females
(a) using Sick
-last category as 
reference-
(b) using Acute 
and limcro 
-last category as 
reference-
(c) using Acute 
and limcro 
-next category as 
reference-
(a) using Sick
-last category as 
reference-
(b) using Acute 
and limcro 
-last category as 
reference-
(c) using Acute 
and limcro 
-next category as 
reference-
(a) using Sick
-last category as 
reference-
(b) using Acute 
and limcro 
-last category as 
reference-
(c) using Acute 
and limcro 
-next category as 
reference-
Age
0-16
17-39
40-59
.5705 * *  
1.0369 n.s. 
.7061 * *
.5704 * *  
.8383 n.s. 
.5704 * *
.6804 * *  
1.4698 **  
.5704 **
.6727 * 
.6487 * 
.7107 *
.5707 * 
.3752 **  
.4403 * *
1.5212 * 
.8521 n.s. 
.4403 * *
.4550 * *  
1.5553 * 
.7413 *
.4789 **  
1.4820 * 
.6695 *
3 2 3 2  * *  
2.2135 **  
.6695 *
Gender .9308 n.s. .8051 * .8051 * n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
HNG 2.2132 ** 1.8514 * * 1.8514 ** 2.4992 * * 2.2719 * * 2.2719 * * 2.0593 * * 1.5826 * * 1.5826 * *
Sick 1.9248 * * n.a. n.a. 2.7934 ** n.a. n.a. 1.3357 n.s. n.a. n.a.
Acute n.a. 1.0988 n.s. 1.0988 n.s. n.a. 1.2026 n.s. 1.2026 n.s. n.a. 1.0708 n.s. 1.0708 n.s.
Limcro n.a. 3.8545 * * 3.8545 ** n.a. 7.5555 * * 7.5555 * * n.a. 3.1796 * * 3.1796 * *
Income
Group 1 (bottom) 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4
.9423 n.s. 
.9140 n.s. 
.8434 n.s. 
.9592 n.s.
.9773 n.s. 
.9434 n.s. 
.8488 n.s. 
.9688 n.s.
1.0360 n.s. 
1.1114 n.s. 
.8762 n.s. 
.9688 n.s.
1.0957 n.s. 
1.2781 n.s. 
1.0979 n.s. 
1.3178 n.s.
1.2961 n.s. 
1.3709 n.s. 
1.1528 n.s. 
1.3318 n.s.
.9455 n.s. 
1.1891 n.s. 
.8656 n.s. 
1.3318 n.s.
.8324 n.s. 
.6330 * 
.6462 * 
.6797 *
.8254 n.s. 
.6230 * 
.6285 * 
.6803 *
1.3249 n.s. 
.9912 n.s. 
.9239 n.s. 
.6803 *
* *  p<0.01 * p<0 .05  n.s. Not significant n.a. Not applicable
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Table 6.4.
Summary of regression results for primary care utilisation
using income and education as socioeconomic variables.
Variable in 
PRIMARY CARE
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA 
Male
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA 
Female
Using Acute 
and limcro
-last category as 
reference-
Using Acute 
and limcro
-last category as 
reference-
Using Acute 
and limcro
-last category as 
reference-
Age
0-16
17-39
40-59
7 2 3 7  *  
.4979 **  
.4812 **
.6681 * 
.4227 **  
.4421 * *
.8085 n.s. 
.6148 **  
.5261 **
Gender 1.1850 * * n.a n.a
HNG 2.0145 ** 1.7800 ** 2.3509 * *
Acute 2.0048 ** 2.2052 * * 1.8007 * *
Limcro 2.7511 * * 3.1765 * * 2.4321 * *
Income
Group 1 (bottom) 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4
1.2690 * 
1.1959 * 
.9709 n.s. 
1.0811 n.s.
1.2048 n.s. 
1.0365 n.s. 
.8960 n.s. 
1.1020 n.s.
1.3726 n.s. 
1.4230 * 
1.0718 n.s. 
1.0555 n.s.
Education 
Illiterate 
Primary studies 
Secondary studies
1.8918 **  
1.3465 * 
1.1257 n.s.
1.9452 * *  
1.3795 * 
1.2629 n.s.
1.9076 * 
1.3354 * 
.9831 n.s.
* *  p<0.01
* p<0 .05  
n.s. Not significant 
n.a. Not applicable
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Table 6.5.
Summary of regression results for specialist care utilisation
using income and education as socioeconomic variables.
Variable in 
SPECIALIST CARE
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA 
Male
Odds Ratio 
CATALONIA 
Female
(b) using Acute 
and limcro
-last category as 
reference-
(b) using Acute 
and limcro
-last category as 
reference-
(b) using Acute 
and limcro
-last category as 
reference-
Age
0-16
17-39
40-59
.5809 **  
1.0493 n.s. 
.9600 n.s.
.6678 * 
.5963 **  
.5438 **
.5196 * *  
1.8203 * *  
1.7484 * *
Gender 2.1628 * * n.a. n.a.
HNG 2.2141 * * 2.5377 * * 2.0062 **
Acute 1.2911 * 1.3945 * 1.2333 n.s.
Limcro 3.0391 * * 4.7013 * * 2.7059 **
Income 
Group 1 (bottom) 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4
.5815 **  
.6775 * *  
.6992 **  
.7956 *
.6713 * *  
.7196 * *  
.6976 * *  
.7883 n.s.
.4874 * *  
.5310 * *  
.5942 * *  
.7179 * *
Education 
Illiterate 
Primary studies 
Secondary studies
.5694 * *  
.7251 **  
.7345 *
.7801 n.s. 
.7684 * 
.8857 n.s.
.4216 **  
.6280 * *  
.5631 * *
* *  p<0.01
*. p<0 .05  
n.s. Not significant 
n.a. Not applicable
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Table 6.6.
Summary of regression results for inpatient care utilisation
using income and education as socioeconomic variables.
Variable in Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
INPATIENT CARE CATALONIA CATALONIA CATALONIA
Male Female
(b) using Acute (b) using Acute (b) using Acute
and limcro and limcro and limcro
-last category as -last category as -last category as
reference- reference- reference-
Age
0-16 3 5 3 8  * * 3 1 7 4  * * 3 2 2 7  *
17-39 .8296 n.s. .3625 ** 1.5640 *
40-59 .5648 ** .4477 ** .6746 *
Gender .8501 * n.a. n.a.
HNG 1.7954 ** 2.2847 ** 1.4784 *
Acute 1.1015 n.s. 1.1197 n.s. 1.1043 n.s.
Limcro 4.1808 ** 8.5525 ** 3.3640 * *
Income
Group 1 (bottom) 1.0108 n.s. 1.3884 n.s. .8375 n.s.
Group 2 .9949 n.s. 1.4924 n.s. .6322 *
Group 3 .8956 n.s. 1.2992 n.s. .6085 *
Group 4 .9404 n.s. 1.3126 n.s. .6495 *
Education
Illiterate .8218 n.s. 1.0128 n.s. .8942 n.s.
Primary studies .7657 n.s. .9881 n.s. .7143 n.s.
Secondary studies .7087 n.s. 1.0459 n.s. .5853 *
* *  p<0.01
* p<0.05
n.s. Not significant
n.a. Not applicable
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CHAPTER 7.
Discussion.
This discussion chapter is structured in five sections. The first section refers to 
inequalities in health and it briefly summarises the main findings regarding 
inequalities in Catalonia disclosed in the results chapters. It also comments on 
how these findings compare with those of previous studies in the area reviewed 
from the literature. The second section covers inequalities in the delivery of 
health care, accounting for the main results and comparing them with those 
from other studies on inequalities in the provision of health care, both in Spain 
and internationally. The third section discusses possible explanations to the 
findings. The fourth section is a discussion of the main limitations imposed by 
the data and the methods, together with the improvements this research offers. 
Finally, in the light of these results and discussion, some possible policy 
responses are disclosed together with the identification of some areas for future 
research. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks.
7.1. Inequalities in health.
The study of the social pattern in health distribution is important in itself for 
many reasons (Blane, 1995). First, it gives an idea of the potential for 
improvement in health status of the different social classes, education levels, or 
income levels, and consequently for improvement for the whole of the 
population. Second, if the objective is to increase the health of the population 
then the revealed patterns would also give policy makers an idea of where to 
act, namely on those groups at greater risk or with poorest health status. Third, 
such studies could give hints on the origins and causes of diseases among the 
population. A better understanding of the causes of inequalities would 
contribute to improve policy responses addressed to such differences. Finally, 
but of most relevance to this research,if we aim to study inequalities in the
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provision of health care relative to need, we first have to know how health, and 
therefore need/morbidity, are distributed across socioeconomic groups so as to 
be able to assess whether the distribution of health care resources follow a 
similar pattern or not.
To assess whether there are inequalities in health to the advantage of any 
socioeconomic group I have specified a series of indicators of health and ill- 
health, as well as specific measures of inequalities. Both the literature review 
and the methods chapter give a full account of the characteristics of such 
indicators and measures. Briefly, the self-reported morbidity indicators selected 
were Health Not Good, Acute, Limcro, Sick and Not-sick. Data to build up 
these indicators were drawn from the data set used in this research, namely the 
CHS (ESCA, 1996). These indicators were explored across the distribution of the 
population in Catalonia ranked by income. Further, standardisation by age and 
gender was necessary since the different income groups considered in the 
analysis had a different age and gender distribution, and both demographic 
variables could be strongly associated with health status (see Annex D.)
It was argued that an appropriate measure of inequality should meet three 
conditions. The first condition requires that it should reflect the frequently 
reported socioeconomic dimension of inequalities in health. The second 
condition demands that the experience of the entire population should be 
reflected, not only that of those in extreme groups in the distribution. Finally, 
the chosen measure of inequality should be sensitive to differences and 
changes in the distribution of the population by sex and gender across 
socioeconomic groups.
The results point to the existence of income inequalities regarding the 
distribution of self-reported health status indicators in Catalonia. Irrespective of 
the indicator used, there is a socioeconomic gradient in how ill-health was 
distributed. The lower the income group the worse is the health status, as
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measured by the Health Not Good, Acute sickness, Limiting Chronic illness,
Sick and Not-Sick indicators. Further, these inequalities remain, albeit less 
pronounced, when standardised by age and gender. All the concentration 
curves, standardised and not standardised, resulting from plotting cumulative 
percentages of population and ill-health, lie above the diagonal, graphically 
identifying an unequal distribution of ill-health across the population. Only the 
Not-Sick indicator is distributed below the diagonal, reinforcing the idea that 
the better-off are also better in terms of a more positive concept of health.
Concentration curves were transformed into concentration indices. These 
indices tell us also about the relative sizes of the income inequalities in health. 
The results show negative indices for almost all indicators. Although all of them 
revealed inequalities to the disadvantage of the worse-off, they do so in 
different degrees. HNG remains as the need indicator that shows the greater 
inequalities of all, followed by Acute, Limcro and Sick, in that order. Not 
surprisingly, the Not-Sick concentration index was positive, identifying 
inequalities to the advantage of the better-off as regards the distribution of good 
health.
The differences in these indices may be responding to the fact that the different 
indicators are actually measuring different issues, for example, chronic versus 
acute conditions that lim it individuals' activities. Further, as w ill be pointed out 
later when discussing utilisation, different gradients for different indicators 
could also be explained by reporting bias either as a consequence of an 
associated stigma or of a failure to recall. Finally, it has become clear that the 
gradient in each distribution is partly a consequence of different age and gender 
distributions. Once standardised for age and gender all illness concentration 
curves move closer to the diagonal, although not all of them do so in the same 
magnitude. The effect of standardisation on HNG seems relatively greater than, 
for instance, on Acute, which suggests that age and gender distributions among 
individuals reporting HNG and Acute are different.
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The presence of income inequalities for all indicators considered here 
reinforces the trend in the Spanish literature on inequalities favouring the 
better-off in the distribution of health, including Alonso et a/. (1988), Guillen 
(1990), Portella et a/. (1990), and Rodriguez and Lemkow (1990). Among more 
recently published studies on inequalities, those by Rodrfguez et a/. (1993), De 
Miguel (1994), Jovell (1994), Navarro and Benach (1996), Fernandez et a/. 
(1999) and Borrell et a/, (forthcoming) agree in their general conclusions.
Despite using different variables to classify the population into groups, and 
despite measuring health and ill-health in slightly different ways (using different 
indicators), all of them identified the presence of an socioeconomic gradient in 
how health and ill-health was distributed, for either Spain, Catalonia or 
Barcelona. The lower the social class, education level, income level or 
professional status the worse the health indicators in the population.
More specifically, Jovell (1994) disclosed the existence of the socioeconomic 
gradient in the distribution of health using a self-perceived health status 
indicator from the CIRES data. The author concluded there was a 
socioeconomic dimension to the measure of inequalities in health in Spain, and 
these inequalities were independent of the socioeconomic variable used to 
classify the population.
Navarro and Benach (1996) studied inequalities across social class using the 
HNG indicator. Their results pointed, once more, to the existence of a 
socioeconomic gradient in the distribution of ill-health. These authors further 
studied how the gradient varied with age. Again, self-perceived health status 
improved as one moved towards higher social classes, irrespective of age. 
Restriction of main activity and chronic illness were two additional indicators 
used in this same study. It was found that the presence of chronic illness and 
the limitation of activity was greater in lower social classes than in higher social 
classes. However, the authors did not consider illness concentration curves nor 
indices, and instead used multiple regression models and the resulting odds
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ratio measures.
Fernandez et a/. (1996) argued that inequalities in health by social class persist 
in Catalonia. This unpublished study is of particular interest to this research 
insofar it uses the same data set (ESCA, 1996), although classifying the 
population according to social class rather than income. It could then be argued 
that inequalities in health in Catalonia do not seem to depend on the 
socioeconomic variable used to classify the population. Fernandez et a/. (1999) 
explored in greater detail inequalities in health by gender, showing women 
were also in worse health than men.
Finally, Borrell et a/, (forthcoming) outline the fact that there are still relevant 
inequalities in health in Barcelona, with people in lower social classes being in 
worse health status, although the setting of the analysis was an urban area, not 
Catalonia as a whole.
The only study on inequalities in health in Spain that made use of concentration 
curves and indices is that of Rodrfguez et a/. (1993). The authors applied a 
similar methodology to the one used in the first part of this research in 
reference to Spain, not to Catalonia, using the 1987 National Health Survey 
data set. The concentration curves and indices considered in Rodrfguez's study 
referred to the distribution of HNG, Acute and Limcro as need indicators across 
the Spanish population ranked also by income. Overall, the study results 
regarding inequalities in health were fairly similar to the ones presented here. 
As illustrated in Figure 7.1 all unstandardised morbidity concentration curves 
resulting from the use of the above mentioned indicators, both for Spain and 
Catalonia, lay above the diagonal. That is, whatever the indicator of need 
chosen they all display inequalities in health to the advantage of the better-off,
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albeit to different degrees depending on the indicator one looks at42.
As seen from Figure 7.1. and Table 7.1. the comparison between Spain and 
Catalonia in relation to the size of these inequalities by means of their 
respective unstandardised concentration indices (CiM) indicate a similar pattern. 
For example, HNG points to -0.2204 in Spain and to -0.2451 in Catalonia; the 
Acute index ranges from -0.1333 for Spain to -0.1203 for Catalonia; and Limcro 
shows -0.1036 for Spain and -0.0798 for Catalonia. Further, the ranking of 
indicators from the one exhibiting the highest inequality, namely HNG, to the 
ones revealing the lowest, namely limiting chronic, is also the same. 
Standardisation by age and gender in Catalonia reduces the size of inequalities 
as measured by Cm indices in Table 4.17. This confirms that the choice of 
morbidity indicator is crucial to the measurement of the magnitude of 
inequalities in health, and hence to the size of inequalities in health care as w ill 
be showed later on.
To sum up, this research points to the presence of inequalities in health to the 
advantage of the better-off, results that are fully compatible with previous 
research findings for the whole of Spain, for Catalonia, and for the particular 
case of Barcelona. In some of the studies reviewed the methods applied to the 
measurement of inequalities allowed for direct comparisons with this research, 
and it was then found, once more, that the findings presented here clearly fall 
w ithin the identified pattern of inequalities in health to the advantage of the 
highest income groups regardless of the morbidity indicator used.
42
The direction and magnitude of these inequalities for Catalonia was displayed in Table 4.17. 
Under both standardised and unstandardised scenarios, all indices, exception made of the Not- 
Sick index, showed a negative sign pointing to inequalities in health to the advantage of the 
highest income groups.
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Figure 7.1.
Illness Concentration curves for Spain and Catalonia.
Source: Catalonia, authors estimates; Spain, Rodriguez eta/. (1993)
Table 7.1.
Unstandardised illness concentration indices for Spain and Catalonia.
CATALONIA SPAIN
HNG -0.24514 - 0.2204
Acute -0.12036 -0.1333
Limcro - 0.07980 -0.1036
Not-Sick 0.22684 n.a.
Sick - 0.04764 n.a.
Source: Catalonia, authors estimates; Spain, Rodriguez et a/. (1993)
7.2. Inequalities in health care.
Building on the reported findings on how self-reported morbidity is distributed 
across the population in Catalonia ranked by income, this research has also 
studied (i) how those in need made use of the different types of care and 
services and, (ii) which variables might have an important role in explaining 
utilisation in each case. This section discusses the main results regarding these 
two issues.
To assess the extent of inequalities in health care two indices of inequalities 
have been used, more specifically, those of Le Grand and of Collins and 
Klein's. The Le Grand Index of Inequity (HI LC) for each morbidity indicator is 
calculated by dividing total expenditure on the various types of services 
allocated to income group-i, by the total number of persons in the selected 
morbidity group. The Collins and Klein (HI C_K) index takes account of 
expenditure in the various types of care by those in income group-i who 
reported morbidity, divided by the number of those who reported morbidity in 
income group-i. Both indices were calculated for all self-reported morbidity
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indicators and income groups, and were later standardized for age and gender.
The results point to similarities and differences across indices. Under the 
unstapdardized scenario for Le Grand and Collins and Klein indices, only HNG 
and Limcro respectively showed inequalities to the advantage of the better-off 
(see Table 4.17). When standardised for age and gender, two additional 
indicators of need changed sign towards favouring the rich, namely Acute in 
the case of the Le Grand index, and HNG in the case of the Collins and Klein. 
Overall, however, the picture shown by these results is of small inequalities, 
close to proportionality.
The Not-Sick indicator was argued as necessary in the overall picture of 
inequalities in health care since those that say to be in good health may also 
use health care services. From the results shown, the Le Grand index of 
inequality for the Not-Sick indicator clearly points to inequalities to the 
advantage of the worse-off, both for not standardised and standardised ratios. 
This is also the case for the Collins and Klein counterparts. Under the 
standardised scenario the Le Grand and Collins and Klein indices for Not-Sick 
and Sick are almost the same, both identifying inequalities to the advantage of 
the worse-off.
In brief, both the choice of self-reported morbidity indicator and the selection of 
the index of inequality, i.e. Le Grand or Collins and Klein, are of importance to 
the measurement of inequalities in health care in Catalonia. Differences in the 
results offered by both indices stem from how these indices are built. Although 
using the same denominator, the numerator in each index refers to a different 
concept. W hile in Le Grand's use/need ratio the numerator accounts for total 
expenditure in group-i of income, Collins and Klein ratio only includes total 
expenditure to those who reported a particular need, e.g. HNG. Therefore, the 
Collins and Klein use/need ratio is marked by the number of individuals 
reporting a given health status or condition on both the numerator and
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denominator, and this has an influence on the C Exp. c -k  index. Therefore, 
although both indices use the same C m for each indicator, the way C Exp. l g
or C Exp. c -k  are constructed determines the size and direction of the final 
index of inequality.
It has been argued that the Le Grand Index of Inequality systematically favours 
the rich even when such inequality does not exist (Wagstaff et a/., 1991a). If we 
took the Collins and Klein index as an unbiased index of inequality the results 
in Table 4.17 show that may be the case for HNG under the not standardised 
scenario, but it is not the case for Limcro. Once standardised, the bias towards 
the rich could still be the case for HNG or Acute, but not for Limcro.
The results shown for the Le Grand index of inequality allow for a series of 
international and national comparisons, too. In this respect, the work by Van 
Doorslaer et a/. (1993) is a valid reference for such a comparative exercise. 
Figure 7.2 in this section shows a series of unstandardised Le Grand indices of 
inequality, calculated for a selection of countries43 according to Van Doorslaer 
study. In three of the selected countries, USA, UK and Spain, the 
unstandardised distribution of health care is inequitable to the advantage of the 
better-off, regardless of the indicator of need chosen. The rest of the countries 
in the graph display various directions of inequalities in line with the self- 
reported morbidity indicator selected. However, it should be noted that all 
HNG indices for the countries included in this graph show inequalities 
favouring the better-off. W ith the exception of Catalonia and Italy, the indices 
for Limcro followed a similar pattern as that described for HNG, although to a 
lesser degree. The rest of the indices displayed different trends. For all
4 3
Not all the countries included in Van Doorslaer et a/. (1993) study reported these indices for all 
the self-reported morbidity indicators used in this research. The choice of one standardisation 
process or another, together w ith the selection of variables for standardisation present some 
differences across country reports for which a comparative table of standardised indices could 
lead to bias in interpretation.
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countries, with the exception of Spain, it could be argued that the distribution 
of health care when using Acute as an indicator of need resulted in inequalities 
to the advantage of the least well-off. Finally, the chronic indicator, when used, 
behaved fairly irregularly across countries in the graph.
This same Figure 7.2 allows for a comparison of the indices not just regarding 
its negative or positive sign but regarding its magnitude, too. In this respect, the 
indices for HNG, followed by those of Limcro, tend to be of a greater size, that 
is, they show greater inequalities than any other index for any other need 
indicators.
Focussing on Catalonia in the graph, it is apparent that it follows a pattern that 
is closer to that of the Netherlands or Denmark than to, for example, Spain.
The Catalan case fits in reasonably well within the set of countries for which the 
choice of need indicator makes a difference to both the size and direction of 
inequalities in health care. Certainly, the use of HNG as indicator of need in 
Catalonia shows inequalities to the advantage of the better-off, whereas using 
Limcro or Acute shows the opposite.
Differently from what was reported for Spain (Rodrfguez et a/., 1993) the 
choice of need indicator is crucial to the assessment of equity in the delivery of 
health care in Catalonia. Despite, the fact that, as discussed in the previous 
section, ill-health is distributed in a similar way to the Spanish case, there are 
relevant differences between Spain and Catalonia as far as the distribution of 
expenditure, which ultimately translates into different indices in size and 
direction of inequalities in health care, as shown by Figure 7.3.
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Figure 7.2.
Unstandardised Le Grand Indices of Inequality:
International perspective.
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On the bases of the Van Doorslaer et a/. (1993) study and the findings from this 
research, differences between Spain and Catalonia as regards inequality in 
health care (see Figure 7.3) seem better explained by how health care 
expenditure is allocated across income groups (expenditure concentration 
curves) than by how health and ill-health are distributed across the population 
(illness concentration curves). In this respect, however, an important remark 
must be made. The date set used in the Spanish case refers to 1987, that is 
shortly after the 1986 General Health Act was passed twelve years ago. Recent 
research using a different methodology and reported in the literature review, 
argue in favour of very small inequalities in health care in Spain, once need 
was taken into account (Navarro and Benach, 1996; Regidor et a/., 1996).
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There is an interesting corollary to this national and regional comparison. This 
refers to the relationship between equity in the provision of health care and the 
prevailing public-private mix in Spain and Catalonia. While Spanish health care 
is largely provided through public centres, the public-private mix in Catalonia is 
radically different from that of Spain, favouring much more the private 
provision of health care, although largely financed by public funds. When 
studying equity in the delivery of care this research shows that a public-private 
mix weighted towards the private side does not necessarily betray the equity 
principle. However, the implications of such a mix on the equity in the finance 
of health care should be explored in greater detail.
In brief, the first hypothesis raised at the beginning of this research regarding 
inequalities in health care is confirmed: overall, the Catalan system is close to 
proportionality, as measured by the two indices of inequality mentioned above 
and illustrated by Figure 7.2, Figure 7.3 and Table 4.17.
Further, the age and gender standardisation of results for Catalonia smoothes 
the indices further, particularly when using the Le Grand index of inequality. 
The range under the not standardized scenario [0.09442, -0.07092] turns to 
[0.05288, -0.01976] under standardisation. Some additional changes as a 
consequence of standardisation should be noted. In Catalonia, once the 
standardisation takes place, both HNG and Limcro44 move closer to zero 
whereas Acute changes sign from indicating inequalities to the disadvantage of 
lower income groups to inequalities favouring the better-off. The choice of need 
indicator remains significant in determining both the magnitude and the 
direction of inequalities in health care in the Catalan case.
44
The fact that results for Limcro remain to the advantage of the worse-off is of special importance 
given the ageing trend in the population, not only in Catalonia but worldwide.
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Figure 7.3.
Illness and expenditure Concentration curves for Spain and Catalonia.
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Despite the degree of equity achieved overall i.e. almost proportionality, 
different patterns of utilisation of health care services according to primary 
care, outpatient care and inpatient care emerged from the logistic regression 
analysis. Primary care utilisation is weighted towards children and elderly 
people, women, and lower income groups and education levels, overall. Out­
patient care utilisation is dominated by intermediate age groups, female in 
particularly, upper income groups, and higher education levels when
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models. Finally, the analysis for inpatient care did not show income nor 
education as significant variables, suggesting it is need rather than, for example, 
capacity to pay which explained hospital utilisation. In all three types of care, 
need, in terms of acute sickness, limiting chronic illness and self-perceived 
health status, remained as significant predictors of utilisation, which falls w ithin 
the findings of major research centres.45
Need variables, however, have dfferent weights according to types of care. 
Limcro is particularly stresssed in reference to specialist and inpatient care, 
while Acute takes a greater role in explaining primary care than specialist and 
inpatient care. Health not good remains fairly the same across types of care.
The fact that need, in its various forms, stands out clearly as a determinant of 
utilisation in almost all cases underlines the importance of studying in depth 
such concept, its multidimensionality, and draws attention to the benefits of 
using a wide range of need indicators when studying equity in health and 
health care.
Socioeconomic variables have also shown as important determinants of 
utilisation, particularly in primary and specialist care. It has become clear that 
utilisation of these types of services does not only respond to need criteria, age 
of gender but also to socioeconomic differences in income and education in the 
population.
All the above suggests that the second hypothesis in this research has been 
confirmed: despite the overall equity in the system it is the case of distinct 
pattern of utilisation according to primary, specialist and inpatient care.
45
The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR, 1999) has recently issued a report 
arguing in favour of self-reported health status as a strong predictor of health care utilisation. 
This report is based on the work by Bierdman et a/. (1999).
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To sum up, at the global level of analysis the Catalan Health System shows as 
only a slightly inequitable system. However, it has been found this overall 
equity coexists with three different patterns of utilisation of health care services 
which pinpoints particular inequalities in the provision of health care at lower 
levels of analysis.46
7.3. Possible explanations.
The aim of this discussion chapter is also to offer some plausible explanations 
of why, on the one hand, the Catalan Health System is fairly equitable overall 
and, on the other hand, it shows particular service inequalities according to the 
different types of care. When studying equity in health care, researchers are 
used to find relevant inequalities for which they try to find explanations. This 
particular case-study, Catalonia, has proven somewhat different and, at least at 
the global level, we are confronted with explaining equity rather than inequity. 
This is a challenge in itself.
In interpreting the degree of equity in Catalonia, the first issue to be 
acknowledged is the role played by egalitarian health care systems 
arrangements in the provision of services. Titmuss (1968) argued that universal 
coverage in health care, like other aspects of social welfare provision, plays a 
fundamental role in the distribution of resources in a given society. In the case 
of Spain, Regidor et a/. (1996) have also pointed to issues such as 
universalisation of health care as one of the explanations to inequalities in 
utilisation not being of great importance once need was taken into account. The 
authors have further argued that the extension of primary care services, the 
decentralization process in health care, and the increased resources into the
46
As stated, the regression models used a variety of variables resulting in a range of simple and 
complex models. Results for each model are included in the Annexes A, B, and C.
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system, specially in hospital care, have also contributed as possible 
explanations in the Spanish case. However, no detailed account is given as to 
how these aspects may have in fact contributed to equity.
According to the methodology used in this research, equity in health care at the 
global level is illustrated by a close to equal distribution of expenditures 
according to need across income groups. The precise degree of equality or 
inequality depended on the indicator of need one looked at. Using one or other 
indicator meant a difference as regards the overall equity of the system, 
pointing out slight inequalities to the advantage of the poor or the rich 
accordingly. The respective standardised indices of inequality were usually 
close to proportionality, which conveys that once age and gender are taken into 
account the utilisation of health care services largely corresponds to need as 
captured by the selected indicators.
However, this equitable picture at the aggregate level changes when looking 
into utilisation by types of services. It was found that the overall equity in the 
health care system comes as a result of three different patterns of utilisation 
balancing each other. For this, special attention should be paid to the reasons 
behind the appearance of such distinct patterns, to find out why do they exist, 
that is, why individuals in different income groups make a different use of 
health care services. Two possible explanations are offered. First, that there are 
differences in the incidence of disease across income groups than ultimately 
determines the utilisation these groups make of the health care system. Second, 
there are other underlying reasons that make individuals use services differently 
for the same diseases. I w ill address these two issues separately.
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7.3.1. Differences in the incidence of disease.
The relevant issue here is whether differences in the utilisation of services stem 
from differences in the presence of disease patterns and need across groups.
That is, whether income groups differ as regards the weight of specific diseases, 
not in respect to the overall level of disease. The data set used here does not 
provide with very precise data about the clinical conditions, both acute and 
chronic, that affect the population by income group. Some data is available, 
however, as regards specific chronic conditions identified in the survey.
The survey explores the presence of sixteen clinical chronic conditions in the 
population. The results by income group are displayed in Annex E. The graph 
in Annex E shows percentual distributions of the these sixteen conditions within 
each income group. Percentages refer to the proportion each clinical condition 
represents of the total number of clinical conditions declared by people in each 
income group. Briefly, the results point to similarities rather than differences 
among income groups as regards the pattern of diseases. Allergies and Skin 
problems, however, seem to be more important for upper income groups than 
for lower income groups, while Cataracts represent a higher percentage among 
lower income groups. Despite these differences the patterns are fairly similar for 
which it is unclear differences in the utilisation of services could be explained 
by the presence of dissimilar disease patterns. More detailed research is needed 
so as to uncover the reasons for differences in the presence of specific 
pathologies across groups.
Moreover, the results offered by the concentration curves (Figure 4.18) and 
indices (Table 4.17) show that, once standardised by age and gender, 
inequalities in the delivery of care in Catalonia are reduced significantly but 
they do not disappear completely. An epidemiological explanation of 
differences between male and female utilisation may also contribute to explain 
a higher use of services by females. In this respect, the CHS survey (ESCA,
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1996) has identified the most prevalent chronic conditions among men and 
women, showed in Table 7.2.
According to this data, women seem to suffer more from high pressure, high 
cholesterol, cataract, skin problems, constipation, depression, varicose veins, 
arthrosis, and allergies, while men suffer more from urinary problems, 
bronchitis, and ulcers. Further, the table seems to point out also the fact that 
female tend to accumulate chronic problems more than men.
Table 7.2.
Most prevalent chronic conditions among men and women.
Chronic illness Male Female
N % N %
High pressure 650 12.5 955 18.8
Urinary 433 8.4 262 5.1
High Cholesterol 472 9.1 532 10.5
Cataract 194 3.7 300 5.9
Skin 219 4.2 317 6.2
Constipation 171 3.3 662 13.0
Depression 281 5.4 728 14.3
Emboly 69 1.3 64 1.3
Heart disease 305 5.9 338 6.6
Varicose veins 263 5.1 1,178 23.2
Arthrosis 1,216 23.5 1,883 37.0
Allergies 456 8.8 725 14.2
Asthma 206 4.0 196 3.9
Bronchitis 433 8.4 245 4.8
Diabetes 222 4.3 258 5.1
Ulcers 368 7.1 229 4.5
Source: Catalan Health Survey ( ESCA), 1996.
Differences in the incidence of disease may thus explain some of the utilisation 
different groups make of the health care services. However, it is also true these 
differences within the population do not fu lly explain differences in the 
utilisation of services.
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According to the results shown, differences persist across socioeconomic 
groups as regards the overall presence of disease in the population of 
Catalonia.47 The logistic regression results pointed out that need, in its various 
forms, is a relevant determinant of utilisation of the services provided.
Certainly, both in primary care and specialist care utilisation all indicators of 
need used (HNG, Limcro, Acute, Sick) showed as statistically significant. Those 
individuals falling into any of those categories used services in a greater amount 
that those other that did not manifested need. As regards Inpatient care 
utilisation, however, Acute did not show as a significant variable in explaining 
use but other indicators such as HNG, Sick and particularly Limcro.
Logistic regressions also served to the purpose of exploring the association of 
age and gender with utilisation. It was then found that the use of primary care 
was weighted towards children and elderly people, which falls w ithin what was 
expected since the survey considered both general practitioners and 
pediatricians under primary care services. It is therefore unsurprising to find the 
0-17 and the over 60 age groups using primary care more since, first, pediatric 
facilities are considered under primary care services and, second, there is an 
accumulation of morbidity in the eldest age groups which ultimately need a 
constant medical surveillance and control provided at the primary care level.
Moreover, within gender, a clear age pattern was found according to which 
intermediate female age groups were greater users of specialist care than any
4 7
The literature on possible explanations to the existence of inequalities in health in western 
countries is vast (Black et a/., 1980; Blane, 1987; Szreter, 1988; Wilkinson, 1994, 1996;
Siegrist, 1995; Marmot eta/., 1997; Wadsworth, 1997; Shi and Lu, 1997; Poland eta/., 1998). 
Similarly, the notion of social determinants of health has also been widely debated (McKeown, 
1979; Evans eta/., 1994), and a series of sociological models have been offered to explain social 
differentials in health. The general understanding around these contributions is that the health 
of the population is determined by many factors in the social and economic sphere and not just 
by the health care sector performance (Macintyre, 1989; Dahlgren and Whitehead, 1991; 
Benzeval eta/., 1995). Health inequalities persist even in the most egalitarian societies 
(Lahelma et a/., 1997a; 1997b). The possible explanations offered by the literature, namely 
artefact, health selection, social causation, behavioural, materialist, life cycle and human capital 
arguments, should not be taken as mutually exclusive.
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other female age group in the scale, most probably as a consequence of 
maternity and gynaecology. When looking into the association between use 
and need variables such as HNG, Acute, Limcro or Sick, we find that indicators 
of need among men are better predictors, as shown by higher odds ratios, of 
primary care and specialist care than those of women. Taking all these facts 
together one may suggest it is a "natural cause", such as maternity/gynaecology, 
not necessarily falling under any category of need considered, which could 
explain the greater use of specialist care among intermediate age females.
7.3.2. Differences in the utilisation of services for the same diseases.
Researchers have worked thoroughly in the building and development of 
explanatory models of utilisation and in pointing out the relevant specific 
factors and elements both in the process of decision-making and the decision 
itself. Rogers and Elliot (1997) argued there are a series of traditional models 
that have attempted to explain health care use: the health belief model, the 
socio-behavioural model, the social network model, and the rational choice 
model. Further, these models are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They 
models point, overall, to utilisation being the outcome of a decision to weigh 
up costs and perceived benefits of receiving care, together w ith other factors 
such as organisational arrangements in primary, secondary and inpatient care.
These research findings indicate lower income groups and education levels use 
primary care services more than higher income groups. This is a well 
documented fact in previous studies on inequalities in Spain (Portella et a/v 
1990; De Miguel, 1994; Navarro and Benach, 1996; Regidor et a/., 1996; 
Abasolo et a/., 1998), including the second Health Plan for Catalonia which 
explicitly reads:
"[...] the use o f primary care services favours the less advantaged
groups"
Generalitat de Catalunya (1997) Pla de Salut de Catalunya 1996-1998:223.
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Greater use of primary care among lower socioeconomic groups while the 
opposite is true for specialist care services, suggests that the different groups are 
facing different costs, and perceiving different benefits from receiving care.
Costs could be higher to lower income groups as a result of greater distances 
(and/or other barriers such as owning some sort of transportation) to access 
health care centres which would translate into larger travelling times, or to a 
greater reliance on the public transportation system, overall.
Less knowledge among lower socioeconomic groups of what services are 
available and how to make use of them could equally determine access to the 
specialist physician (Kee et a/., 1993; Ben-Shlomo et a/., 1995). Higher 
socioeconomic groups, differently, may be more aware of health disturbance, 
have greater capacity to solve bureaucratic problems, better communication 
skills in general, better knowledge of how the system operates, and therefore 
better informed about care-seeking options, making overall a better use of 
health services resources.
Other factors explaining differences in the utilisation of health care among 
socioeconomic groups in the population may include differences in how 
individuals value health or simply differences in the attitudes among such 
groups towards seeking medical attention. In this respect, lower social groups 
may be inclined to visit the GP relatively more often with minor complaints that 
do not need referral. Moreover, referrals could also be determined by pressure 
on the GP to refer, even when the complaint itself could be adequately handled 
within the GP surgery. Hence, greater ability to pressure primary care 
physicians for referral could be one reason for higher social groups using 
specialist care more.
Finally, lower income groups and education levels may be confronting higher 
costs as a consequence of a lower capacity to pay for health care outside the 
public sector, particularly in the case of specialist care. The Catalan Health
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survey used in this research explores utilisation of services regardless of 
whether it was privately or puclicly provided. Individuals in higher income 
groups may well be avoiding using public primary care and accessing specialist 
either directly or within the private sector. Accordingly, we may be picking up 
here the effect of private medicine in the overall equity in the delivery of care 
in the system.
In this respect, Van de Meer et a/. (1996):argue that fewer specialist contacts in 
low socioeconomic groups in Denmark, while the reverse is true for contacts 
with the GP, is perhaps partly to be explained by a substitution phenomenon in 
the system with private insurance common among the better-off and the GP 
being the gatekeeper in the public sector, not in the private sector. The fact that 
in Catalonia low income and education level groups do not visit the specialist 
doctor as much may be a consequence of primary care services remaining 
largely in public hands, while specialist care has a well known private side 
accessed by insurance premia and out-of-pocket payments.
As reported, women use primary care services more than men and use 
specialist care even more.48 Such differences, beyond the described 
epidemiological and biological explanations, could also be explained by 
women facing either lower costs to receiving care and/or by their having a 
greater perception of benefit of receiving care a priori. In this respect, 
Fernandez et a/. (1999) report that when taking account of need, women 
declaring good health reported a greater probability of consulting a health 
professional, although no differences were found for utilisation of inpatient
48
Besides, differences in the use of primary care and specialist care across income groups seem to 
be more important both in magnitude and statistical significance among women than men.
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care, nor for dentists nor optometrists.49
In this regard, higher utilisation may be caused by lower costs faced by women 
at the time of expressing/reporting needs. The cost of opportunity of getting 
care could be smaller among females than males since in Catalonia there is still 
a sizeable percentage of the female population taking care of households. Not 
too regular nor fixed working hours in their activities may be also a reason for 
a greater use of health care services, not only on their own behalf but also 
acting as informal care seekers for the rest of the family. Indeed, particularly in 
primary care services, it may well be the case that the reason for using primary 
care services could be different from seeking care for oneself, but for other 
members of the family. The role of women as informal care providers in Spain 
may well be related to a number of visits to primary care physicians seeking 
advice, referral or getting a prescription for their children and husbands50.
On the perceived benefit side, we may argue that females could be more 
receptive to getting medical treatment, and share a higher perception of benefit 
of getting such care than males, either as a consequence of greater health 
knowledge, a more positive attitude to medical care, or better information on 
availability of treatment.
At the level of inpatient care it was found that inequalities were small overall. 
This may point to medical need as the principal criterion to use hospital 
services, that is, it is medical professionals that determine the use the 
population makes of inpatient care facilities. As regards the rest of variables in
49
Hunt et a/. (1999) argue against the most w idely accepted explanation for gender differences in 
consulting for the most common chronic conditions, namely that women are simply more likely 
to consult a GP than men, once account was taken of the presence of specific individual 
symptoms. The authors also refer to other studies to support such an argument.
50
It should also be noted that a visit to a GP or a specialist could also be reflecting bureaucratic 
processes and not strictly medical attention.
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the inpatient care models the role of age and gender together should be given 
emphasis. Once more, in a similar way to specialist care utilisation, women in 
intermediate age groups seem to be associated to higher inpatient care use. The 
rationale for this may be found once more in gynaecologic and maternity 
services.
Differences between males and females as regards utilisation of hospital care 
were not significant when using HNG and Sick together, or HNG alone, as 
need indicators. When other need indicators were used in the regression 
analysis these differences, although significant, were not of a great magnitude. 
Fernandez et a/. (1999) and Borrell et a/, (forthcoming) reported also not 
significant differences in the utilisation of inpatient care by gender. When 
looking into other sources of information it was found that differences in 
hospitalisation episodes and days of stay between male and female were not 
very important in size. Indeed, the hospital discharge statistics and average 
length of stays reported in Table 7.3 show that, although there are some gender 
differences as regards the type of illness that causes the institutionalisation of 
the patient, overall the number of discharges and length of stays are quite 
similar between both gender groups.
The regression analyses showed that those reporting Limcro used inpatient care 
facilities more than those that do not, especially for men. It could be argued 
that among those that used hospital facilities there is a relevant presence of 
chronic pathologies that lim it individual daily activities, and that had caused 
hospital admissions probably as a consequence of an acute episode in their 
limiting chronic condition.
As stated, neither income nor education level have proven to be significant in 
explaining inpatient care utilisation for the whole of the population sample as 
well as for males. However, both were found to have some role in explaining 
utilisation in the female sample. This does not mean that it is purely the income
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or education variables which directly explained utilisation of inpatient care but 
also other related factors to income or education that have an impact in patterns 
of services and types of services consumption, for example cosmetic surgery 
versus treatment of acute or chronic conditions.
The global picture is that of inequalities across services, according to which low 
income groups and lower education levels preferably use primary care services 
and upper-income groups and higher education levels make a greater use of 
specialist care. Hospital care remains fairly independent of income and 
education, but is characterised by other variables within the need category 
such as age, gender, and ill-health in its various forms and indicators.
On the whole, it is difficult to disentangle the many different factors 
determining utilisation. This study has tried to discuss plausible explanations 
both on utilisation influenced by the presence of disease and by other factors.
The difficulties in determining by means of a population survey such as the one 
used here, whether the use made of services was adequate or not, are 
enormous. We are unable to tell whether the visit paid to the general 
practitioner, for example, was proper in all cases, and whether this 
appropriateness was higher among upper income groups than lower income 
groups, among younger age groups rather than older groups, or among male 
rather than female. This is of utmost importance in so far its policy implications. 
If the amount of care received by females in general is higher than by men, 
how can we be sure all that utilisation is not an unjustified use of services? Or, 
similarly, how can we be certain that there is an underuse of services among 
men? Assuming that all care provided, and therefore all utilisation made of the 
services, is appropriate is far from being true in all cases. Further, there might 
be a large amount of unmet need in terms of waiting lists and unrevealed need 
coexisting with well known unnecessary visits.
221
Table 7.3.
Average length of stay and discharges in Catalonia in 1994.
Morbidity group Average length of 
stay
Discharges Average total days
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Intestine Infectious diseases 4 5 2,516 2,213 10,064 11,065
Tuberculosis 15 18 1,269 592 19,035 10,656
Other bact. diseases 16 15 720 655 11,456 9,825
Virus infections 9 7 1,742 1,121 15,678 7,847
Equinocococis 16 14 132 105 2,112 1,470
Other infectious diseases 7 12 992 739 6,944 8,868Malign tumours 13 13 25,090 16,932 326,170 220,116
Benign tumours 6 7 2,560 7,179 15,360 50,253CIS 3 12 46 201 138 2,412
Not specified tumours 10 8 3,996 3,130 39,960 25,040
Endocrine glands 14 10 6,320 8,239 88,480 82,390
Nutrition 13 10 63 30 819 300
Blood disease-hemat. org 10 11 2,236 3,121 22,360 23,331
Mental illness 98 146 11,498 9,747 1,126,804 1,423,062
Nervous system disease 17 9 4,474 5,988 76,058 53,892
Eye and annexes 3 4 15,497 17,140 46,491 68,560Ear 4 3 3,386 3,489 13,544 10,467
Circulatory system 11 11 39,528 31,916 434,808 351,076
Respiratory system 8 8 35,144 20,857 281,152 166,856
Mouth ana annexes 3 4 2,446 3,091 7,338 12,364
Digestive system 8 9 44,996 32,027 359,968 288,243
Urinary system 8 8 10,583 8,814 84,664 70,512
Genital system Male 6 - 14,062 - 84,372
Breast Female 5 4 340 3,055 1,700 12,220
Genital system Female - 5 - 16,073 80,365
Abortion - 2 . 6,724 13,448
Obstetric direct causes - 6 _ 20,642 123,852
Obstetric indirect causes - 4 _ 612 _ 2,448
Delivery - 4 - 35,359 - 141,436
Skin 9 8 4,293 4,385 38,637 35,080
Osteomuscular system 9 9 20,296 22,484 182,664 202,356
Congetic abnormalities 6 10 3,747 2,791 22,482 27,910
Perinatal care 10 11 4,584 4,024 45,840 44,264
Not defined morbidity 8 8 27,994 27,392 223,952 219,136
Fractures 11 14 14,015 12,754 154,165 178,556
Dislocations and sprains 5 6 4,214 2,332 21,070 13,992
Internal trauma 8 9 5,008 2,320 40,064 20,880
Injures 7 9 2,848 925 19,936 8,325
Burns 15 12 760 418 11,400 5,016
Poisoning 8 7 953 826 7,624 5,782
Other trauma and poisoning 9 11 5,652 4,388 50,868 48,268
Other causes 8 7 33,098 32,530 264,784 227,710
TOTAL 12 11 357,099 378,757 4,158,961 4,309,649
Sources: INE (1996, 1997a)
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7.4. Limitations and improvements.
7.4.1. Limitations.
There is no such thing as perfect research. Improvements in research 
methodologies, as well as information systems and databases in any particular 
field, have been in the minds of researchers all over the world and have 
contributed to the research debate and literature ever since science was born as 
a concept. In this respect, there are a number of limitations to the study of 
inequalities in health and health care. These are of a diverse nature, ranging 
from those that relate to the data set used and how this data was collected, 
together with its implications to the measurement of morbidity and utilisation, 
to those other limitations imposed by the methods applied.
Population health interview surveys are well known and frequently used 
sources to the study of how both health and health care are distributed across a 
given population. However, such surveys share a series of shortcomings that 
need to be acknowledged. First, health surveys do not usually consider people 
in hospital or institutionalised of any kind at the moment of the interview, and 
these are usually a group of people in great need51. This may have important 
implications to the analysis of equity depending on whether those 
instutionalised follow the income and morbidity patterns shown for those that 
completed the questionnaire. If lower income groups in hospital represent a 
higher percentage of the population than they do in the sample then we would 
say our study is underestimating need in those groups and, consequently, 
inequalities in health. Since the information sources used in this research do 
not allow for such issue to be explored there is little one can do to alleviate this 
difficulty but to encourage new research and to make explicit this limitation
51
Further, sometimes indirect informants are used which can also bias the real impact of 
morbidity (Alonso et a/., 1988).
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when reporting results.
The wording of the questions and their interpretation could be argued as an 
additional limitation to the use of questionnaires and surveys (Collins and Klein, 
1980). In this respect, it could be the case that those classified as in equal need 
by the selected indicators were not really in an equal situation as regards the 
presence of morbidity, disability or other images of ill-health. That is, the 
indicators used to measure need may not be reflecting the same situations in 
lower income groups than in higher income groups, which may ultimately 
translate into a different use of health care services and, hence, to inequalities 
in the provision of health care. It is difficult to ascertain the reasons why this 
may happen. There may be different perceptions over symptoms and overall 
dissimilar concepts of health across income groups. The very concept of illness, 
or poor health could be different among the poor (Blaxter, 1989). Individual 
perception may also vary according to what is understood by activity, and 
restriction of activity, in each case (Alonso et a/., 1988; Gonzalez and Regidor, 
1988). This w ill lead to people falling in the same group of need, e.g. HNG, 
being objectively different across income groups. For instance, people in higher 
income groups may enjoy better health in general. In brief, levels of actual 
health status may not be comparable across groups despite having produced 
similar answers to the questionnaire.
However, it is difficult to ascertain in which direction this could affect the 
results shown. In the case there was a higher perception of activity restriction 
among the worse-off this would lead to an overestimation of, particularly, Acute 
and Limcro as morbidity indicators to the advantage of these groups. Such an 
overestimation would have an effect on the illness concentration curves, 
making the real distribution of morbidity less inequitable, and the 
corresponding inequality indexes would move more to the advantage of the 
better-off. That is, the effect of having overestimated the size of the inequalities 
in health to the benefit of the worse-off w ill ultimately led us to believe that,
224
ceteris paribus, inequalities in the provision of health care would be closer to 
zero as far as the Limcro indicator refers, and more to the advantage of the 
better-off when considering Acute as indicator of need.
Since the need indicators used in this research are based on self perception of 
health status the ways of conceiving health may therefore be different across 
income groups, social class, status and gender52. However, these are shared 
problems of socioeconomic research using surveys, particularly if no standard 
medical examination is performed in situ at the time the questionnaire is 
administered.
Moreover, Schrijers et a/. (1994) noted there is some evidence that lower 
socioeconomic groups systematically underreport certain health conditions 
such as cancer, asthma and heart disease. However, these same authors also 
point out that a combination of health status measures, covering the three 
important dimensions of health -  perceived complaints, diseases, and 
handicaps - ,  enables extensive control for health status in surveys aiming at 
measuring socioeconomic differences in health care utilisation. This research 
has used up to five need indicators to try to overcome this limitation.
A third set of problems to research using health surveys are those associated to 
the use of utilisation indicators. Biases can come as a result of, for example, 
relevance, memory and stigma in reporting. It has been argued, however, these 
sources of bias are not necessarily correlated with social class or income groups 
(Alonso et a/., 1988; Jovell, 1994), for which it is reasonable to conclude that 
they are of a lesser importance to this research. If, on the contrary, there was a 
true association between under-reporting for these reasons and income group 
distribution one w ill be facing a sizeable problem in the measurement of
52
People in higher income groups may make greater use of services as a consequence of a better 
perception of symptoms, and not just those that affect their capacity to work typical of low 
income groups, as well as a quicker response to them.
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inequalities in health care. Indeed, if the less advantaged groups systematically 
under-report utilisation for any of the forementioned reasons the results of this 
research would be indicating these groups use services less than they really 
do53. The true expenditure concentration curve w ill shift towards the upper-left 
corner in the box, that is, more to the advantage of the least well-off and, ceteris 
paribus, the inequality indexes w ill then show greater inequality to the 
advantage of lower income groups.
The use/need ratios and the inequality indices used share an unsolved 
implication. That is, the so-called proportionality assumption. It is difficult to 
ascertain how much medical care is adequate to a certain degree of need, and 
hence, whether greater amount of need would require equal greater amount of 
medical treatment, that is, proportional medical assistance.
Further, the use/need ratios used here, and elsewhere, do inform us about 
services being provided according to need, but they do not tell us about the 
appropriateness of such utilisation nor about the effectiveness, cost- 
effectiveness nor quality of the services provided in each case (Gonzalez and 
Regidor, 1988; Borras, 1994). Such an exercise would require immense effort in 
gathering and processing the necessary information. Even when possible, the 
researcher would still have to face a common definition of what is to be 
consider as appropriate and beneficial. Certainly, we should not only provide 
care to those that need care but ensure that the care provided is the adequate 
care. We should be looking into more research regarding treatment decisions, 
development of standards, clinical practice guidelines, studies on cost- 
effectiveness of interventions, as well as accreditation mechanisms, and 
whether individuals in the same need are really equally responsive to 
treatment. The role of evidence based health care should be crucial to the
53
Survey data rely too heavily on respondents and, as reported, results may change if hospital 
records were used instead (Van de Meer et a/., 1996).
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provision of care on both individual and population bases. For such a purpose, 
efforts should be committed to technology assessment and health services 
research initiatives.
A further problem is that the number of medical visits and in-patient days 
considered in the calculation of the use/need ratios do not necessarily relate to 
the identified morbidity and, accordingly, health problems reported by 
respondents may or may not be the reasons for utilisation of the services at the 
various levels. However, the data used, as well as many other data sets in other 
countries, does not provide this information. Further, the potential of 
population health surveys to find causal relationships between utilisation and 
the rest of variables is very limited. Although a series of associated factors have 
been raised here, further research should be encouraged towards the disclosure 
of the causal relationship between utilisation and age, gender, income or 
education in general.
The study of the Catalan Health System as a whole, both public and private 
provision, forces a number of limitations, some of them commented upon 
previously. From the Catalan health survey data (ESCA, 1996) one cannot tell 
whether a particular visit was paid to private or public centres, for which an 
homogeneous monetary value for both public and private medical visits and 
hospitals stays was used. It could be argued, however, that a visit paid to a 
private physician, or an inpatient stay in a private hospital, is rather more 
expensive in monetary terms. If that was the case our results w ill point to 
greater inequality to the disadvantage of lower income groups, particularly in 
specialist and hospital care, since those groups would use these private services 
in a lesser degree (Fernandez et a/., 1996). Further, the use of a single unit of 
costs implies that no differentiation is being made among specialties, for 
example, accounting for their different resource implications. However, given 
the source of data used there was little that could be done around this problem 
since the Catalan health survey does not provide information on the particular
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hospital resources involved in the process of care. It was therefore assumed that 
the case-mix attended in each hospital was broadly similar and that no 
differences existed among income groups as regards resource intensive 
pathologies. If on the contrary, lower income groups were affected by 
pathologies that implied a higher use of resources then our results would under­
estimate their utilisation and hence any reported inequality favouring the better 
off.
It is important to highlight the fact that the results refer to the whole of the 
Catalan Health System, and hence to the existing public-private mix. Despite 
the CHS allowing for the identification of those individuals that prefer to use 
private services it does not allow for the separation of private and public use. 
Rather than a limitation this could well be thought as an advantage to some 
extent. Certainly, the results displayed for the whole system are of utmost 
importance, since we are contemplating not just the impact on equity from 
public provision but also from private services. The split between provision and 
purchasing in the Catalan Health system since the early 90s took account of the 
different nature of the ownership of health care centres in Catalonia. As seen in 
the literature review chapter, the presence of numerous non-public institutions 
shaped the future structure of the Catalan Health System in which over 60% of 
the hospital beds are non-public. However, the finance of the system remains 
largely on public hands, despite almost 25% of the population in Catalonia 
enjoys a double insurance (public and private). This fact reinforces the need to 
study not only the public side but both, assessing which is the equity impact of 
such a private-public mix in the provision of health care.
In any case, the study of equity in the provision of health care in Catalonia 
should be complemented with the analysis of equity in the finance of these 
same health care services, also at the decentralised level of analysis. However, 
although Catalonia has been endowed with full competencies in health care 
organisation and management in its territory, this is far from also being the case
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on the finance side. The Spanish system is largely financed by taxes centrally 
collected by authorities in Madrid and, as shown in previous chapters, 
geographically distributed later to the regions according to their population. 
This makes the analysis of equity in the finance extraordinarily complicated.
Although the limitations pointed out above have identified a series of possible 
biases in to the measurement of inequalities in health and health care, health 
interview surveys do offer researchers a very rich source of information. Above 
all, they are said to improve information gathered by hospital medical records 
and the way they account for both individuals that use health care services and 
individuals that do not. Further, the inclusion in the surveys of socio-economic 
and others variables would allow for prediction of utilisation and adequate 
policy responses. Finally, as Blaxter has argued, despite the acceptance of self 
reports may be thought problematic, in fact, where comparisons have been 
made, the agreement with doctors' assessments or medical records has been 
high (Blaxter, 1985).
7.4.2. Improvements.
Despite these limitations, it is my belief that this study has made some 
improvements to previous research in the area. The first, and probably most 
important, is the geographical area of interest in which the hypotheses of the 
study have been tested, namely Catalonia. This is of particular importance in 
the future as far as policy responses design and implementation. Devolution of 
health care policy in Spain to regional administrative levels such as Catalonia 
necessarily shifts any analysis from national to regional level. This research 
takes account of this context and, using a specific Catalan data set, studied 
equity at the level of the Catalan health care system. At the time of writing this 
report there was no comprehensive regional analysis published exploring 
inequalities in health care as the one presented here. Despite the important 
information and conclusions gathered, further research should also be
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encouraged at smaller geographical levels of analysis within Catalonia, beyond 
the existing one on Barcelona.
Secondly, this research has used a wider range of need indicators than any 
other similar study. Indeed, this study has explored the distribution of five 
indicators, as proxies to need, across the population ranked by income, namely 
Health Not Good, Acute illness, Limiting Chronic illness, Sick and Not-sick.
This has allowed for a greater picture of self-reported morbidity distribution, as 
well as a better assessment of equity in the provision of health care since the 
choice of indicator has proven crucial in determining the magnitude of the 
disclosed inequalities. The selection of such a wide range minimises the bias 
inherent in the use of just one or two particular indicators, such as the not-sick 
making use of health care services, too.
Further, this research has brought into play two inequality indices, namely Le 
Grand's and Collins and Klein's. This has also proven useful to ascertain in 
which magnitude and direction any of these indices could be biased to favour 
the better-off or the least well-off, as pointed out by the literature review.
Finally, this study has gone further in the analysis of equity to account for 
service delivery inequalities at three levels of provision, namely primary care, 
specialist care and inpatient care. This has proven of great value since it has 
shown that overall equitable systems may hide sizeable inequalities at the three 
different levels of provision, for which variables such as age, gender, income 
and education may have different weights. Accordingly, more targetted policy 
responses could possibly be designed.
7.5. Policy implications.
One of the ultimate ends of applied research in social sciences is to inform 
policy-making in the specific area of concern. From this piece of research one
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should be able to extract a number of relevant policy implications which ought 
to promote the debate, for instance, on the most appropriate policy responses 
to the disclosed inequalities. In this sense, policy implications derived from this 
study aim at better targeting the causes of inequality and to foster the need of 
continuing research along these and other lines, both to better understand the 
dimensions of inequalities and to monitor the effectiveness of policy responses.
In the first place, the reported findings direct attention to the existence of a 
relatively small degree of inequality in the delivery of health care in Catalonia. 
Overall, the Catalan health care system was found fairly equitable as a 
consequence of expenditures in health care being distributed, across socio­
economic groups, only in a slightly different way from ill-health and health. If 
that were not the case, a relevant policy implication would be to re-allocate 
expenditure to meet need across income groups, that is equalising the 
distribution of expenditure in medical care across socioeconomic groups (Le 
Grand, 1982). In this case study, however, there is not a great margin for such 
a policy since equity in the provision of care has broadly been achieved
Nevertheless, the reasons why the system shows a small degree of inequity are 
found in the balance of utilisation of the different health care services, namely 
primary care, specialist care and hospital care. For this, it matters less as to 
whether the equity principle has been achieved or not at the global level, but 
more as to how or why is this the case and, hence, to a better understanding of 
the factors behind the emergence of different patterns of utilisation of services 
across income groups, education levels, gender and age. In terms of policy 
implications, one may better give thought to adequate policy instruments and 
tools that would correct the dislosed inequalities.
In this respect, primary care and specialist care utilisation are clear examples of 
income inequalities to the advantage of the worse-off and better-off, 
respectively. Policy recommendations should therefore address these two
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levcels by means of exploring into the reasons for that being the case:
(i) differences in the incidence of types of disease across income groups, and/or
(ii) differences in the rates at which those reporting a given condition use the 
health services.
7.5.1. Differences in the incidence of disease.
Under the first scenario of inequalities being caused by a different distribution 
of epidemiological variables such as incidence, prevalence and risk of disease, 
the resulting policy implications seem clear. Policy makers should be targetting 
disease as a whole, with particular emphasis on those less advantaged groups 
and their particular morbidity components54. The policy instruments to do so 
may vary from educational programs to prevention of disease and risk 
assessment. The wide range of measures fall in part under health care policy 
competencies but also, and probably more important, under the capacity, 
expertise and competency of other policy areas such as housing, education, and 
economic and social policies in general.
In this respect, it has been frequently argued that there is little the health care 
system can do to correct inequality in health since most of the elements and 
factors influencing health are beyond its direct control and competency, and 
inequalities in health care and in health reflect the basic structure of social and 
economic inequality (Le Grand, 1982). However, there is a complementary 
vision to this. It has been pointed out that the health care sector could have a 
major role in encouraging the development of an equity orientation across the 
whole range of public policies that have and impact on health, as suggested by
54
Targetting less advantaged groups could be of primarily importance in drafting and 
implementing policies. It could well be the case of certain health education/prevention policies 
that, despite being of a universal nature when being drafted, could at the end benefit particular 
population groups. For instance, a universal anti-smoking campaign would probably reduce 
smoking rates more among the best educated or higher income groups than among those other 
less priviledged groups as a consequence, for instance, the former attaching a greater social 
importance to health.
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Benzeval et a/. (1996) and Foster (1996). The authors argue that, first, the health 
sector is in a pivotal position in terms of experience to assess link between 
health status and socioeconomic variables and, second, it is the door at which 
health problems are presented. Credibility is also at stake. If the health sector is 
not concerned with equity in health and health care, who will? There should 
always be a role for health care services in tackling inequalities in health, or at 
least helping to prevent an increase in inequalities as a consequence of external 
influences (Van Doorslaer et a/., 1993).
Age and gender differences in the presence of illness may well be rooted on 
biological and epidemiological factors. In this case there is little the health care 
services could do to equalise utilisation of primary or specialist care if there is 
an age pattern in utilisation of primary care as a consequence of infant care 
and/or the presence of chronic pathologies among the elderly. Further, the 
eldest use health care services more often, particularly primary care as a result 
of greater morbidity levels in general and the greater presence of chronic 
illness. The role of health care policy is unknown in terms of correcting such 
age marked patterns since they largely come as a consequence of factors of a 
biological nature and life cycle epidemiology.
However, policy responses may well consider epidemiology and medical 
research so as to improve the knowledge on the distribution of illness and 
disease across the disadvantage groups.
7.5.2. Differences in the utilisation of services for the same disease.
Inequalities could also come as a consequence of different rates of reporting 
illness, disease, or ill-health in general to the health care system. A number of 
reasons for which low income groups may actually be under-reporting illness 
was given in the previous section. It was argued that the utilisation of services
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came largely as a consequence of the population balancing costs and perceived 
benefits of receiving care. Policy responses should then be addressed to alter 
these particular circumstances, changing behaviour and attitudes towards health 
care, improving communication skills and information to disadvantaged groups, 
altering their perception of benefits by means of health education, and ensuring 
that referrals to specialist care are not a consequence of pressure to the GP but 
of adequate medical assessment.
Similarly, some thought should be given to increasing males' lower perception 
of benefit by adequate information on disease symptoms, severity of illness, 
and availability of appropriate medical treatment and adequate information on 
treatment availability in general.
Also the role of incentives and desincentives may be considered, not only as a 
means to make possible a particular policy to reduce inequalities but also to 
signal the possible negative effects of other policy options. For example, this 
study has disclosed that primary care utilisation is weighted towards the least 
advantaged groups. In order to preserve equity it would therefore not be 
appropriate to encourage a policy on co-payment of primary care services since 
that is likely to have a major effect on lower income groups' utilisation. An 
additional example relates to the role of the GP as gatekeeper in the public 
sector, since it may be the case that GPs do not refer the poor to specialist care 
as often as the rich. Incentives would then contemplate a change in suppliers' 
behaviour towards these groups, improving communication and information 
flows to low socioeconomic groups, as well as a referral policy operative on a 
need bases and not on a pressure bases. In brief, these research findings would 
help policy makers concerned with equity to design and implement positive 
and negative incentives to the utilisation of the different forms of care.
Different patterns of use of services across income groups may be triggering the 
appearance of inefficiencies at each level of provision, either as a consequence
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of misuse, bad use or unjustified overuse. Indeed, as a result of receiving 
different shares of care from each service as compared with need, those shares 
received may well be above the need or below the need, pinpointing 
inadequate use of services.
The fact that the distribution of health care is equitable is undoubtedly 
important in itself. Health care is indeed a contributor to a fairer society if 
provision addresses the needs of the population. But the determinants of the 
health of the nation may be posing enormous challenges to health care policies. 
Most of the time factors beyond health policy control continue to shape 
inequalities in health. Great inequalities in health, as measured by illness 
concentration curves, may exist in a given country with a fair distribution of 
health care resources across socioeconomic groups, as measured by a similar 
expenditure concentration curve. There must be something more the health 
care authorities could do besides ensuring services are provided according to 
need. Since it is health and its distribution what is considered here as the 
ultimate end, there should be a role for health authorities to enhance health, 
not only by means of providing services equitably, but to lead a wider debate 
and policy action agenda in the pursuit of equity in health, as mentioned 
before.
7.5.3 Further research.
Any research should encourage further research and this study is no exception. 
If there is a policy commitment to the amelioration of inequalities there are 
important research needs to fulfil in the future. First, it should be highlighted 
that any future applied research in this field of knowledge should also be 
encouraged at the decentralised level where action is taken by policy makers. 
This is particularly important in the case of Spain given the decentralisation 
process started in the eighties. Autonomous Communities should then count on 
both the competencies to tackle inequality problems as well as the instruments
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to inform such decisions, particularly context specific population health 
surveys. Further, the fact that the system has been found equitable on the 
whole, it does not follow that health districts within Catalonia share the same 
level of equity in their respective territory. District research should be 
encouraged as far as local needs assessment and the geographical allocation of 
resources.
More generally, the instruments needed to inform policy decisions regarding 
inequalities should include health surveys carried out at the appropriate level of 
decision-making. The development of other epidemiological and demographic 
information systems should also be in place to inform policy on these matters. 
Similarly, adequate instruments to measure and monitor changes in inequalities 
are also needed. In this respect, future research should be addressed to generate 
evidence of what works and what does not in the correction of inequalities in 
health and health care in the specific context of action.
Moreover, there is a need of continuous research on the equity impact of 
present and future arrangements in the health care system at the provider and 
purchasing levels. The primary care reform in place in Catalonia at the moment 
together with the appearance of new forms of health services management and 
incentives, both positive and negative, should be studied not only as regards 
their impact on efficiency but also on equity, particularly in terms of correcting, 
or not, the existing patterns of utilisation. Research should also be promoted at 
a micro level of provision. The existence of inequalities in health care at the 
broadest sense within a population scope could just be the tip of the iceberg in 
this sense. The existence of inequalities in access and utilisation of particular 
services should not be neglected (Luengo et a/. 1996), ranging from screening 
programs to big ticket technologies. Targeted research to these areas should be 
promoted so as to define a better picture of inequalities in the provision of 
health care data at lower level of analysis. The asessment of emerging and 
existing technologies should also account for equity considerations together
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w ith  the well known safety, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness criteria.55
7.6. Conclusions.
The research here has shown that broadly the Catalan health system provides 
equal treartment for equal need. This confirms the first research hypothesis 
raised in the methodology chapter. However, this study has also demonstrated 
that there are inequalities within the system with respect to specific services for 
which adequate policy responses should be in place. The existence of service 
inequalities has served the purpose of confirming our second hypothesis of 
research, but also of fostering the need for specific and targetted research at 
lower levels of analysis.
Catalan Health authorities have frequently claimed equity to be among their 
policy objectives. The findings of this research show that this aspiration has 
broadly been achieved, although they also suggest the need for constant 
surveillance and monitoring regarding the equity impact of health policy 
instruments and choices.
55
Technology should here be understood in the widest sense, from an aspirin to the most 
sophisticated diagnostic, treatment and rehabilitation procedures and services. Evidence based 
medicine and policymaking may provide most useful information as regards the introduction 
adoption and difussion of medical technologies.
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CHAPTER 8. 
Conclusions.
Equity is a major policy objective in the Spanish health care system, both at 
national and regional levels. However, most of the studies on inequalities in 
health and health care in Spain have concentrated on the national perspective. 
Given the decentralisation process of health care such research efforts should 
better be addressed at the adequate level of policy-making, which in the case of 
Spain are largely the regions enjoying full competencies such as Catalonia.
This research has studied equity in the delivery of health care in Catalonia. It 
has first shown that important inequalities in health persist in the territory, as 
revealed by all indicators of self-reported morbidity used in this research, 
largely reflecting social and economic inequalities. However, the provision of 
health care in Catalonia has proven to be fairly equitable. That is, once self- 
reported morbidity is take into account, the utilisation of health care services by 
the population is only slightly inequitable, to the advantage of the better-off or 
worse off depending on the indicator of self-reported morbidity and the index 
of inequality used.
Possible explanations to this could be found in the nature, development and 
arrangements of the Spanish and Catalan health care systems, including the 
universal coverage, the extension of primary care services and increased 
resources into the system. Acknowledging this, this study offers an additional 
explanation grounded on the balance of particular service inequalities as a 
consequence of the different patterns of care disclosed. Indeed, three distinct 
patterns emerged for primary, specialist and inpatient care, which allowed for a 
much better understanding of the underlying inequalities in health care.
238
The discussion has pointed to possible interpretations of the main findings, 
including the most renowned models of service utilisation and feasible ways in 
which these models may accomodate with the context and the findings.
Following the results and discussion chapters it has been argued there is room 
for policy intervention in the correction of inequalities. Ways to do so may vary 
from better addressing expenditure to the most disadvantaged groups, 
promoting awareness of health disturbance among the least privileged groups, 
increasing information about care seeking options, balance perceived costs and 
benefits from using the health care, and stress public health in general, 
preventive services, education, and any other social and economic policy that 
would target inequalities in health.
At the level of individuals and the population we should be ready to encourage 
their participation in the health care policy area as a means to enhance equity 
in the system. The room for participation is enormous, not only by means of 
public representation, consultation and voting but also by means of education 
in the use of health care services. Participation should not only be defended on 
the bases of expert knowledge but on democratic principles, too.
Equity is one more of the health care system objectives, and the study of equity 
in health care is a constant challenge, not only because it requires high doses of 
social solidarity but also as a consequence of an environment in constant 
change. Certainly, the needs of the population are in continuous redefinition as 
a result of changing life styles, environmental conditions, socioeconomic 
factors and epidemiological variables. Further, new medical and technological 
advances and services have to adapt to these changes. The pressure of limited 
resources and the concern for efficiency, together with the aspiration of 
providing effective good quality health care are two other key goals in modern 
health care systems. Despite there being well known trade-offs among these 
multiple objectives there should be room for policy responses addressing equity
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and efficiency at the same time.
The study in depth of the above mentioned different utilisation patterns may 
well disclose areas of inefficiencies at each level of provision either as a 
consequence of misuse, bad use or unjustified overuse. Intervention to enhance 
equity should address these different patterns both for the sake of equity and 
efficiency in the next Century's health care systems. In this respect, a stronger 
social and political commitment to health and health care w ill be needed.
Finally, this research has mentioned, although not explored in depth, the need 
for evaluation of policy initiatives, both when designed to tackle inequalities or 
when addressing organizational aspects and incentives in the system. The 
information provided by this research has aimed at helping policy-makers to do 
so.
Universalisation of care may be considered as a correct policy response to 
tackle inequalities at the broadest level, that is, the overall expenditure received 
by the different income, age and gender groups according to their respective 
needs. However, universalisation may at the same time be hiding the presence 
of different patterns of use of services according to these same socioeconomic 
and demographic variables. W ithin a given degree of overall equity in the 
system it is important to examine how is this equity achieved and whether it is 
consistent across different sectors. Results from this study point to the fact that 
although being slightly inequitable the system maintains different patterns of 
utilisation of the various types of care across age, gender, income groups and 
education levels. On balance, the system may be found equitable, or 
reasonably inequitable, but it hides a clear picture of different use for the same 
needs, for which further research is needed as regards their contributing factors 
and plausible responses.
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ANNEX A.
Logistic Regressions Models: Output I.
A.1. Logistic regressions and primary care utilisation.
(PC-1) Dependent variable: PC
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, sick, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: P C - f {age*, gender, hng, sick, income**}
being age* - [4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e**- [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 170, 5009 3 , 0000 , 1185
0-16 , 2871 ,0889 10, 4288 1 , 0012 ,0268
17-39 -,5019 ,0762 43, 3611 1 , 0000 -,0594
40-59 -,5873 ,0746 61, 9356 , 0000 -,0715
GENDER , 1607 ,0481 11, 1441 1 , 0008 , 0279
HNG , 7876 ,0684 132, 5068 1 ,0000 , 1055
SICK , 8817 ,0599 216, 3602 1 , 0000 , 1353
INCOME 14, 3967 , 0061 , 0234
INCOME(1) ,2360 ,0832 8, 0436 1 , 0046 , 0227
INCOME(2) ,2214 ,0766 8, 3625 1 , 0038 , 0233
INCOME(3) , 0216 ,0719 0906 1 ,7635 , 0000
INCOME(4) ,0981 ,0710 1, 9109 1 , 1669 , 0000
Constant -,0671 , 0945 5041 1 , 4777
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 1,3326 1,1195 1,5863
17-39 , 6054 , 5214 , 7029
40-59 ,5558 , 4802 , 6434
GENDER 1,1743 1,0686 1,2905
HNG 2,1981 1,9223 2,5136
SICK 2,4150 2,1473 2,7161
INCOME(1) 1,2662 1,0756 1,4905
INCOME(2) 1,2478 1,0739 1,4498
INCOME(3) 1,0219 , 8876 1,1765
INCOME(4) 1,1031 , 9598 1,2676
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(PC-2) Dependent variable: PC 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: P C -f {age*, gender, hng, acute, limcro, incom e**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** - [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 332, 7874 3 , 0000 , 1670
0-16 ,2932 ,0889 10, 8719 1 , 0010 , 0275
17-39 -,8060 ,0740 118, 5511 1 ,0000 -,0997
40-59 -,7785 ,0741 110, 2882 1 , 0000 -,0961
GENDER , 1719 ,0477 12, 9791 1 , 0003 , 0306
HNG , 7553 ,0686 121, 2003 1 , 0000 , 1009
INCOME 20, 7900 , 0003 , 0330
INCOME(1) , 2825 ,0827 11, 6704 1 , 0006 , 0287
INCOME(2) ,2615 ,0760 11, 8516 1 , 0006 ,0290
INCOME(3) , 0248 ,0711 1213 1 , 7277 , 0000
INCOME(4) ,0930 ,0701 1, 7579 1 , 1849 , 0000
ACUTE ,7104 ,1080 43, 2376 1 , 0000 , 0593
LIMCRO , 9473 ,1148 68, 0503 1 ,0000 , 0751
Constant , 5265 ,0841 39, 2062 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 1,3407 1,1263 1,5959
17-39 , 4466 , 3863 ,5164
40-59 , 4591 , 3970 ,5309
GENDER 1,1876 1,0815 1,3040
HNG 2,1283 1,8605 2,4347
INCOME(1) 1,3264 1,1280 1,5597
INCOME(2) 1,2989 1,1192 1,5074
INCOME(3) 1,0251 , 8917 1,1785
INCOME(4) 1,0975 , 9565 1,2592
ACUTE 2,0348 1,6465 2,5147
LIMCRO 2,5789 2,0591 3,2298
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(PC-Male1) Dependent variable: PC 
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, sick, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: PC=»f {age*, hng, sick, income**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e**- [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 95,1118 3 , 0000 , 1198
0-16 , 2434 , 1200 4,1174 1 , 0424 , 0185
17-39 -,5672 , 1032 30,2184 1 , 0000 -,0674
40-59 -,6225 , 1014 37,6893 1 , 0000 -,0758
HNG , 6102 ,0953 40,9577 1 , 0000 , 0792
INCOME 5,7962 , 2149 , 0000
INCOME(1) , 1588 , 1160 1,8727 1 , 1712 , 0000
INCOME(2) , 0612 , 1030 ,3527 1 ,5526 , 0000
INCOME(3) -,0705 , 0959 ,5404 1 , 4623 , 0000
INCOME(4) , 1144 , 0940 1,4790 1 ,2239 , 0000
SICK , 8946 , 0795 126,6201 1 ,0000 , 1417
Constant ,2218 , 0718 9,5489 1 , 0020
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp (B) Lower Upper
0-16 1,2756 1,0083 1,6138
17-39 , 5671 , 4632 , 6942
40-59 , 5366 , 4399 , 6546
HNG 1,8407 1,5270 2,2189
INCOME(1) 1,1721 , 9337 1,4714
INCOME(2) 1,0631 , 8688 1,3008
INCOME(3) , 9319 ,7722 1,1247
INCOME(4) 1,1211 , 9324 1,3480
SICK 2,4465 2,0935 2,8590
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(PC-Male2) Dependent variable: PC 
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: P C -f {age*, hng, acute, limcro, income**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 205,3215 3 , 0000 , 1792
0-16 , 2183 , 1201 3,3056 1 , 0690 , 0145
17-39 -,9428 , 0996 89,5546 1 , 0000 -,1188
40-59 -,8697 , 1003 75,1857 1 , 0000 -,1086
HNG , 6560 , 0951 47,5336 1 ,0000 , 0856
INCOME 9,0471 ,0599 , 0130
INCOME(1) , 2481 , 1155 4,6159 1 ,0317 , 0205
INCOME(2) , 1019 , 1024 , 9910 1 ,3195 , 0000
INCOME(3) -,0733 , 0950 , 5941 1 , 4408 , 0000
INCOME(4) , 0926 ,0931 , 9893 1 ,3199 , 0000
ACUTE , 8054 , 1577 26,0691 1 , 0000 , 0623
LIMCRO 1,1144 , 1798 38,4161 1 , 0000 , 0766
Constant , 8430 , 0386 476,3099 1 , 0000
Variable Exp(B)
95% Cl for 
Lower
Exp(B)
Upper
0-16 1,2439 , 9831 1,5739
17-39 ,3895 , 3204 , 4735
40-59 ,4191 , 3443 , 5101
HNG 1,9270 1,5992 2,3221
INCOME(1) 1,2817 1,0220 1,6073
INCOME(2) 1,1073 , 9060 1,3532
INCOME(3) , 9294 ,7714 1,1197
INCOME(4) 1,0971 , 9140 1,3167
ACUTE 2,2376 1,6425 3,0482
LIMCRO 3,0478 2,1426 4,3354
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(PC-Female1) Dependent variable: PC 
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, sick, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: PC = f {age*, hng, sick, income**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income* * = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 78,5510 3 , 0000 , 1152
0-16 , 3484 , 1329 6,8716 1 , 0088 ,0299
17-39 -,4162 , 1138 13,3830 1 , 0003 -,0457
40-59 -,5651 , 1108 26,0250 1 , 0000 -,0663
HNG , 9642 , 0986 95,6718 1 ,0000 , 1310
INCOME 17,0846 ,0019 , 0408
INCOME(1) , 3327 , 1206 7,6122 1 , 0058 , 0321
INCOME(2) , 4224 , 1151 13,4780 1 , 0002 , 0458
INCOME(3) , 1444 , 1088 1,7623 1 , 1843 , 0000
INCOME(4) , 0871 , 1080 , 6501 1 , 4201 , 0000
SICK , 8743 , 0919 90,4714 1 , 0000 , 1273
Constant , 3390 , 0848 15,9841 1 , 0001
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 1,4168 1,0919 1,8383
17-39 , 6596 , 5277 , 8243
40-59 , 5683 , 4574 ,7061
HNG 2,6227 2,1619 3,1817
INCOME(1) 1,3947 1,1011 1,7665
INCOME(2) 1,5257 1,2176 1,9116
INCOME(3) 1,1553 , 9335 1,4299
INCOME(4) 1,0910 , 8829 1,3481
SICK 2,3971 2,0019 2,8703
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(PC-Female2) Dependent variable: PC 
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: PC~f {age*, hng, acute, limcro, incom e**}
being age* -  [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** - [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 134,0799 3 ,0000 , 1531
0-16 , 3861 , 1329 8,4445 1 , 0037 , 0343
17-39 -,6483 , 1112 33,9730 1 , 0000 -,0765
40-59 -,6905 , 1105 39,0737 1 ,0000 -,0824
HNG , 8826 , 0998 78,2475 1 , 0000 , 1181
INCOME 19,6915 , 0006 , 0463
INCOME(1) , 3504 , 1197 8,5673 1 , 0034 , 0347
INCOME(2) , 4529 , 1141 15,7618 1 , 0001 , 0502
INCOME(3) , 1501 , 1077 1,9402 1 , 1637 , 0000
INCOME(4) , 0974 , 1067 , 8325 1 , 3615 , 0000
ACUTE , 6100 , 1486 16,8428 1 , 0000 , 0521
LIMCRO , 8184 , 1501 29,7109 1 ,0000 ,0712
Constant , 9810 , 0423 537,1486 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 1,4712 1,1339 1,9088
17-39 , 5229 , 4205 , 6503
40-59 , 5013 , 4037 , 6225
HNG 2,4172 1,9878 2,9392
INCOME(1) 1,4196 1,1227 1,7949
INCOME (2) 1,5729 1,2578 1,9671
INCOME(3) 1,1619 , 9407 1,4351
INCOME(4) 1,1023 , 8942 1,3588
ACUTE 1,8404 1,3753 2,4629
LIMCRO 2,2668 1,6890 3,0424
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(PC-3) Dependent variable: PC 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: PC=*f {age*, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e**- [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: Next category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 332,7874 3 ,0000 , 1670
0-16 1,0992 ,0734 224,3179 1 , 0000 , 1378
17-39 -,0275 ,0588 , 2183 1 , 6403 , 0000
18-59 -,7785 ,0741 110,2882 1 , 0000 -,0961
GENDER , 1719 , 0477 12,9791 1 ,0003 , 0306
HNG ,7553 , 0686 121,2003 1 ,0000 , 1009
ACUTE ,7104 , 1080 43,2376 1 ,0000 , 0593
LIMCRO , 9473 , 1148 68,0503 1 , 0000 , 0751
INCOME 20,7900 , 0003 , 0330
INCOME(1) , 0210 , 0830 , 0637 1 , 8007 , 0000
INCOME(2) , 2367 , 0762 9,6566 1 ,0019 , 0256
INCOME(3) -,0682 , 0720 , 8990 1 , 3430 , 0000
INCOME(4) , 0930 , 0701 1,7579 1 , 1849 , 0000
Constant , 6588 , 0744 78,4967 1 ,0000
99% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 3,0017 2,4847 3,6263
17-39 , 9729 , 8362 1,1320
40-59 , 4591 , 3793 ,5557
GENDER 1,1876 1,0502 1,3429
HNG 2,1283 1,7835 2,5397
ACUTE 2,0348 1,5405 2,6877
LIMCRO 2,5789 1,9185 3,4665
INCOME(1) 1,0212 , 8245 1,2647
INCOME(2) 1,2671 1,0413 1,5418
INCOME(3) , 9340 ,7760 1,1243
INCOME(4) 1,0975 , 9161 1,3148
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(PC-Male3) Dependent variable: PC 
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: PC = f {age*, gender, hng, acute, limcro, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: next category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 205,3215 3 , 0000 , 1792
0-16 1,1611 , 1010 132,2105 1 , 0000 , 1448
17-39 -,0731 , 0788 , 8610 1 , 3535 , 0000
40-59 -,8697 , 1003 75,1857 1 , 0000 -,1086
HNG , 6560 ,0951 47,5336 1 , 0000 ,0856
ACUTE , 8054 , 1577 26,0691 1 , 0000 , 0623
LIMCRO 1,1144 , 1798 38,4161 1 , 0000 , 0766
INCOME 9,0471 ,0599 , 0130
INCOME(1) , 1463 , 1176 1,5470 1 ,2136 , 0000
INCOME(2) , 1752 , 1035 2,8622 1 ,0907 , 0118
INCOME(3) -,1659 , 0970 2,9219 1 , 0874 -,0122
INCOME(4) , 0926 , 0931 , 9893 1 ,3199 , 0000
Constant , 8430 , 0386 476,3099 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 3,1933 2,6199 3,8922
17-39 , 9295 , 7964 1,0847
40-59 ,4191 , 3443 ,5101
HNG 1,9270 1,5992 2,3221
ACUTE 2,2376 1,6425 3,0482
LIMCRO 3,0478 2,1426 4,3354
INCOME(1) 1,1575 , 9192 1,4575
INCOME(2) 1,1914 , 9726 1,4595
INCOME(3) , 8471 ,7004 1,0246
INCOME(4) 1,0971 , 9140 1,3167
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(PC-Female3) Dependent variable: PC 
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: PC = f {age*, gender, hng, acute, limcro, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: next category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 134,0799 3 ,0000 , 1531
0-16 1,0344 , 1071 93,3146 1 , 0000 , 1293
17-39 , 0423 , 0888 , 2264 1 , 6342 , 0000
40-59 -,6905 , 1105 39,0737 1 , 0000 -,0824
HNG , 8826 , 0998 78,2475 1 , 0000 , 1181
ACUTE , 6100 , 1486 16,8428 1 ,0000 , 0521
LIMCRO ,8184 , 1501 29,7109 1 , 0000 ,0712
INCOME 19,6915 ,0006 , 0463
INCOME(1) -,1026 , 1187 , 7470 1 ,3874 , 0000
INCOME(2) , 3029 , 1132 7,1555 1 , 0075 , 0307
INCOME(3) , 0527 , 1076 ,2395 1 , 6246 , 0000
INCOME(4) ,0974 , 1067 , 8325 1 , 3615 , 0000
Constant , 9810 , 0423 537,1486 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B ) Lower Upper
0-16 2,8133 2,2807 3,4702
17-39 1,0432 , 8765 1,2415
40-59 , 5013 , 4037 , 6225
HNG 2,4172 1,9878 2,9392
ACUTE 1,8404 1,3753 2,4629
LIMCRO 2,2668 1,6890 3,0424
INCOME(1) , 9025 , 7152 1,1389
INCOME(2) 1,3537 1,0843 1,6901
INCOME(3) 1,0541 , 8536 1,3017
INCOME(4) 1,1023 , 8942 1,3588
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A.2. Logistic regressions and specialist care utilisation
(SC-1) Dependent variable: SpC 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, sick, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: SpC=-f {age*, gender, hng, sick, income**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** - [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 232,6116 3 , 0000 , 1264
0-16 -,6041 , 0724 69,6504 1 , 0000 -,0690
17-39 , 3933 ,0646 37,0692 1 , 0000 ,0497
40-59 , 1756 ,0617 8,1034 1 , 0044 , 0207
GENDER , 6662 , 0422 248,8401 1 , 0000 , 1319
HNG , 8185 , 0536 233,2381 1 ,0000 , 1277
SICK ,8356 , 0623 179,6912 1 , 0000 , 1119
INCOME 100,9246 4 , 0000 , 0809
INCOME(1) -,6660 ,0725 84,3066 1 , 0000 -,0762
INCOME(2) -,5172 ,0685 56,9699 1 ,0000 -,0622
INCOME(3) -,4450 ,0669 44,2674 1 , 0000 -,0546
INCOME(4) -,2373 ,0660 12,9331 1 , 0003 -,0278
Constant -1,7424 , 0906 369,9866 1 , 0000
Variable Exp(B )
95% Cl for 
Lower
Exp(B) 
Upper
0-16 ,5466 , 4743 , 6299
17-39 1,4819 1,3057 1,6819
40-59 1,1920 1,0562 1,3452
GENDER 1,9469 1,7922 2,1149
HNG 2,2670 2,0410 2,5181
SICK 2,3062 2,0410 2,6059
INCOME (1) ,5138 , 4457 , 5923
INCOME (2) , 5962 , 5212 , 6819
INCOME(3) , 6408 , 5621 , 7306
INCOME(4) , 7888 , 6931 , 8977
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(SC-2) Dependent variable: SpC 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: S p C -f {age*, gender, hng, acute, limcro, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
--------------------- Variables in the Equation ----------------
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 133, 5547 3 , 0000 , 0948
0-16 -,5812 ,0729 63, 6424 1 ,0000 -,0659
17-39 , 1400 ,0632 4, 9141 1 ,0266 , 0143
40-59 , 0098 , 0622 0247 1 , 8751 , 0000
GENDER , 6407 ,0423 229, 5003 1 , 0000 , 1266
HNG , 7680 ,0546 197, 6993 1 , 0000 , 1174
INCOME 88, 7887 , 0000 , 0755
INCOME(1) -,6253 ,0726 74, 2268 1 , 0000 -,0713
INCOME(2) -,4749 ,0683 48, 3356 1 , 0000 -,0571
INCOME(3) -,4320 ,0665 42, 1363 1 ,0000 -,0532
INCOME(4) -,2350 ,0655 12, 8581 1 , 0003 -,0277
ACUTE , 2466 ,0763 10, 4545 1 , 0012 , 0244
LIMCRO 1,0957 ,0849 166, 4971 1 , 0000 , 1077
Constant -1,1114 ,0767 209, 7579 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 5592 , 4848 , 6451
17-39 1,1503 1,0164 1,3019
40-59 1,0098 , 8940 1,1407
GENDER 1,8979 1,7469 2,0619
HNG 2,1555 1,9367 2,3991
INCOME(1) , 5351 , 4641 , 6169
INCOME(2) , 6220 , 5440 ,7111
INCOME(3) , 6492 , 5698 ,7397
INCOME(4) , 7906 , 6953 , 8989
ACUTE 1,2796 1,1020 1,4859
LIMCRO 2,9912 2,5326 3,5328
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(SC-Male1) Dependent variable: SpC 
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, sick, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: SpC = f {age*, hng, sick, income**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 23,2517 3 , 0000 , 0500
0-16 -,4012 , 0981 16,7356 1 , 0000 -,0462
17-39 -,1100 , 0903 1,4813 1 ,2236 , 0000
40-59 -,3023 , 0877 11,8922 1 , 0006 -,0379
HNG , 8952 ,0764 137,2467 1 , 0000 , 1401
INCOME 36,1317 , 0000 ,0639
INCOME(1) -,5443 , 1032 27,8405 1 , 0000 -,0612
INCOME(2) -,4100 , 0954 18,4670 1 , 0000 -,0489
INCOME(3) -,4340 ,0925 22,0344 1 , 0000 -,0539
INCOME(4) -,2504 , 0892 7,8831 1 , 0050 -,0292
SICK , 8635 ,0891 93,9621 1 , 0000 , 1155
Constant -1,4326 ,0825 301,3069 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 6695 , 5524 ,8114
17-39 , 8959 , 7505 1,0694
40-59 , 7391 , 6224 , 8777
HNG 2,4477 2,1073 2,8432
INCOME(1) , 5802 , 4740 ,7103
INCOME(2) , 6636 , 5504 , 8001
INCOME(3) , 6479 , 5405 ,7766
INCOME(4) ,7785 , 6536 , 9272
SICK 2,3715 1,9915 2,8239
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(SC-Male2) Dependent variable: SpC 
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro,income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: SpC=*f {age*, hng, acute, limcro, incom e**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e**- [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 45,2174 3 , 0000 ,0754
0-16 -,4456 , 0993 20,1489 1 , 0000 -,0513
17-39 -,4749 , 0889 28,5675 1 ,0000 -,0621
40-59 -,5646 ,0888 40,4577 1 , 0000 -,0747
HNG , 9031 ,0776 135,4331 1 , 0000 , 1391
INCOME 30,3801 , 0000 , 0570
INCOME(1) -,4671 , 1038 20,2662 1 , 0000 -,0515
INCOME(2) -,3822 , 0962 15,7824 1 , 0001 -,0447
INCOME(3) -,4377 , 0930 22,1604 1 , 0000 -,0541
INCOME(4) -,2686 , 0898 8,9504 1 , 0028 -,0318
ACUTE , 3746 , 1134 10,9161 1 , 0010 ,0360
LIMCRO 1,5006 , 1376 118,9522 1 , 0000 , 1303
Constant -,8228 ,0363 513,1626 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 6404 , 5272 , 7780
17-39 , 6219 , 5225 , 7402
40-59 , 5686 , 4778 , 6766
HNG 2,4673 2,1192 2,8726
INCOME(1) , 6268 , 5115 ,7682
INCOME(2) , 6824 , 5651 , 8240
INCOME(3) , 6455 , 5380 , 7746
INCOME(4) , 7645 , 6412 , 9115
ACUTE 1,4545 1,1646 1,8164
LIMCRO 4,4845 3,4245 5,8726
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(SC-Female1) Dependent variable: SpC 
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, sick, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: SpC = f {age*, hng, sick, income**}
being age* =*[4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** =-[5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
----  Variables m  the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 356,7322 3 , 0000 ,2239
0-16 -,8210 , 1058 60,2008 1 , 0000 -,0912
17-39 , 8665 ,0945 84,0611 1 , 0000 , 1083
40-59 , 6571 ,0884 55,2530 1 , 0000 , 0872
HNG , 7819 , 0766 104,2208 1 , 0000 , 1209
INCOME 80,7154 , 0000 , 1019
INCOME(1) 8421 , 1062 62,8501 1 ,0000 -,0933
INCOME(2) -,7604 , 1030 54,5286 1 , 0000 -,0867
INCOME(3) 5833 , 1021 32,6023 1 , 0000 -,0661
INCOME(4) 3065 , 1036 8,7537 1 , 0031 -,0311
SICK , 7663 ,0928 68,2526 1 , 0000 ,0973
Constant -,7355 , 0853 74,3145 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 4400 ,3576 ,5414
17-39 2,3786 1,9764 2,8626
40-59 1,9291 1,6222 2,2940
HNG 2,1856 1,8810 2,5396
INCOME(1) , 4308 , 3498 ,5305
INCOME(2) , 4675 , 3820 , 5720
INCOME(3) , 5581 , 4568 , 6818
INCOME(4) , 7360 , 6007 , 9017
SICK 2,1518 1,7941 2,5808
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(SC-Female2) Dependent variable: SpC 
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro,income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: S p C -f {age*, hng, acute, limcro, incom e**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 294,7977 3 , 0000 ,2032
0-16 -,7589 ,1062 51,0249 1 ,0000 -,0837
17-39 , 7001 , 0923 57,5518 1 ,0000 , 0891
40-59 , 5645 , 0888 40,3750 1 , 0000 , 0741
HNG , 6724 , 0787 73,0394 1 , 0000 , 1008
INCOME 77,2513 , 0000 , 0995
INCOME(1) -,8270 , 1062 60,6855 1 , 0000 -,0916
INCOME(2) -,7318 , 1027 50,7192 1 , 0000 -,0834
INCOME(3) -,5723 , 1020 31,5076 1 , 0000 -,0649
INCOME(4) -,2994 , 1033 8,3995 1 , 0038 -,0302
ACUTE , 1592 , 1043 2,3282 1 , 1270 , 0068
LIMCRO 1,0230 , 1103 85,9770 1 , 0000 , 1096
Constant -,1688 , 0377 20,0119 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B ) Lower Upper
0-16 , 4682 , 3802 , 5766
17-39 2,0140 1,6808 2,4133
40-59 1,7585 1,4775 2,0930
HNG 1,9589 1,6789 2,2854
INCOME(1) , 4374 , 3552 , 5385
INCOME(2) , 4811 , 3933 , 5884
INCOME(3) , 5642 , 4620 , 6890
INCOME(4) ,7412 , 6054 , 9076
ACUTE 1,1726 , 9557 1,4386
LIMCRO 2,7814 2,2406 3,4528
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(SC-3) Dependent variable: SpC 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: SpC~f {age*, gender, hng, acute, limcro, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: Next category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 133,5547 3 , 0000 , 0948
0-16 -,5812 , 0729 63,6424 1 , 0000 -,0659
17-39 , 1400 , 0632 4,9141 1 , 0266 , 0143
40-59 , 0098 , 0622 , 0247 1 , 8751 , 0000
GENDER , 6407 , 0423 229,5003 1 , 0000 , 1266
HNG -,7680 ,0546 197,6993 1 , 0000 -,1174
ACUTE -,2466 , 0763 10,4545 1 , 0012 -,0244
LIMCRO -1,0957 , 0849 166,4971 1 , 0000 -,1077
INCOME 88,7887 , 0000 , 0755
INCOME(1) -,6253 , 0726 74,2268 1 , 0000 -,0713
INCOME(2) -,4749 , 0683 48,3356 1 , 0000 -,0571
INCOME(3) -,4320 , 0665 42,1363 1 ,0000 -,0532
INCOME(4) -,2350 ,0655 12,8581 1 ,0003 -,0277
Constant , 5515 , 0483 130,3638 1 ,0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 5592 , 4848 , 6451
17-39 1,1503 1,0164 1,3019
40-59 1,0098 , 8940 1,1407
GENDER 1,8979 1,7469 2,0619
HNG , 4639 ,4168 , 5163
ACUTE ,7815 , 6730 , 9075
LIMCRO , 3343 , 2831 , 3949
INCOME(1) , 5351 , 4641 , 6169
INCOME(2) , 6220 , 5440 ,7111
INCOME(3) , 6492 , 5698 ,7397
INCOME(4) , 7906 , 6953 , 8989
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(SC-Male3) Dependent variable: SpC 
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro,income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: S p C -f {age*, hng, acute, limcro, incom e**}
being age* =*[4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** =■ [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: Next category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 45,2174 3 , 0000 , 0754
0-16 , 0293 , 0901 , 1059 1 , 7449 , 0000
17-39 , 0896 , 0813 1,2150 1 ,2704 , 0000
40-59 -,5646 , 0888 40,4577 1 ,0000 -,0747
HNG , 9031 , 0776 135,4331 1 , 0000 , 1391
ACUTE , 3746 ,1134 10,9161 1 , 0010 , 0360
LIMCRO 1,5006 , 1376 118,9522 1 ,0000 , 1303
INCOME 30,3801 , 0000 , 0570
INCOME(1) -,0849 , 1008 ,7091 1 , 3997 , 0000
INCOME(2) , 0555 , 0970 , 3276 1 , 5671 , 0000
INCOME(3) -,1691 , 0942 3,2220 1 ,0727 -,0133
INCOME(4) -,2686 ,0898 8,9504 1 , 0028 -,0318
Constant 8228 ,0363 513,1626 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 1,0297 , 8631 1,2286
17-39 1,0938 , 9326 1,2828
40-59 , 5686 , 4778 , 6766
HNG 2,4673 2,1192 2,8726
ACUTE 1,4545 1,1646 1,8164
LIMCRO 4,4845 3,4245 5,8726
INCOME(1) , 9186 , 7539 1,1193
INCOME(2) 1,0571 , 8741 1,2783
INCOME(3) , 8444 ,7020 1,0157
INCOME(4) , 7645 , 6412 , 9115
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(SC-Female3) Dependent variable: SpC 
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro,income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: SpC = f {age*, hng, acute, limcro, income**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: Next category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 294,7977 3 , 0000 , 2032
0-16 -1,4591 , 0926 248,1905 1 ,0000 -,1876
17-39 , 1356 , 0851 2,5379 1 , 1111 , 0088
40-59 , 5645 , 0888 40,3750 1 , 0000 , 0741
HNG , 6724 , 0787 73,0394 1 , 0000 , 1008
ACUTE , 1592 , 1043 2,3282 1 , 1270 , 0068
LIMCRO 1,0230 , 1103 85,9770 1 ,0000 , 1096
INCOME 77,2513 , 0000 , 0995
INCOME(1) -,0952 , 0918 1,0764 1 ,2995 , 0000
INCOME (2) -,1595 , 0953 2,8024 1 , 0941 -,0107
INCOME(3) -,2729 , 0987 7,6494 1 ,0057 -,0284
INCOME(4) -,2994 , 1033 8,3995 1 , 0038 -,0302
Constant -,1688 ,0377 20,0119 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 ,2325 , 1939 , 2787
17-39 1,1453 , 9692 1,3532
40-59 1,7585 1,4775 2,0930
HNG 1,9589 1,6789 2,2854
ACUTE 1,1726 , 9557 1,4386
LIMCRO 2,7814 2,2406 3,4528
INCOME(1) , 9092 , 7595 1,0884
INCOME(2) , 8526 ,7074 1,0276
INCOME(3) ,7612 , 6274 , 9236
INCOME(4) , 7412 , 6054 , 9076
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A.3. Logistic regressions and inpatient care utilisation.
(IPC-1) Dependent variable: IP 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, sick, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: IP - f  {age*, gender, hng, sick, income**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e**- [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 33,9638 3 , 0000 , 0685
0-16 -,5613 , 1343 17,4611 1 , 0000 -,0509
17-39 , 0362 , 1041 , 1208 1 , 7281 , 0000
40-59 3480 , 1015 11,7520 1 , 0006 -,0405
GENDER -,0717 , 0727 , 9738 1 ,3237 , 0000
HNG ,7944 , 0829 91,7759 1 , 0000 , 1227
SICK , 6548 , 1321 24,5566 1 , 0000 , 0615
INCOME 2,2242 , 6946 ,0000
INCOME(1) -,0594 , 1227 ,2343 1 , 6284 ,0000
INCOME(2) -,0900 ,1202 , 5602 1 , 4542 , 0000
INCOME(3) -,1703 , 1221 1,9463 1 , 1630 , 0000
INCOME(4) -,0416 , 1196 , 1211 1 , 7278 , 0000
Constant -3,1077 , 1735 320,6527 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 5705 , 4384 , 7423
17-39 1,0369 , 8455 1,2716
40-59 ,7061 , 5787 ,8615
GENDER , 9308 , 8071 1,0733
HNG 2,2132 1,8812 2,6038
SICK 1,9248 1,4856 2,4938
INCOME(1) , 9423 , 7408 1,1986
INCOME(2) , 9140 , 7221 1,1568
INCOME(3) , 8434 , 6640 1,0714
INCOME(4) , 9592 , 7587 1,2127
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(IPC-2) Dependent variable: IP 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: IP - f  {age*, gender, hng, acute, limcro, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 38,6036 3 , 0000 , 0740
0-16 -,5614 , 1351 17,2762 1 , 0000 -,0506
17-39 -,1763 , 1048 2,8331 1 , 0923 -,0118
40-59 -,5615 , 1042 29,0564 1 , 0000 -,0674
GENDER -,2168 , 0756 8,2196 1 , 0041 -,0323
HNG , 6160 , 0870 50,1068 1 , 0000 , 0898
INCOME 2,2645 , 6872 , 0000
INCOME(1) -,0229 , 1251 , 0336 1 , 8546 ,0000
INCOME(2) -,0583 , 1218 ,2290 1 , 6322 , 0000
INCOME(3) 1639 , 1236 1,7598 1 , 1847 , 0000
INCOME(4) -,0317 , 1210 , 0687 1 ,7932 , 0000
ACUTE , 0942 , 1088 ,7502 1 , 3864 , 0000
LIMCRO 1,3492 , 0961 196,9219 1 , 0000 , 1809
Constant -2,4936 , 1366 333,1300 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 ,5704 , 4378 , 7433
17-39 , 8383 , 6827 1,0294
40-59 , 5704 , 4651 , 6996
GENDER , 8051 , 6941 , 9337
HNG 1,8514 1,5611 2,1957
INCOME(1) , 9773 ,7649 1,2488
INCOME(2) , 9434 ,7430 1,1978
INCOME(3) , 8488 , 6662 1,0814
INCOME(4) , 9688 , 7642 1,2281
ACUTE 1,0988 , 8878 1,3600
LIMCRO 3,8545 3,1925 4,6538
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(IPC-Malel) Dependent variable: IP 
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, sick, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: IP - f  {age*, hng, sick, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e**- [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 10,5810 3 , 0142 ,0394
0-16 -,3965 , 1708 5,3922 1 , 0202 -, 0339
17-39 -,4328 , 1555 7,7473 1 , 0054 -,0441
40-59 -,3416 , 1400 5,9500 1 , 0147 -,0366
HNG , 9160 , 1156 62,7806 1 ,0000 , 1434
INCOME 3,8854 ,4217 , 0000
INCOME(1) ,0914 , 1841 , 2465 1 , 6195 , 0000
INCOME(2) ,2454 , 1740 1,9874 1 , 1586 , 0000
INCOME(3) , 0934 , 1787 ,2730 1 , 6014 , 0000
INCOME(4) ,2759 , 1726 2,5556 1 ,1099 ,0137
SICK 1,0273 ,2167 22,4626 1 ,0000 , 0832
Constant -3,6266 ,2062 309,3358 1 ,0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 6727 , 4813 , 9400
17-39 , 6487 , 4783 , 8798
40-59 ,7107 , 5401 , 9351
HNG 2,4992 1,9925 3,1348
INCOME(1) 1,0957 ,7638 1,5719
INCOME(2) 1,2781 , 9087 1,7976
INCOME(3) 1,0979 , 7734 1,5584
INCOME(4) 1,3178 , 9395 1,8483
SICK 2,7934 1,8266 4,2719
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(IPC-Male2) Dependent variable: IP 
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: IP =-f {age*, hng, acute, limcro, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 45,3205 3 ,0000 , 1154
0-16 -,5609 , 1746 10,3222 1 ,0013 -,0531
17-39 -,9804 , 1618 36,6967 1 , 0000 -,1084
40-59 -,8203 , 1506 29,6577 1 , 0000 -,0968
HNG , 8206 , 1191 47,4479 1 , 0000 , 1240
INCOME 4,0428 , 4002 , 0000
INCOME(1) ,2594 , 1892 1,8793 1 , 1704 , 0000
INCOME(2) , 3154 , 1795 3,0887 1 ,0788 , 0192
INCOME(3) , 1422 , 1836 , 6004 1 , 4384 , 0000
INCOME(4) , 2865 , 1786 2,5738 1 ,1086 , 0139
ACUTE , 1845 , 1658 1,2380 1 ,2659 , 0000
LIMCRO 2,0223 , 1536 173,2376 1 , 0000 ,2407
Constant -2,9647 , 0739 1609,899 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 5707 , 4053 , 8035
17-39 ,3752 ,2732 , 5152
40-59 , 4403 , 3277 ,5915
HNG 2,2719 1,7988 2,8695
INCOME(1) 1,2961 , 8945 1,8779
INCOME(2) 1,3709 , 9643 1,9489
INCOME(3) 1,1528 , 8045 1,6520
INCOME(4) 1,3318 , 9385 1,8900
ACUTE 1,2026 , 8689 1,6645
LIMCRO 7,5555 5,5909 10,2105
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(IPC-Female1) Dependent variable: IP 
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, sick, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: IP = f {age*, hng, sick, income**}
being age* =-[4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 51,2053 3 , 0000 , 1227
0-16 -,7874 ,2202 12,7869 1 , 0003 -,0599
17-39 , 4417 , 1472 8,9998 1 ,0027 , 0483
40-59 -,2993 , 1484 4,0659 1 , 0438 -,0262
HNG , 7224 , 1194 36,5845 1 , 0000 , 1073
INCOME 11,6512 , 0201 , 0349
INCOME(1) -,1835 , 1657 1,2265 1 , 2681 , 0000
INCOME(2) -,4573 , 1698 7,2551 1 ,0071 -,0418
INCOME(3) -,4367 , 1696 6,6303 1 ,0100 -,0393
INCOME(4) -,3861 , 1700 5,1603 1 ,0231 -,0324
SICK , 2894 , 1692 2,9246 1 , 0872 ,0175
Constant -3,0311 , 1638 342,5501 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 4550 ,2955 , 7006
17-39 1,5553 1,1655 2,0755
40-59 , 7413 , 5542 , 9917
HNG 2,0593 1,6295 2,6025
INCOME(1) , 8324 , 6016 1,1517
INCOME(2) , 6330 , 4538 , 8829
INCOME(3) , 6462 , 4634 , 9010
INCOME(4) , 6797 , 4871 , 9484
SICK 1,3357 , 9586 1,8611
(IPC-Female2) Dependent variable: IP 
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: IP = f {age*, hng, acute, limcro, income**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 50,2879 3 , 0000 , 1214
0-16 -,7362 , 2211 11,0871 1 , 0009 -,0550
17-39 , 3934 , 1482 7,0441 1 , 0080 ,0410
40-59 -,4012 , 1503 7,1218 1 , 0076 -,0413
HNG , 4591 , 1267 13,1374 1 , 0003 , 0609
INCOME 12,2240 , 0158 , 0375
INCOME(1) -,1919 , 1682 1,3012 1 , 2540 , 0000
INCOME(2) -,4732 , 1718 7,5895 1 ,0059 -,0431
INCOME(3) -,4644 , 1719 7,2972 1 , 0069 -,0420
INCOME(4) -,3852 , 1716 5,0401 1 , 0248 -,0318
ACUTE , 0684 , 1453 ,2218 1 , 6377 , 0000
LIMCRO 1,1568 , 1278 81,9296 1 , 0000 , 1631
Constant -2,9125 , 0795 1342,672 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 4789 , 3105 , 7387
17-39 1,4820 1,1084 1,9816
40-59 , 6695 , 4986 , 8989
HNG 1,5826 1,2347 2,0286
INCOME(1) , 8254 , 5936 1,1478
INCOME(2) , 6230 , 4449 ,8724
INCOME(3) , 6285 , 4487 , 8803
INCOME(4) , 6803 , 4860 , 9523
ACUTE 1,0708 , 8055 1,4235
LIMCRO 3,1796 2,4751 4,0847
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(IPC-3) Dependent variable: IP
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, hng, sick, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: IP = f {age*, hng, sick, income**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: Next category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 38,6036 3 , 0000 , 0740
0-16 -,3850 , 1273 9,1530 1 , 0025 -,0346
17-39 , 3851 , 1050 13,4428 1 ,0002 , 0438
40-59 -,5615 , 1042 29,0564 1 , 0000 -,0674
GENDER -,2168 ,0756 8,2196 1 , 0041 -,0323
HNG , 6160 , 0870 50,1068 1 , 0000 , 0898
ACUTE , 0942 , 1088 , 7502 1 ,3864 , 0000
LIMCRO 1,3492 ,0961 196,9219 1 , 0000 , 1809
INCOME 2,2645 , 6872 , 0000
INCOME(1) , 0354 , 1094 , 1045 1 , 7465 , 0000
INCOME(2) , 1056 , 1178 , 8036 1 ,3700 , 0000
INCOME(3) -,1322 , 1215 1,1829 1 ,2768 , 0000
INCOME(4) -,0317 , 1210 , 0687 1 ,7932 , 0000
Constant -2,5489 , 1176 469,4531 1 , 0000
99% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 6804 , 4902 , 9444
17-39 1,4698 1,1214 1,9265
40-59 , 5704 , 4362 , 7459
GENDER ,8051 , 6626 , 9782
HNG 1,8514 1,4797 2,3166
ACUTE 1,0988 , 8303 1,4543
LIMCRO 3,8545 3,0089 4,9377
INCOME(1) 1,0360 , 7815 1,3733
INCOME(2) 1,1114 , 8205 1,5055
INCOME(3) , 8762 , 6407 1,1983
INCOME(4) , 9688 , 7093 1,3231
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(IPC-Male3) Dependent variable: IP 
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, sick, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: IP =*f {age*, hng, sick, income**}
being age* =*[4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: Next category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 45,3205 3 ,0000 , 1154
0-16 ,4195 , 1821 5,3084 1 ,0212 , 0335
17-39 -,1601 , 1609 , 9894 1 ,3199 , 0000
40-59 -,8203 , 1506 29,6577 1 , 0000 -,0968
HNG , 8206 , 1191 47,4479 1 , 0000 , 1240
ACUTE , 1845 , 1658 1,2380 1 ,2659 , 0000
LIMCRO 2,0223 , 1536 173,2376 1 , 0000 , 2407
INCOME 4,0428 , 4002 , 0000
INCOME(1) -,0561 , 1582 , 1256 1 ,7230 , 0000
INCOME(2) , 1732 , 1639 1,1165 1 ,2907 , 0000
INCOME(3) -,1443 , 1698 , 7222 1 ,3954 , 0000
INCOME(4) ,2865 , 1786 2,5738 1 , 1086 , 0139
Constant -2,9647 , 0739 1609,899 1 , 0000
Variable Exp(B)
95% Cl for 
Lower
Exp(B) 
Upper
0-16 1,5212 1,0646 2,1734
17-39 , 8521 , 6216 1,1680
40-59 , 4403 , 3277 ,5915
HNG 2,2719 1,7988 2,8695
ACUTE 1,2026 , 8689 1,6645
LIMCRO 7,5555 5,5909 10,2105
INCOME(1) , 9455 , 6933 1,2893
INCOME(2) 1,1891 , 8624 1,6397
INCOME(3) , 8656 , 6206 1,2074
INCOME(4) 1,3318 , 9385 1,8900
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(IPC-Female3) Dependent variable: IP 
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, sick, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: IP = f {age*, hng, sick, income**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: Next category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 50,2879 3 , 0000 , 1214
0-16 -1,1296 , 1997 31,9938 1 , 0000 -,0999
17-39 ,7946 , 1480 28,8321 1 , 0000 , 0945
40-59 -,4012 , 1503 7,1218 1 , 0076 -,0413
HNG , 4591 , 1267 13,1374 1 , 0003 ,0609
ACUTE , 0684 , 1453 ,2218 1 , 6377 , 0000
LIMCRO 1,1568 , 1278 81,9296 1 , 0000 , 1631
INCOME 12,2240 , 0158 ,0375
INCOME(1) ,2813 , 1555 3,2746 1 , 0704 , 0206
INCOME(2) -,0089 , 1730 , 0026 1 , 9592 , 0000
INCOME(3) -,0792 , 1786 , 1966 1 , 6575 , 0000
INCOME(4) -,3852 , 1716 5,0401 1 ,0248 -,0318
Constant -2,9125 , 0795 1342,672 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 3232 , 2185 , 4780
17-39 2,2135 1,6562 2,9583
40-59 , 6695 , 4986 , 8989
HNG 1,5826 1,2347 2,0286
ACUTE 1,0708 , 8055 1,4235
LIMCRO 3,1796 2,4751 4,0847
INCOME(1) 1,3249 , 9769 1,7969
INCOME(2) , 9912 , 7061 1,3913
INCOME(3) , 9239 , 6510 1,3111
INCOME(4) , 6803 , 4860 , 9523
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ANNEX B.
Logistic Regressions Models: Output II.
B.1. Logistic regressions and primary care utilisation.
Dependent variable: PC 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income, education)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: P C -f {age*, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income**, education***} 
being age* - [4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e**- [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
being education*** [4 categories, top university education as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
--------------------- Variables in the Equation ---------------------
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 110,3324 3 ,0000 , 0990
0-16 -,3233 , 1024 9,9791 1 , 0016 -,0274
17-39 -,6973 , 0787 78,4171 , 0000 -,0848
40-59 -,7315 , 0771 89,9222 1 , 0000 -,0909
GENDER , 1698 , 0496 11,7023 1 , 0006 ,0302
HNG , 7004 , 0711 97,1481 1 ,0000 , 0946
ACUTE , 6955 , 1138 37,3845 1 , 0000 ,0577
LIMCRO 1,0120 , 1183 73,1448 1 , 0000 , 0818
INCOME 13,8503 , 0078 ,0234
INCOME(1) , 2383 , 0902 6,9763 1 , 0083 ,0216
INCOME(2) , 1789 , 0824 4,7108 1 , 0300 , 0160
INCOME(3) -,0295 , 0772 , 1458 1 ,7026 , 0000
INCOME(4) , 0779 , 0743 1,1003 1 , 2942 , 0000
EDUCATION 24,1281 ,0000 , 0413
EDUCATION(1) , 6375 , 1377 21,4377 1 ,0000 , 0427
EDUCATION(2) , 2975 , 0919 10,4848 1 , 0012 , 0282
EDUCATION(3) , 1184 , 1098 1,1630 1 , 2808 , 0000
Constant , 4723 , 0841 31,5208 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 7237 , 5922 , 8845
17-39 , 4979 , 4267 , 5810
40-59 , 4812 ,4137 , 5597
GENDER 1,1850 1,0752 1,3061
HNG 2,0145 1,7526 2,3155
ACUTE 2,0048 1,6041 2,5056
LIMCRO 2,7511 2,1817 3,4692
INCOME(1) 1,2690 1,0634 1,5144
INCOME(2) 1,1959 1,0175 1,4056
INCOME(3) , 9709 , 8346 1,1296
INCOME(4) 1,0811 , 9345 1,2506
EDUCATION(1) 1,8918 1,4443 2,4778
EDUCATION(2) 1,3465 1,1246 1,6122
EDUCATION(3) 1,1257 , 9077 1,3961
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Dependent variable: PC
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro, income, education)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: PC=-f {age*, hng, acute, limcro, income**, education***}
being age* - [4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e** =-[5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
being education*** [4 categories, top university education as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
---------------------  Variables in the Equation---------------------
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 84,2209 3 , 0000 , 1173
0-16 -,4033 , 1387 8,4544 1 ,0036 -,0337
17-39 -,8611 , 1040 68,5358 1 , 0000 -,1081
40-59 -,8163 , 1026 63,2502 1 , 0000 -,1038
HNG , 5766 , 0973 35,1472 1 , 0000 , 0763
ACUTE ,7908 , 1641 23,2372 1 , 0000 , 0611
LIMCRO 1,1549 , 1797 41,2906 1 , 0000 , 0831
INCOME 7,6132 , 1068 , 0000
INCOME(1) ,1863 , 1254 2,2087 1 , 1372 , 0061
INCOME(2) ,0359 , 1114 , 1038 1 , 7473 , 0000
INCOME(3) -,1099 , 1028 1,1430 1 ,2850 , 0000
INCOME(4) , 0971 , 0983 , 9761 1 ,3232 , 0000
EDUCATION 13,2498 , 0041 , 0357
EDUCATION(1) , 6654 , 1860 12,7964 1 ,0003 , 0436
EDUCATION(2) , 3217 , 1212 7,0412 1 ,0080 , 0298
EDUCATION(3) ,2334 , 1463 2,5446 1 , 1107 , 0098
Constant , 6703 ,0601 124,1701 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B ) Lower Upper
0-16 , 6681 , 5091 , 8768
17-39 , 4227 , 3447 , 5183
40-59 , 4421 ,3615 , 5406
HNG 1,7800 1,4711 2,1538
ACUTE 2,2052 1,5989 3,0416
LIMCRO 3,1736 2,2313 4,5136
INCOME(1) 1,2048 , 9423 1,5404
INCOME(2) 1,0365 , 8332 1,2895
INCOME(3) , 8960 , 7325 1,0959
INCOME(4) 1,1020 , 9089 1,3362
EDUCATION(1) 1,9452 1,3509 2,8008
EDUCATION(2) 1,3795 1,0877 1,7495
EDUCATION(3) 1,2629 , 9480 1,6823
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Dependent variable: PC
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro, income, education)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: P C -f {age*, hng, acute, limcro, income**, education***}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e** - [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
being education*** [4 categories, top university education as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
--------------------- Variables in the Equation---------------------
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 34,4281 3 , 0000 , 0761
0-16 -,2126 , 1524 1,9473 1 , 1629 , 0000
17-39 -,4864 , 1215 16,0188 1 , 0001 -,0534
40-59 -,6422 , 1174 29,9158 1 , 0000 -,0754
HNG , 8548 , 1048 66,5721 1 , 0000 , 1147
ACUTE , 5882 , 1584 13,7843 1 ,0002 , 0490
LIMCRO , 8888 , 1581 31,5944 1 , 0000 , 0776
INCOME 12,9777 ,0114 , 0318
INCOME(1) , 3167 , 1310 5,8477 1 , 0156 , 0280
INCOME(2) , 3528 , 1235 8,1625 1 , 0043 , 0354
INCOME(3) , 0694 , 1175 , 3484 1 , 5550 , 0000
INCOME(4) , 0540 , 1137 , 2253 1 , 6350 , 0000
EDUCATION 14,2060 , 0026 , 0409
EDUCATION(1) , 6459 ,2067 9,7628 1 , 0018 , 0398
EDUCATION(2) , 2892 , 1421 4,1432 1 , 0418 , 0209
EDUCATION(3) -,0170 , 1668 , 0104 1 , 9188 , 0000
Constant ,7634 ,0660 133,6548 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B ) Lower Upper
0-16 , 8085 , 5998 1,0898
17-39 , 6148 , 4845 , 7802
40-59 , 5261 , 4180 , 6623
HNG 2,3509 1,9145 2,8868
ACUTE 1,8007 1,3201 2,4564
LIMCRO 2,4321 1,7840 3,3157
INCOME(1) 1,3726 1,0619 1,7743
INCOME(2) 1,4230 1,1171 1,8126
INCOME(3) 1,0718 , 8513 1,3494
INCOME(4) 1,0555 , 8446 1,3190
EDUCATION(1) 1,9076 1,2722 2,8605
EDUCATION(2) 1,3354 1,0108 1,7643
EDUCATION(3) , 9831 , 7090 1,3632
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NB.2. Logistic regressions and specialist care utilisation.
Dependent variable: ESP 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income, education)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: ESP =-f {age*, gender, hng, acute, limcro, incom e**, education***} 
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
being education*** [4 categories, top university education as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
--------------------- Variables in the Equation----------------------
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 49,2570 3 , 0000 , 0591
0-16 -,5432 , 0933 33,9027 1 , 0000 -,0508
17-39 , 0481 , 0682 , 4974 1 , 4807 , 0000
40-59 -,0408 , 0655 , 3874 1 ,5337 , 0000
GENDER , 7714 , 0454 288,9875 1 , 0000 , 1523
HNG , 7948 ,0581 187,2432 1 , 0000 , 1224
ACUTE ,2555 , 0847 9,0894 1 , 0026 , 0239
LIMCRO 1,1115 , 0904 151,2258 1 , 0000 , 1098
INCOME 48,3953 , 0000 ,0572
INCOME(1) -,5422 , 0816 44,1854 1 , 0000 -,0584
INCOME(2) -,3894 , 0768 25,6760 1 , 0000 -,0438
INCOME(3) -,3578 , 0745 23,0602 1 , 0000 -,0413
INCOME(4) -,2286 , 0719 10,1140 1 , 0015 -,0256
EDUCATION 22,7157 , 0000 , 0368
EDUCATION(1) -,5631 , 1187 22,4928 1 , 0000 -,0407
EDUCATION(2) -,3215 , 0913 12,4032 1 , 0004 -,0290
EDUCATION(3) -,3085 , 1095 7,9345 1 , 0049 -,0219
Constant -1,6007 ,0790 410,1617 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 5809 , 4838 , 6974
17-39 1,0493 , 9179 1,1995
40-59 , 9600 , 8443 1,0916
GENDER 2,1628 1,9788 2,3640
HNG 2,2141 1,9758 2,4810
ACUTE 1,2911 1,0935 1,5243
LIMCRO 3,0391 2,5457 3,6281
INCOME(1) , 5815 , 4955 , 6823
INCOME(2) , 6775 , 5828 , 7876
INCOME(3) , 6992 , 6042 , 8091
INCOME(4) , 7956 , 6910 , 9160
EDUCATION(1) , 5694 , 4512 ,7186
EDUCATION(2) , 7251 , 6063 , 8671
EDUCATION(3) , 7345 , 5926 , 9104
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Dependent variable: ESP
File: Catalonia (MALES)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro, income, education)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: ESP = f {age*, hng, acute, limcro, income**, education***}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
being education*** [4 categories, top university education as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
--------------------- Variables in the Equation----------------------
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 47,6836 3 , 0000 , 0825
0-16 -,4038 , 1281 9,9283 1 , 0016 -,0360
17-39 -,5171 , 0942 30,1446 1 , 0000 -,0678
40-59 -,6091 , 0918 44,0002 1 , 0000 -,0828
HNG , 9313 , 0813 131,2413 1 , 0000 , 1453
ACUTE , 3325 , 1245 7,1397 1 , 0075 , 0290
LIMCRO 1,5478 , 1410 120,5672 1 , 0000 , 1392
INCOME 16,3155 , 0026 , 0369
INCOME(1) -,3986 , 1169 11,6324 1 ,0006 -,0397
INCOME(2) -,3290 , 1084 9,2061 1 , 0024 -,0343
INCOME(3) -,3601 , 1035 12,1146 1 , 0005 -,0406
INCOME(4) -,2379 ,0981 5,8817 1 ,0153 -,0252
EDUCATION 5,3323 , 1490 , 0000
EDUCATION(1) -,2484 , 1640 2,2949 , 1298 -,0069
EDUCATION(2) -,2635 , 1221 4,6518 1 ,0310 -,0208
EDUCATION(3) -,1214 , 1484 , 6692 1 ,4133 , 0000
Constant -,7396 ,0565 171,4116 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 6678 , 5195 , 8585
17-39 , 5963 , 4958 ,7171
40-59 , 5438 , 4543 , 6511
HNG 2,5377 2,1639 2,9760
ACUTE 1,3945 1,0927 1,7797
LIMCRO 4,7013 3,5664 6,1973
INCOME(1) , 6713 , 5338 , 8440
INCOME(2) ,7196 , 5819 , 8900
INCOME(3) , 6976 , 5695 , 8544
INCOME(4) ,7883 , 6504 , 9554
EDUCATION(1) , 7801 , 5657 1,0757
EDUCATION(2) , 7684 , 6048 , 9762
EDUCATION(3) , 8857 , 6622 1,1846
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Dependent variable: ESP
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro, income, education)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: ESP-f {age*, hng, acute, limcro, income**, educa tion***}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e** - [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
being education*** [4 categories, top university education as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
--------------------- Variables in the Equation---------------------
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 139,8844 3 ,0000 , 1508
0-16 6547 , 1337 23,9872 1 , 0000 -,0611
17-39 , 5990 , 1012 35,0586 1 , 0000 , 0749
40-59 ,5587 , 0948 34,7488 1 ,0000 , 0746
HNG , 6962 , 0845 67,9294 1 ,0000 , 1058
ACUTE , 2097 , 1174 3,1936 1 , 0739 , 0142
LIMCRO , 9954 , 1195 69,3823 1 , 0000 , 1070
INCOME 42,9733 , 0000 , 0771
INCOME(1) -,7186 , 1194 36,2176 1 , 0000 -,0762
INCOME(2) -,6329 , 1159 29,8237 1 , 0000 -,0687
INCOME(3) -,5206 , 1153 20,4003 1 , 0000 -,0559
INCOME(4) -,3314 , 1145 8,3786 1 , 0038 -,0329
EDUCATION 25,2101 , 0000 ,0571
EDUCATION(1) -,8636 , 1866 21,4235 1 , 0000 -,0574
EDUCATION(2) -,4653 , 1561 8,8895 1 , 0029 -,0342
EDUCATION(3) -,5743 , 1803 10,1459 1 ,0014 -,0372
Constant -,0980 , 0622 2,4849 1 , 1149
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 5196 , 3999 , 6752
17-39 1,8203 1,4929 2,2195
40-59 1,7484 1,4520 2,1053
HNG 2,0062 1,7000 2,3674
ACUTE 1,2333 , 9799 1,5523
LIMCRO 2, 7059 2,1409 3,4201
INCOME(1) , 4874 , 3857 , 6160
INCOME(2) , 5310 , 4231 , 6665
INCOME(3) , 5942 , 4740 , 7448
INCOME(4) , 7179 , 5737 , 8985
EDUCATION(1) , 4216 , 2925 , 6078
EDUCATION(2) , 6280 , 4625 , 8526
EDUCATION(3) ,5631 ,3954 , 8018
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B.3. Logistic regressions and inpatient care utilisation.
Dependent variable: IP 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income, education)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: IP — f {age*, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income**, education***} 
being age* =*[4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
being education*** [4 categories, top university education as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
--------------------- Variables in the Equation----------------------
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 44,8213 3 , 0000 ,0864
0-16 -1,0391 , 2108 24,3030 1 , 0000 -,0655
17-39 -,1869 , 1129 2,7384 1 , 0980 -,0119
40-59 -,5712 , 1094 27,2717 1 , 0000 -,0697
GENDER -,1624 , 0810 4,0243 1 , 0448 -,0197
HNG , 5852 , 0919 40,5661 1 , 0000 , 0861
ACUTE , 0966 , 1179 , 6716 1 , 4125 , 0000
LIMCRO 1,4305 , 1007 201,7565 1 , 0000 , 1959
INCOME 1,2714 , 8662 , 0000
INCOME(1) , 0108 , 1417 ,0058 1 , 9394 , 0000
INCOME(2) -,0051 , 1370 , 0014 1 , 9704 , 0000
INCOME(3) -,1102 , 1382 , 6361 1 , 4251 , 0000
INCOME(4) -,0614 , 1340 ,2104 1 , 6465 , 0000
EDUCATION 3,9363 , 2684 , 0000
EDUCATION(1) -,1963 , 1921 1,0442 1 , 3068 , 0000
EDUCATION(2) -,2670 , 1569 2,8956 1 , 0888 -,0131
EDUCATION(3) -,3443 , 1956 3,0980 1 , 0784 -,0145
Constant -2,7117 , 1397 376,8787 1 , 0000
Variable Exp(B)
95% Cl for 
Lower
Exp(B) 
Upper
0-16 , 3538 ,2341 , 5347
17-39 , 8296 , 6648 1,0351
40-59 , 5648 , 4558 , 6999
GENDER ,8501 ,7253 , 9963
HNG 1,7954 1,4995 2,1496
ACUTE 1,1015 , 8742 1,3878
LIMCRO 4,1808 3,4319 5,0932
INCOME(1) 1,0108 ,7657 1,3345
INCOME(2) , 9949 ,7606 1,3014
INCOME(3) , 8956 , 6831 1,1743
INCOME(4) , 9404 ,7232 1,2228
EDUCATION(1) , 8218 , 5640 1,1974
EDUCATION(2) , 7657 , 5630 1,0414
EDUCATION(3) , 7087 , 4830 1,0399
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Dependent variable: IP
File: Catalonia (MALES)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, acute, limcro, income, education)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: IP - f  {age*,hng, acute, limcro, income**, education***}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
being education*** [4 categories, top university education as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
--------------------- Variables in the Equation----------------------
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 46,3606 3 , 0000 , 1249
0-16 -1,1475 ,2729 17,6871 1 , 0000 -,0779
17-39 -1,0147 , 1730 34,3914 1 , 0000 -,1119
40-59 -,8036 , 1555 26,7182 1 , 0000 -,0978
HNG , 8262 , 1252 43,5514 1 , 0000 , 1268
ACUTE , 1130 , 1812 , 3891 1 ,5328 , 0000
LIMCRO 2,1462 , 1598 180,3010 1 , 0000 ,2626
INCOME 3,8000 , 4337 , 0000
INCOME(1) , 3282 , 2198 2,2291 1 , 1354 , 0094
INCOME(2) , 4004 ,2078 3,7119 1 , 0540 , 0257
INCOME(3) , 2618 ,2087 1,5727 1 ,2098 , 0000
INCOME(4) ,2720 ,2033 1,7904 1 , 1809 , 0000
EDUCATION , 0780 , 9943 , 0000
EDUCATION(1) , 0127 , 2966 , 0018 1 , 9658 , 0000
EDUCATION(2) -,0120 ,2530 , 0023 1 , 9621 , 0000
EDUCATION(3) , 0449 , 3140 , 0204 1 , 8863 , 0000
Constant -3,1241 , 1185 694,8359 1 ,0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 3174 , 1859 ,5419
17-39 ,3625 , 2583 , 5089
40-59 , 4477 , 3301 , 6072
HNG 2,2847 1,7875 2,9201
ACUTE 1,1197 , 7850 1,5970
LIMCRO 8,5525 6,2523 11,6989
INCOME(1) 1,3884 , 9025 2,1360
INCOME(2) 1,4924 , 9931 2,2428
INCOME(3) 1,2992 , 8630 1,9560
INCOME(4) 1,3126 , 8812 1,9551
EDUCATION(1) 1,0128 , 5663 1,8114
EDUCATION(2) , 9881 , 6018 1,6222
EDUCATION(3) 1,0459 , 5653 1,9352
302
Dependent variable: IP
File: Catalonia (FEMALES)
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income, education)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: IP = f {age*, gender, hng, acute, limcro, income**, education***} 
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
being education*** [4 categories, top university education as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
--------------------- Variables in the Equation ---------------------
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 44,2103 3 , 0000 , 1209
0-16 -1,1311 , 3511 10,3813 1 , 0013 -,0566
17-39 , 4473 , 1647 7,3787 1 ,0066 , 0454
40-59 -,3936 , 1622 5,8863 1 , 0153 -,0386
HNG , 3910 , 1350 8,3916 1 , 0038 , 0494
ACUTE , 0992 , 1574 , 3975 1 , 5284 , 0000
LIMCRO 1,2131 , 1356 79,9805 1 , 0000 , 1727
INCOME 11,2663 , 0237 , 0353
INCOME(1) -,1773 , 1872 , 8977 1 , 3434 , 0000
INCOME(2) -,4585 , 1896 5,8464 1 , 0156 -,0384
INCOME(3) -,4967 , 1920 6,6971 1 ,0097 -,0424
INCOME(4) -,4316 , 1864 5,3617 1 , 0206 -,0359
EDUCATION 6,2948 , 0981 , 0106
EDUCATION(1) -,1118 ,2618 , 1823 1 , 6694 , 0000
EDUCATION(2) -,3364 ,2082 2,6109 1 , 1061 -,0153
EDUCATION(3) -,5357 , 2585 4,2936 1 , 0383 -,0296
Constant -2,9753 , 1233 582,2031 1 , 0000
95% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 3227 , 1622 , 6421
17-39 1,5640 1,1326 2,1598
40-59 , 6746 , 4908 , 9271
HNG 1,4784 1,1348 1,9261
ACUTE 1,1043 , 8112 1,5032
LIMCRO 3,3640 2,5786 4,3885
INCOME(1) , 8375 , 5803 1,2086
INCOME(2) , 6322 , 4360 , 9168
INCOME(3) , 6085 ,4177 , 8865
INCOME(4) , 6495 , 4508 , 9359
EDUCATION(1) , 8942 , 5353 1,4938
EDUCATION(2) ,7143 , 4750 1,0743
EDUCATION(3) , 5853 , 3526 , 9714
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ANNEX C.
Logistic Regressions Models: Output III.
C.1. Logistic regressions and primary care utilisation.
Dependent variable: PC 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: P C -f {age*, gender, hng, incom e**}
being age* - [4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e**- [5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig
AGE 310, 5162 3 , 0000
0-16 , 3328 , 0884 14, 1831 1 , 0002
17-39 -,7401 , 0733 101, 8810 1 , 0000
40-59 -,7167 , 0734 95, 3808 1 , 0000
GENDER ,2048 , 0474 18, 6806 1 , 0000
HNG , 9354 , 0671 194, 4035 1 , 0000
INCOME 22, 1623 , 0002
INCOME(1) ,2946 , 0821 12, 8750 1 , 0003
INCOME(2) , 2660 , 0754 12, 4469 1 , 0004
INCOME(3) , 0292 , 0706 1708 1 , 6794
INCOME(4) ,0931 , 0696 1, 7875 1 , 1812
Constant , 6833 , 0738 85, 7204 1 , 0000
99% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 1,3948 1,1109 1,7513
17-39 , 4771 ,3950 ,5763
40-59 , 4884 , 4043 , 5900
GENDER 1,2273 1,0863 1,3866
HNG 2,5482 2,1438 3,0288
INCOME(1) 1,3425 1,0867 1,6587
INCOME(2) 1,3047 1,0744 1,5844
INCOME(3) 1,0296 , 8584 1,2349
INCOME(4) 1,0976 , 9174 1,3132
R
1612
0322
0923
0893
0377
1282
0348
0305
0299
0000
0000
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Dependent variable: PC
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: PC=*f {age*, hng, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** =-[5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 187,7954 3 , 0000 , 1711
0-16 , 2802 , 1192 5,5240 1 , 0188 , 0238
17-39 -,8481 , 0985 74,1694 1 , 0000 -,1078
40-59 -,7849 , 0992 62,6112 1 , 0000 -,0988
HNG , 7738 , 0935 68,4759 1 , 0000 , 1035
INCOME 9,2651 4 , 0548 , 0143
INCOME(1) , 2485 , 1145 4,7141 1 , 0299 , 0209
INCOME(2) , 1080 , 1013 1,1357 1 ,2866 , 0000
INCOME(3) -,0705 , 0941 , 5617 1 , 4536 , 0000
INCOME(4) , 0983 , 0922 1,1380 1 ,2861 , 0000
Constant , 9160 , 0378 587,8108 1 ,0000
99% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 1,3234 , 9735 1,7991
17-39 , 4282 ,3323 , 5519
40-59 , 4562 , 3533 , 5890
HNG 2,1680 1,7039 2,7585
INCOME(1) 1,2821 , 9547 1,7217
INCOME(2) 1,1140 , 8581 1,4462
INCOME(3) , 9319 , 7314 1,1875
INCOME(4) 1,1033 , 8702 1,3989
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Dependent variable: PC
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: PC=f {age*, hng, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 128,0093 3 , 0000 , 1495
0-16 , 4042 , 1321 9,3684 1 , 0022 , 0367
17-39 -,6086 , 1103 30,4350 1 , 0000 -,0722
40-59 -,6549 , 1095 35,7813 1 , 0000 -,0786
HNG 1,1019 , 0966 130,0513 1 , 0000 , 1531
INCOME 21,1164 , 0003 , 0490
INCOME(1) , 3680 , 1190 9,5566 1 , 0020 ,0372
INCOME(2) , 4605 , 1135 16,4726 1 , 0000 , 0515
INCOME(3) , 1578 , 1071 2,1720 1 , 1405 , 0056
INCOME(4) , 0930 , 1062 ,7675 1 ,3810 , 0000
Constant 1,0519 ,0414 644,6805 1 , 0000
99% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 1,4981 1,0661 2,1051
17-39 , 5441 , 4095 , 7229
40-59 , 5195 , 3918 , 6887
HNG 3,0099 2,3467 3,8604
INCOME(1) 1,4448 1,0633 1,9632
INCOME(2) 1,5849 1,1832 2,1230
INCOME(3) 1,1710 , 8887 1,5429
INCOME(4) 1,0975 , 8349 1,4426
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C.2. Logistic regressions and specialist care utilisation.
Dependent variable: SC 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: P C -f {age*, gender, hng, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 144,6887 3 ,0000 , 0989
0-16 -,5488 , 0721 57,9431 1 , 0000 -,0628
17-39 , 1936 , 0624 9,6178 1 ,0019 , 0232
40-59 , 0820 ,0611 1,8040 1 , 1792 , 0000
GENDER , 6891 , 0418 271,2331 1 , 0000 , 1377
HNG , 9251 , 0527 307,6862 1 , 0000 , 1468
INCOME 85,4810 , 0000 , 0739
INCOME(1) -,6066 , 0718 71,3574 1 , 0000 -,0699
INCOME(2) -,4627 , 0676 46,8032 1 , 0000 -,0562
INCOME(3) -,4225 , 0660 41,0368 1 , 0000 -,0524
INCOME(4) -,2297 , 0650 12,4712 1 ,0004 -,0272
Constant -1,4651 , 0675 470,7505 1 , 0000
99% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 5776 , 4797 , 6955
17-39 1,2136 1,0333 1,4254
40-59 1,0855 , 9275 1,2705
GENDER 1,9919 1,7884 2,2185
HNG 2,5221 2,2018 2,8891
INCOME(1) , 5452 , 4531 , 6560
INCOME(2) , 6296 , 5289 , 7494
INCOME(3) , 6554 , 5530 ,7768
INCOME(4) ,7948 , 6722 , 9397
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Dependent variable: SC
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: P C -f {age*, hng, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 26,4949 3 , 0000 , 0545
0-16 -,3605 , 0978 13,5816 1 , 0002 -,0410
17-39 -,3429 , 0871 15,4912 1 ,0001 -,0442
40-59 -,4222 , 0867 23,7124 1 , 0000 -,0561
HNG 1,0094 , 0754 179,0463 1 , 0000 , 1603
INCOME 30,1067 ,0000 ,0566
INCOME(1) -,4708 , 1024 21,1457 1 , 0000 -,0527
INCOME(2) -,3616 , 0943 14,6906 1 , 0001 -,0429
INCOME(3) -,4196 , 0912 21,1650 1 , 0000 -,0527
INCOME(4) -,2503 , 0879 8,1070 1 , 0044 -,0298
Constant -,7296 , 0348 440,4630 1 , 0000
99% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 6973 , 5420 , 8972
17-39 ,7097 , 5671 , 8883
40-59 , 6556 , 5244 , 8197
HNG 2,7439 2,2593 3,3324
INCOME(1) , 6245 , 4798 , 8130
INCOME(2) , 6966 , 5463 , 8882
INCOME(3) , 6573 , 5197 , 8314
INCOME(4) , 7786 , 6209 , 9764
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Dependent variable: SC
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: P C -f {age*, hng, incom e**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income* * = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 305,9775 3 , 0000 ,2071
0-16 -,7606 , 1051 52,3995 1 , 0000 -,0849
17-39 ,7038 , 0913 59,4462 1 , 0000 ,0906
40-59 ,5903 , 0875 45,5411 1 , 0000 , 0789
HNG , 8735 , 0752 134,8707 1 , 0000 , 1378
INCOME 72,9189 , 0000 ,0963
INCOME(1) -,7956 , 1052 57,2011 1 , 0000 -,0888
INCOME(2) -,7094 , 1019 48,4763 1 , 0000 -,0815
INCOME(3) -,5565 , 1012 30,2461 1 , 0000 -,0635
INCOME(4) -,2939 , 1028 8,1803 1 , 0042 -,0297
Constant -,0991 , 0367 7,2778 1 , 0070
99% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 4674 , 3566 , 6127
17-39 2,0215 1,5979 2,5574
40-59 1,8046 1,4405 2,2606
HNG 2,3953 1,9734 2,9073
INCOME(1) , 4513 , 3442 ,5918
INCOME(2) , 4920 ,3784 , 6396
INCOME(3) , 5732 , 4417 , 7439
INCOME(4) , 7453 , 5720 , 9712
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C.3. Logistic regressions and inpatient care utilisation.
Dependent variable: IP 
File: Catalonia
Variables in the model: Age, gender, hng, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: P C -f {age*, gender, hng, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 27,3158 3 , 0000 , 0598
0-16 -,5189 , 1344 14,9154 1 , 0001 -,0466
17-39 -,0797 , 1030 , 5983 1 , 4392 , 0000
40-59 -,3952 , 1016 15,1396 1 , 0001 -,0470
GENDER -,0527 , 0726 , 5264 1 , 4681 , 0000
HNG , 8739 , 0825 112,2747 1 , 0000 , 1360
INCOME 2,0831 , 7205 , 0000
INCOME(1) -,0297 , 1229 , 0585 1 , 8089 , 0000
INCOME(2) -,0616 , 1201 , 2629 1 , 6081 , 0000
INCOME(3) -,1590 , 1218 1,7047 1 , 1917 , 0000
INCOME(4) -,0382 , 1194 , 1023 1 , 7491 , 0000
Constant -2,6559 , 1167 517,7620 1 , 0000
99% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 5952 , 4210 , 8413
17-39 , 9234 , 7082 1,2040
40-59 , 6736 , 5185 , 8750
GENDER , 9487 , 7868 1,1438
HNG 2,3962 1,9376 2,9634
INCOME(1) , 9707 , 7073 1,3322
INCOME(2) , 9403 , 6901 1,2811
INCOME(3) , 8530 , 6233 1,1673
INCOME(4) , 9625 , 7078 1,3090
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Dependent variable: IP
File: Catalonia (MALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: P C -f {age*, hng, incom e**}
being age* - [ 4  categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being incom e** = [5 categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 19,1544 3 ,0003 , 0667
0-16 -,3534 , 1711 4,2685 1 , 0388 -,0277
17-39 -,6367 , 1536 17,1909 1 , 0000 -,0717
40-59 -,4368 , 1401 9,7244 1 ,0018 -,0511
HNG 1,0253 , 1153 79,0336 1 ,0000 , 1615
INCOME 3,9169 ,4174 , 0000
INCOME(1) , 1419 , 1844 , 5920 1 ,4416 , 0000
INCOME(2) , 2793 , 1739 2,5802 1 , 1082 , 0140
INCOME(3) , 1012 , 1782 , 3226 1 ,5701 , 0000
INCOME(4) ,2689 , 1720 2,4448 1 , 1179 , 0123
Constant -2,7534 , 0677 1655,873 1 , 0000
99% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 7023 , 4520 1,0911
17-39 , 5290 ,3562 , 7857
40-59 , 6461 , 4504 , 9268
HNG 2,7880 2,0714 3,7524
INCOME(1) 1,1525 ,7166 1,8533
INCOME(2) 1,3222 , 8449 2,0692
INCOME(3) 1,1065 , 6993 1,7508
INCOME(4) 1,3086 , 8402 2,0380
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Dependent variable: IP
File: Catalonia (FEMALE)
Variables in the model: Age, hng, income)
Method: Forcing all variable in.
Model: P C -f {age*, hng, incom e**}
being age* = [4 categories, 60 years-old or more as a reference] 
being income** - [ 5  categories, top income level as reference group] 
Reference category: last category
Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R
AGE 48,1025 3 ,0000 , 1184
0-16 -,7617 ,2199 12,0016 1 , 0005 -,0577
17-39 , 3993 , 1459 7,4937 1 ,0062 , 0428
40-59 -,3134 , 1484 4,4585 1 , 0347 -,0286
HNG , 7629 , 1179 41,9039 1 , 0000 , 1153
INCOME 11,3462 ,0229 , 0334
INCOME(1) -,1715 , 1656 1,0728 1 ,3003 , 0000
INCOME(2) -,4436 , 1696 6,8418 1 ,0089 -,0401
INCOME(3) -,4293 , 1694 6,4185 1 ,0113 -,0384
INCOME(4) -,3815 , 1698 5,0469 1 , 0247 -,0318
Constant -2,7875 , 0765 1328,656 1 , 0000
99% Cl for Exp(B)
Variable Exp(B) Lower Upper
0-16 , 4669 ,2650 , 8225
17-39 1,4909 1,0239 2,1708
40-59 , 7310 , 4988 1,0713
HNG 2,1445 1,5830 2,9052
INCOME(1) , 8424 , 5499 1,2905
INCOME(2) , 6417 , 4146 , 9933
INCOME(3) , 6510 , 4208 1,0072
INCOME(4) , 6828 , 4409 1,0575
312
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ANNEX D. 
Gender and Age Distribution and Income Level in Catalonia
TOTAL MALE FEMALE
Income 1
0-16 11.3 51.3 48.7
17-39 14.2 46.9 53.1
40-59 17.9 38.0 62.0
60 or over 56.6 38.5 61.5
Income 2
0-16 16.4 47.9 52.1
17-39 22.8 45.9 54.1
40-59 25.2 46.5 53.5
60 or over 35.6 52.3 47.7
Income 3
0-16 20.6 50.2 49.8
17-39 31.9 51.2 48.8
40-59 26.2 49.2 50.8
60 or over 21.3 54.9 45.1
Income 4
0-16 21.0 53.8 46.2
17-39 38.0 51.3 48.7
40-59 29.6 58.4 41.6
60 or over 11.4 56.8 43.2
Income 5
0-16 21.6 50.6 49.4
17-39 42.5 55.5 44.5
40-59 29.2 62.3 37.7
60 or over 6.7 61.3 38.7
Source: Catalan Health Survey (ESCA), 1996.
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ANNEX E.
Chronic Clinical Conditions and Income Level in Catalonia.
Emboly 
Asthma 
Diabetes 
Cataracts 
Heart disease  
Skin 
Bronchitis 
Ulcers 
Urinary 
Constipation 
High Cholesterol 
Depression 
Allergies 
Varicose veins 
High pressure 
Arthrosis
Source: Catalan Health Survey (ESCA), 1996.
Group-e
Group-d
Group-c
Group-b
Group-a
12
%
15 18 21 24
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